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Thought experiments (TEs) are important tools in science, used to both undermine and 
support theories, and communicate and explain complex phenomena. Their interest within 
philosophy of science has been dominated by a narrow question: How do TEs increase 
knowledge? My aim is to push beyond this to consider their broader value in scientific 
practice. I do this through an investigation into the scientific imagination. Part one explores 
questions regarding TEs as “experiments in the imagination” via a debate concerning the 
epistemic status of computer simulations in science. I outline how, against Hacking, TEs 
also have “a life of their own” and I argue against accounts that privilege experiments over 
simulations (and by extension TEs) in light of their capacity to surprise in a productive way. 
Part two develops a pluralist account of the nature of the imagination in science. At its core, 
my view is that when we attend to a number of examples of TEs and consider the context in 
which they are used, we see that TEs engage a variety of our imaginative capacities. Existing 
monistic views fail to recognise the richness of the imagination and its potential in science. 
Part three looks to the “beauty” of TEs which is currently overlooked in the aesthetics of 
science literature. I put forward a new account that demonstrates the epistemic value of 
aesthetic features in science by showing how an appropriate fit between form and content 
enhances the usability of a TE, and its effectiveness as a prompt for our imagination. This 
also enables a more nuanced take on the proposed similarities between TEs and literary 
fictions. In the concluding chapter, I outline ways in which the core features of my account 
can be extended beyond TEs to illuminate the significance of the imagination and aesthetic 







Acknowledgements _________________________________________________________ iii 
Abstract ___________________________________________________________________ v 
Contents _________________________________________________________________ vi 
List of Figures ___________________________________________________________ viii 
Introduction _______________________________________________________________ 1 
1. Thought Experiments and Experiments ____________________________________ 11 
 Introduction ___________________________________________________________ 11 
 Thought Experiments, Experiments and Computer Simulations ________________ 12 
 The Life of an Experiment _______________________________________________ 17 
1.3.1 The Evolution of Experiments _____________________________________________________ 19 
1.3.2 The Robustness of Experimental Results _____________________________________________ 20 
1.3.3 Experiments Can Precede Theory __________________________________________________ 21 
 The Life of a Thought Experiment ________________________________________ 21 
1.4.1 The Evolution of Thought Experiments ______________________________________________ 22 
1.4.2 The Robustness of Thought Experiments ____________________________________________ 25 
1.4.3 Thought Experiments Can Precede Theory ___________________________________________ 27 
 Conclusion ____________________________________________________________ 30 
2. Privileging Experiments ________________________________________________ 31 
 Introduction ___________________________________________________________ 31 
 The Materiality Thesis __________________________________________________ 31 
 The Value of Surprise ___________________________________________________ 37 
 Surprise and Confoundment in Thought Experiments ________________________ 41 
2.4.1 Brown’s View: Thought Experiments and Platonism ___________________________________ 42 
2.4.2 Norton’s View: Thought Experiments are Arguments ___________________________________ 44 
 Thought Experiments, the Imagination and Surprise _________________________ 50 
 Conclusion ____________________________________________________________ 55 
3. The Scientific Imagination ______________________________________________ 58 
 Introduction ___________________________________________________________ 58 
 Science and the Imagination ______________________________________________ 59 
 Models as Fictions ______________________________________________________ 62 
 The Varieties of Imagination _____________________________________________ 67 
 Thought Experiments and Imagery ________________________________________ 70 
 The Propositional Alternative ____________________________________________ 75 
 Propositional Imagination and Argumentation ______________________________ 80 
 Conclusion ____________________________________________________________ 83 
4. A Pluralist Account of the Imagination in Science ___________________________ 85 




 Thought Experiments, Models and Mental Images ___________________________ 85 
 Invitations to Imagine ___________________________________________________ 91 
 The Case for Pluralism __________________________________________________ 95 
4.4.1 Propositional Imagination ________________________________________________________ 95 
4.4.2 Objectual Imagination ___________________________________________________________ 96 
 Conclusion ___________________________________________________________ 104 
5. The Aesthetics of Science: The Case of Thought Experiments _________________ 105 
 Introduction __________________________________________________________ 105 
 The Cognitive Value of Literature ________________________________________ 107 
 Disanologies Between Literature and Thought Experiments __________________ 112 
 The Beauty of Thought Experiments ______________________________________ 117 
 Problems for Aesthetics of Science ________________________________________ 121 
 Conclusion ___________________________________________________________ 124 
6. The Aesthetic and Literary Qualities of Thought Experiments _________________ 125 
 Introduction __________________________________________________________ 125 
 Form and Content in Aesthetics __________________________________________ 126 
 The Formulation of Thought Experiments _________________________________ 129 
 Interpretation of Scientific and Artistic Representations _____________________ 135 
 Selecting the Right Examples ____________________________________________ 139 
6.5.1 The Thought Experiment Genre ___________________________________________________ 140 
6.5.2 Speculative Fiction _____________________________________________________________ 142 
6.5.3 Fables and Parables ____________________________________________________________ 144 
 Conclusion ___________________________________________________________ 148 
Conclusion ______________________________________________________________ 149 




List of Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: A picture proof (from Brown 2004a) ......................................................................... 3 
Figure 2: Bohr’s “pseudorealistic drawing”of the clock in the box (from Bohr 1949) ........... 24 
Figure 3: Bohr’s depiction of Einstein’s clock in the box (from Bohr 1949) .......................... 24 






Thought Experiments in Science 
Philosophical discussions of the imagination have been primarily located in the philosophy 
of mind and aesthetics and until recently, rarely discussed in the case of science. My project 
sets out to show that thought experiments are an excellent case study for thinking about the 
value of the imagination across the sciences. This is because thought experiments directly 
appeal to the imagination and have led to significant scientific advances.  
Famous examples of thought experiments include Galileo’s falling bodies, Einstein’s 
elevator, Darwin’s “imaginary illustrations”, Schrödinger’s cat, Newton’s bucket and 
Maxwell’s demon, to name just a few. Thought experiments are not limited to the sciences. 
Their use in philosophy is well known, and they can also be found in history, mathematics, 
political theory and theology. Additionally (as I discuss in chapter 5) some artworks have 
also been described as thought experiments, which, it is argued, explains how many of us 
come away from great works of literature or films with a sense that we have gained 
something of epistemic value.  
What is a thought experiment? There is no accepted definition, but as Brown states, we 
‘recognize them when we see them’ (2011, 1). They often take a narrative form and begin 
with a description of a hypothetical scenario. We imagine the state of affairs in order to “see” 
or determine what would happen if such a scenario were to occur, and the conclusions that 
we draw from them are taken to tell us something beyond the particulars of the case. Many 
(but not all) thought experiments would be impossible to conduct as a physical experiment. 
Perhaps a precise definition can be given, and throughout the thesis, I compare thought 
experiments with other features of scientific practice, including experiments, computer 
simulations and models more generally, in order to highlight thought experiments’ 
distinctive qualities. However, like Brown, I think it is best to proceed with examples from 
different areas of science rather than to put strict boundaries on what constitutes a thought 
experiment. 
While their use can be seen throughout history, and they have been the subject of 
philosophical interest in the works of Kant and Lichtenberg amongst others (Fehige and 
Stuart 2014), the term “thought experiment” was not coined until the eighteenth century. 




his paper “Über Gedankenexperimente” (“On Thought Experiments”) (ibid.). Furthermore, 
the discussion of thought experiments in the philosophy of science did not really take off 
until the late 1980s with a debate between Brown and Norton which continues to shape the 
literature to this day. Brown and Norton are each concerned with what is often known as 
Kuhn’s (1977) “paradox” or “puzzle” of thought experiments (Stuart et. al. 2018, 9). This is 
the question of how thought experiments can provide new information about the world. 
Kuhn’s original question was: ‘How, then, relying exclusively upon familiar data, can a 
thought experiment lead to new knowledge or to a new understanding of nature?’ (1977, 
241).  
With Kuhn, Brown and Norton agree that thought experiments can provide knowledge of 
the world. Further, they each take it that their positions represent the only possible ways of 
responding to Kuhn’s question. But that is about as far as their agreement goes.  
According to Brown (1986, 2004a, 2004b, 2011), there is a class of thought experiments that 
allow us to ‘intuit the laws of nature’ which exist as platonic objects in an abstract realm. In 
particular, Brown holds that natural laws are necessary relations between universals, as 
proposed by the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong (DTA) theory and rejects the Humean line that 
the laws of nature are merely regularities. As Tooley states ‘the fact that universals stand in 
certain relationships may logically necessitate some corresponding generalization about 
particulars, and that when this is the case, the generalization in question expresses a law’ 
(1977, 672). Brown therefore commits to a governing conception of laws; they ‘necessitate 
the regularities that we experience in the empirical world’ (2004b, 1131). 
Brown’s view is a rationalist approach to thought experiments; they enable us to learn new 
things about the world independently of empirical evidence, that is, simply by thinking about 
a scenario. He states that intuitions ‘are nonsensory perceptions of abstract entities. Because 
they do not involve the senses, they transcend experience, and give us a priori knowledge of 
the laws of nature’ (2004a, 34). He compares his view to Gödel’s mathematical platonism. 
For Gödel, mathematical objects such as numbers and sets are “real” entities that exist 
independently of human minds. Both Brown and Gödel draw analogies with ordinary 
perception; although not a sensory experience, we perceive some mathematical propositions 
as truths, or perceive the laws of nature through our faculty of intuition. This is thus a seeing 
with the “mind’s eye”. In chapter 2 I consider a further connection between these two views 




Brown states that contra Norton’s view, discussed below, the process of a thought 
experiment cannot be reduced to an argument. To support the view that sometimes we can 
“see” the truth, Brown provides examples used in mathematics such as the “picture proof” 
for the theorem ‘n2/2 + 1/2n = 1 + 2 + 3 + …n’ and argues that in such cases, we are not 








Analogously, when we conduct a thought experiment we see why the results must follow, 
rather than inferring this via argumentation (Brown 2004a, 32). Brown presents Galileo’s 
famous thought experiment against Aristotle as an illustrative example. The thought 
experiment undermines Aristotle’s theory that heavier bodies fall faster than lighter ones by 
a reductio ad absurdum, and also generates a new theory, making it, what Brown labels, 
both a destructive and a constructive thought experiment. Galileo asks us to imagine 
attaching two balls together, a heavy cannonball and a lighter musket ball, and dropping 
them from the leaning tower of Pisa. What does Aristotle’s theory predict? Both that the 
combined balls will fall faster than the heavier one on its own, as the combined object is 
heavier, and that the combined object will fall slower, as the lighter ball is inclined to fall 
slower and so, will drag the heavier body back. From this, Galileo proposes a new theory; 
all objects fall at the same speed. 
Brown emphasises that not only does this thought experiment undermine Aristotle’s theory 
by a reductio ad absurdum, it also plays a constructive role. That is, it proposes the basis of 
a new theory of motion—that all objects fall at the same rate. And he claims that no new 
empirical data is being used when we move from Aristotle to Galileo’s theory, nor does the 
thought experiment illustrate a logical truth. Therefore, the argument goes, with platonist 
thought experiments, that is, ones which have the capacity to refute one theory (by exposing 




its inconsistency) whilst proposing another, we are given a priori knowledge of nature. I 
come back to this example and Brown’s analysis of it in chapter 2. 
Norton has dismissed Brown’s approach as ‘epistemic magic’ and aims to provide an 
empiricist alternative (2004, 44). As mentioned, Norton’s key focus is to answer Kuhn’s 
“puzzle” of thought experiments. Norton phrases the issue as the ‘epistemological problem’ 
of thought experiments which he outlines as the following question: ‘Thought experiments 
are supposed to give us knowledge of the natural world. From where does this knowledge 
come?’ (ibid.). In response, Norton has defended a view in which thought experiments are 
arguments, although often disguised in a more “picturesque” form (1991, 1996, 2004).  
More precisely, Norton states that thought experiments are arguments which ‘(i) posit 
hypothetical or counterfactual states of affairs, and (ii) involve particulars irrelevant to the 
generality of the conclusion’ (1991, 129). Thought experiments transform what we already 
know (whether explicitly or tacitly) through deduction and/or induction. The outcome of a 
thought experiment is reliable only insofar as the reorganisation of existing knowledge 
preserves the truth of the premises, or in inductive cases, there is a strong chance of its 
preservation. To support his view, Norton has reconstructed many thought experiments into 
arguments, where the result is stated as a conclusion, and he claims that this process can 
extend to any example. Norton outlines two ways in which thought experiments should be 
thought of as arguments: 
‘(Ia) (Context of justification) All thought experiments can be reconstructed as 
arguments based on tacit or explicit assumptions. Belief in the outcome-conclusion of 
the thought experiment is justified only insofar as the reconstructed argument can 
justify the conclusion. 
(1b) (Context of discovery) The actual conduct of a thought experiment consists of the 
execution of an argument, although this may not be obvious, since the argument may 
appear only in abbreviated form and with suppressed premises’ (2004, 50). 
Norton’s (1a), can be further outlined as comprising two claims. Firstly, the “reconstruction 
thesis” holds that all thought experiments can be reconstructed as arguments by filling in 
their assumptions. Secondly, the “elimination thesis” entails that the particularities of a 
thought experiment have no epistemic force. Norton does not mention any role for the 
imagination, mental imagery, intuition, nor for their narrative structure, arguing that there is 




factors are merely picturesque qualities and can be eliminated without losing anything 
epistemically relevant. 
Although they have shaped the discussion, neither Brown nor Norton’s view have gained 
much support. Brown’s view is rejected in light of its controversial platonism regarding the 
metaphysics and epistemology of the laws of nature. Further, his account applies to only a 
few cases. Although I will come back to Norton’s account at various points throughout the 
thesis, it is worth mentioning some of the worries positioned against his view. 
Some have accepted some version of (1a), arguing that insofar as a thought experiment can 
play a justificatory role, they must provide an argument, or at least, they agree that 
representing thought experiments as arguments can be an illuminating way of checking the 
quality of the inferences involved in their conduct. But this does not commit us to Norton’s 
(1b), that is, the claim that the performance of a thought experiment just is that of an 
argument. Häggqvist highlights that argumentation is also important to concrete 
experiments, the results of which can also be set out in argument form, yet we do not class 
experiments as arguments (2009, 61). Further, many have highlighted, with Brown, that the 
phenomenology of conducting a thought experiment is very different than a reconstructed 
argument. And this can be maintained whilst rejecting the claim that thought experiments 
are “windows to Plato’s heaven” as on Brown’s view. One way to articulate this is to focus 
on the imagination and/or “mental models” (Nersessian 1992, 2007). It  has also been pointed 
out how a reconstructed argument version of a thought experiment lacks features that form 
part of the epistemic value of the example when conducted in its original form. We shall see 
this in chapter 2 via Gendler’s (1998) criticism of Norton.  
A further source of worry is that Norton’s view has changed over the years and is a ‘moving 
target’ (Brendel 2018, 283; Stuart 2016b). Norton’s initial formulation of the view was 
restricted to deductive and inductive reasoning, but in later papers, in order to reconstruct 
many thought experiments, Norton has expanded this to include inferences to the best 
explanation, informal logics, diagrams, and arguments from analogy (1996, 2004). A case 
of the latter is Freiling’s “refutation” of the continuum hypothesis which crucially involves 
‘some kind of visual or figurative evidence’, namely an analogy to throwing darts at a 
dartboard (Brendel 2018, 286; see also Norton 2004). The problem is that Norton’s view has 
been modified so much that any thought experiment can be reconstructed into an argument 




thought experiments can also be reconstructed as arguments ‘a good deal less impressive’ 
(2016b, 453). 
And so, there are difficulties with the two major approaches to thought experiments. Further, 
as previously mentioned, Norton and Brown are interested in a narrow question regarding 
thought experiments: How do they give us knowledge? But as I have already indicated, 
thought experiments play a variety of roles in science, and I set out to illuminate those that 
go beyond increasing knowledge. Now that we have an understanding of the contours of the 
central debate on thought experiments, I’ll outline the thesis that follows.  
 
Thesis Outline 
The first part of my thesis explores the sense in which thought experiments can be considered 
“experiments” in the imagination. Since Mach, there has been a set of views that treat thought 
experiments as genuinely experimental, pointing out that thought experiments also work by 
what is called “the method of variation”. I outline how a parallel debate occurs in the 
literature on computer simulation methods and that drawing on this debate can allow us to 
make progress in our comparisons between thought experiments and ordinary, physical 
experiments.  
In chapter 1, I consider the claim that experiments have a “life of their own” independent of 
theory, which motivates an epistemology of experiments. I outline the central features that 
give experiments a “life” through a prominent account of experiments provided by Hacking 
(1983). In a short paper on thought experiments, Hacking (1992) denies that thought 
experiments have a life of their own. Rather, he claims, they are “icons”. Unlike experiments, 
the argument goes, thought experiments do not evolve and their role is limited to the tension 
that they were designed to expose. I present three ways in which Hacking claims that 
experiments have a life independent of theory, and I demonstrate that thought experiments 
also have a life according to these criteria.  
In chapter 2, I consider two arguments for the privileging of experiments over computer 
simulations: The materiality thesis and the argument from surprise. A major proponent of 
both of these arguments is Mary Morgan (2003, 2005). The materiality thesis claims that 
there is an essential difference concerning the relation between the object of an investigation 
and the ultimate target of an investigation in an experiment compared with that of a 




that we have learned something about the world in an experiment than in a computer 
simulation. The second argument that Morgan proposes is the argument from surprise which 
she links with Hacking’s views on experiments. The core claim is that given that a computer 
simulation is programmed by scientists, and does not interact with a part of nature, they 
cannot surprise in the way experiments can. Morgan labels the valuable type of surprise 
“confoundment” and highlights its productivity; it can force scientists to revise their theories 
in order to accommodate the results. I show how, if these arguments are true, they each have 
implications for the status of thought experiments.  
However, neither succeed in giving automatic epistemic privilege to experiments. I utilise 
discussions on computer simulations in order to put pressure on the materiality thesis before 
turning to my main concern in the chapter; the argument from surprise. I begin by 
considering surprise from the perspective of Brown and Norton’s accounts before discussing 
the differences between thought experiments on one hand, and computer simulations and 
arguments on the other. Gendler (1998) presents an argument against Norton’s view through 
the example of Galileo’s falling bodies. She argues that the thought experiment cannot be 
reconstructed into an argument form without losing part of its epistemic value. Through 
considering this objection, I argue that we can see that the surprise that this example brings 
about cannot be adequately captured on the argument view. Rather, the use of imagination 
in thought experiments means that we can be surprised in a distinctive way. The “freedom” 
of imagination allows for reasoning that cannot be captured within the framework of more 
formal reasoning. 
I end the first part of the thesis by coming back to Hacking’s claim that thought experiments 
are “icons”. Interestingly, Hacking also includes plays such as Othello within this category. 
Hacking himself does not add much detail as to what he means by this statement and so, I 
attempt to flesh out his claim. While Hacking uses this comparison to deny the life of thought 
experiments, I argue that his comparison actually opens up some interesting questions which 
are at the heart of the rest of the thesis: What is the significance of the imagination in thought 
experiments? And to what extent do thought experiments share features with works of art, 
in particular, literary fictions?   
In the second part of the thesis, I explore the role of the imagination in science and propose 
a pluralist view of the nature of imagination in thought experiments. In chapter 3, I begin 




point out that while the imagination is starting to gain attention in the philosophy of science, 
most notably through a collection of views that characterise models as fictions, there is a 
central question that remains under explored: What is meant by the imagination?  
There has been a general assumption in philosophy of science that the imagination consists 
in mental images. In particular, views that have included the imagination in their analysis of 
thought experiments have taken it to mean that we form visual “pictures” in our minds of 
the described scenario. Salis and Frigg (2020) challenge this assumption in a recent paper. 
As on my account, they draw on discussions of imagination in other areas of philosophy to 
increase our understanding of thought experiments and models. Salis and Frigg argue that 
mental imagery is never required for the conduct of a thought experiment (or a scientific 
model). Rather, they claim that the only type of imagination that is relevant in the scientific 
domain is of a propositional kind; we imagine that something is the case. They take their 
position to be extendable to all scientific thought experiments (and models).  
Against these existing monistic views, I develop a pluralist account of the nature of the 
imagination in science. In chapter 4, I begin with the ways in which thought experiments 
and scientific models differ. These differences impact the nature and role of the imagination 
in their use. In particular, I show that an underlying motivation for the propositional view—
the complexity of models and hence the limitations of mental images—does not carry over 
to the use of thought experiments. The upshot of this is that while there are clearly 
connections to be made in terms of the imagination in thought experiments and other areas 
of science, we should not assume that details regarding the imagination in modelling can be 
automatically generalised to thought experiments.  
I then turn to my main argument in the chapter. I emphasise that we need to pay close 
attention to particular examples of thought experiments and their use in scientific practice in 
order to determine the type of imagination that the example invites. This includes the 
different functions of thought experiments, as well as a consideration of the context in which 
they are formulated, and who they are formulated for. Through outlining a number of 
examples, I demonstrate how some thought experiments clearly invite merely a propositional 
form of imagination, whereas others invite an imaginative activity that goes beyond this. In 
cases of the latter, we are also invited to form objectual imaginings, in particular, to visualise 
a state of affairs. The outcome of this is that we can attempt to reconstruct thought 




which they engage the imagination. My pluralist alternative accommodates how thought 
experiments call on the imagination in an effective way to communicate and explain. 
The final part of the thesis continues with this focus on the imagination in scientific practice 
to consider the role of aesthetic values in thought experiments, and the ways in which thought 
experiments can be said to share qualities with literary works. The aesthetics of science 
literature primarily focuses on the “beauty” of theories and mathematical proofs as well as 
whether such judgements can indicate the truth of a theory, or can play some other epistemic 
role. I outline how thought experiments should also be part of the discussion; they are often 
described using aesthetic language (whether positive or negative). Furthermore, connections 
have been drawn between thought experiments and artworks. In particular, there is a 
prominent set of views in philosophy of art that defend the cognitive value of narrative art, 
usually literary fiction, by arguing that artworks can function as thought experiments and 
hence, can provide us with insights about the world and our place within in (Elgin 2014). 
However, chapter 5 also includes the ways in which thought experiments and literary fictions 
differ which, it is argued, undermines the ways in which we can say they provide insights in 
a similar way. Further to this, I present a dilemma for existing aesthetics of science projects 
as introduced by Todd (2008). It appears that either aesthetic language should be understood 
as a proxy for epistemic features, or aesthetic language is literal, but we are left with a need 
to explain why such values are significant in science and consequently why they should be 
of any interest to philosophers of science.  
Responding to this dilemma is my central aim in chapter 6. I outline a new approach to an 
aspect of aesthetics of science that offers a way of defending the epistemic importance of 
aesthetic values, without reducing them to epistemic features. I turn to accounts in aesthetics 
that discuss the interrelation between form and content as a source of aesthetic value. On 
these views, the aesthetic pleasure of artworks is rooted in our appreciation of the ways in 
which the form of a work is well suited to an artwork’s overarching content. I then discuss 
this in the context of thought experiments through focusing on two examples from Darwin. 
I argue that the usefulness of a thought experiment in scientific practice is impacted by the 
way in which its content is conveyed through the concrete particulars given in the narrative, 
as well as through the use of diagrams and other visual aids. Well formulated thought 
experiments are better prompts for our imagination, they aid our understanding, and can 




Once my proposal for a promising and novel view of aesthetics in science is in place, I come 
back to the proposed similarities between thought experiments and works of art. I claim that 
we should not be too quick to defend the cognitive value of all literary fictions via an 
emphasis on their similarities with thought experiments. Instead, I argue, via a consideration 
of genre conventions in science, that we should be more selective in our comparisons. In 
particular, I outline how thought experiments are significantly similar to works of 
speculative fiction as well as to fables and parables. 
The thesis concludes by summing up my key findings in the previous chapters which 
together show how an exploration of the varieties of the imagination in thought experiments 
sheds new light on their value in scientific practice. This includes how thought experiments 
can surprise in a fruitful way and can aid our understanding of theories and phenomena, as 
well as demonstrating the salience of aesthetics in science for forming useful imaginings. I 
also suggest the ways in which my core contributions can be extended to other areas of 





1. Thought Experiments and Experiments 
 
 Introduction 
One way in which the thought experiment literature is divided is through the relations between 
thought experiments and ordinary experiments. Some argue that thought experiments are 
experiments or share significant features with the latter. Whereas others argue that thought 
experiments lack key features of genuine experiments, such as the fact that they do not 
intervene on the world and therefore do not belong in the class of experiments. However, 
much of the answers to these questions appear down to a matter of emphasis; views either 
focus on certain qualities of thought experiments that make them appear experimental (and 
thereby include them in the class of experiments) or alternatively, they focus on the ways in 
which they differ and so, claim they are something else (for example, arguments).  
In this chapter and the one that follows, I move away from identity questions (that is, are 
thought experiments experiments?) and instead provide a closer look at the ways in which 
thought experiments compare to physical experiments. I do this via attending to issues in 
philosophy of experiment as well as by drawing on debates surrounding the epistemic status 
of computer simulations compared to ordinary, physical experiments which is a central topic 
in the philosophy of computer simulations in science.  
This chapter begins with an overview of some of the existing accounts of thought experiments 
and physical experiments, and highlights the commonalities between these discussions and 
those that surround computer simulations. I then turn to Hacking’s view that experiments have 
a “life of their own”, independent from theory, which he denies for thought experiments. But 
I set out to show how thought experiments also have a life of their own. In the next chapter, I 
continue with these comparisons. I outline two arguments for privileging experiments—the 
materiality thesis and my main focus, the surprise argument—which are central in the 
literature on computer simulations. I demonstrate how, if true, these arguments would also 
have implications for the epistemic status of thought experiments. However, I argue that 
despite there being important differences between experiments and these other practices, 
neither of the arguments are successful in establishing the superiority of experiments in 





Thought experiments, I argue, have a sui generis status from experiments and computer 
simulations despite similarities in their methodologies. Discussions that identify thought 
experiments with other practices try to fit thought experiments into one box and in doing so, 
they lose part of thought experiments’ value. These two chapters set up the rest of the thesis 
as I then go on to explore features which might not be unique to thought experiments but play 
a central role in their use. The second part of the thesis looks at the nature and role of the 
imagination in thought experiments and the final part looks at their aesthetic features and how 
they compare with literary works.  
 
 Thought Experiments, Experiments and Computer Simulations 
What is the relationship between thought experiments and physical experiments? Should we 
understand the use of “experiment” in thought experiments as a mere metaphor? This issue 
has divided the literature on scientific thought experiments. On one side, there are those who 
take seriously the “experimental” aspect of thought experiments. Proponents claim, for 
example, that thought experiments are experiments in their own right or are on a continuum 
with experiments. On the other side are those who draw a sharp line between thought 
experiments and experiments. This is a key difference between Norton and Brown’s 
approaches. As seen (in the introductory chapter), for Norton, thought experiments are 
arguments. As they work by inferences and do not involve interacting with, manipulating nor 
observing the natural world, any similarities with experiments are superficial. Whereas for 
Brown, that thought experiments take place in, as he puts in, the “laboratory of the mind” 
does not entail that they are not experimental. Thought experiments involve quasi-
observation; a system is represented and then observed by the mind’s eye in a way that is 
analogous to physical experiments.  
Highlighting the similarities between thought and physical experiments can be used as part of 
a defence of the epistemic value of thought experiments given the acceptance of experiments 
as a crucial part of acquiring scientific knowledge. An early reflection on the methodology of 
thought experiments did just this. According to Mach, thought experiments are experiments 
that operate at a ‘higher intellectual level’ than physical experiments (1896/1973, 452).1 He 
 
1 Although he focuses on cases in physics and mathematics, Mach also looks beyond science and draws 
connections with the arts when discussing experiments and thought experiments: ‘The dreamer, the 




argues that ‘it can be seen that the basic method of thought experiment is just like that of 
physical experiment, namely, the method of variation. By varying the circumstances 
(continuously, if possible) the range of validity of an idea (expectation) related to these 
circumstances is increased’ (ibid., 453). In the design of an experiment, certain factors are 
isolated, variables are controlled, and irrelevant aspects are idealised away. The experimenter 
then observes what follows and interprets the results. Thought experiments, too, involve this 
method of variation. But in their case, the manipulation it not of the world itself. Rather, 
thought experiments are conducted in the imagination. For Mach, then, there are similarities 
in the methodologies of thought experiments and physical experiments. Further to this, Mach 
argues that carrying out experiments in our minds is advantageous, as our ‘own ideas are more 
easily and readily at our disposal than physical facts. We experiment with thought, so to say, 
at little expense’ (ibid., 452). And this explains why many thought experiments are precursors 
to physical experiments; ‘it shouldn’t surprise us that, oftentimes, the thought experiment 
precedes the physical experiment and prepares the way for it…Every inventor and every 
experimenter must have in his mind the detailed order before he actualizes it’ (ibid.). It 
remains unclear whether Mach regards thought experiments as mere instances of imagining 
about concrete experiments, such as in the latter’s design, since he does not distinguish 
between this kind of imagined experiment and thought experiments.  
While thought experiments can precede experiments in this sense, Mach highlights how the 
former are ultimately dependent on the latter. The success of a thought experiment relies on 
knowledge that has been gained by previous experience with the world. That is, they work by 
drawing on these past observations, allowing us to see features that had gone unnoticed. 
Additionally, for Mach, if there is any doubt regarding the result of a thought experiment, 
then a physical experiment needs to be carried out. Mach acknowledges that the result of some 
thought experiments ‘can be so definite and decisive that any further test by means of a 
physical experiment, whether rightly or wrongly, may seem unnecessary to the author’ (ibid.). 
But he was wary of those who take the outcome of a thought experiment as decisive. He 
argued that the ‘more uncertain and more indefinite the results are, however, the more the 
thought experiment necessitates the physical experiment as its natural continuation which 
must now delimit and determine the experiment’ (ibid.). As a consequence, some have argued 
 
451). I come back to connections between thought experiments and the arts in chapters 5 and 6 where 




that for Mach, ‘physical experiment always prevails over thought experiment’ (Sorensen 
1992a, 74; see also Buzzoni 2018). 
Other accounts of thought experiments can be said to be part of the Machian tradition. For 
example, Sorensen has argued that thought experiments are a limiting case of experiment 
(1992a, 1992b). Sorensen builds on Mach’s analysis and also highlights the advantages of 
conducting thought experiments over physical experiments in that they are easier to conduct 
and replicate (see also Gooding 1992). But Sorensen emphasises thought experiments’ 
independent value from physical experiments by stating that not all thought experiments can 
be realised as a physical experiment and further, this is not required for belief in their results. 
For Sorensen, thought experiments are a limiting case of experiment; a ‘thought experiment 
is an experiment that purports to answer (or raise) its question by mere contemplation of its 
design’ (1992b, 16). Similarly, Elgin regards thought experiments as ‘not actual, and often 
not even possible, experiments’ (2017, 229). Like Mach, Elgin emphasises the similarities in 
the methodology of thought experiments and ordinary, physical experiments. She points out 
how in laboratory experiments, ‘scientists simplify, streamline, manipulate, and omit, so that 
the effects of the potentially confounding factors are minimized, marginalized, or cancelled 
out’. Laboratory experiments thus involve “departures from nature” and Elgin argues that 
thought experiments share these features but involve even further distancing (ibid.).  
We can see that a similar discussion occurs in the philosophy of computer simulations. Their 
use to study a range of complex phenomena is prevalent throughout the sciences. Winsberg 
presents a narrow and a broad definition of a computer simulation. In the narrow sense, a 
computer simulation is a computer program that uses ‘step-by-step methods to explore the 
approximate behaviour of a mathematical model’. This can be, but is not always, a model of 
a real-world system. A more broader use of computer simulation ‘includes choosing a model; 
finding a way of implementing that model in a form that can be run on a computer; calculating 
the output of the algorithm; and visualising and studying the resultant data’ (Winsberg 2019, 
§1).2 A key issue is how they compare to ordinary, physical experiments, and they have been 
classed as, for example, experiments in silico, numerical experiments, virtual experiments or 
 
2 Similarly, Brown states that a narrow definition of an experiment or thought experiment is the setup 
and the behaviour we observe. A broad definition includes any initial theorizing, draw conclusions and 
so on: ‘The   narrow   sense   of   experiment   (whether   real  experiment   or thought  experiment)  is  
what  we  observe,  the  phenomenon,  the middle  of  the  schema.  The  broad  sense  includes  the  





experiments without materiality. And some have claimed that computer simulations just are 
experiments (see Barberousse et al (2009) for an overview). But their status as genuinely 
experimental is contested. This is because, like thought experiments, computer simulations 
do not intervene on the natural world and instead explore “hypothetical worlds” (Lenhard 
2018).  
As Arcangeli points out, it is fairly easy to see from Winsberg’s description of a computer 
simulation that Mach’s “method of variation” can also be applied to their case. Choosing the 
model (and finding a way to implement it) belongs with the setup of an experiment (or thought 
experiment) and the selection and isolation of certain factors. The running of the computer 
program belongs with the stage in which the variables interact. And the calculating of the 
output as well as studying/visualising the results accords with the experimenter’s (or thought 
experimenter’s) observations of what happens, and their interpretation of the results (2018, 
9).3 We also saw that Mach highlighted how conducting thought experiments can be easier 
than physical experiments. Computer simulations also come “at little expense” in the sense 
that it can be easier to conduct a computer simulation than perform a physical experiment to 
learn about particular systems. Finally, while we can maintain that thought experiments and 
computer simulations have a role beyond preparing physical experiments, Winsberg makes a 
point similar to Mach’s when he argues that physical experiments have priority over computer 
simulations in that the latter rely on data and information that has been previously collected 
from experiment and observation (2009, 591).4  
While there is a way, then, of highlighting similarities between the three practices with regards 
to their methodologies, there are also comparisons that have focused predominately on the 
similarities that thought experiments and computer simulations share, given that unlike 
experiments, neither involve intervening on the world. Some have commented on how 
computer simulations are thought experiments, albeit ones that use a computer program. For 
example, Dennett (1994) and Swan (2009) have suggested that the Tierra model of artificial 
 
3 Applying Mach’s insights in this way is similar to El Skaf and Imbert’s (2013) view that physical 
experiments, thought experiments and computer simulations each involve the construction of a scenario 
which is then “unfolded” and interpreted.  
4 I’ll come back to issues regarding the privileging of experiments over simulations in the next chapter 
but it is important to note that this is not entailed by Winsberg’s statement regarding the priority of 
experiments. He states: ‘There may have been a time in the history of science, perhaps before Newton, 
perhaps even earlier, when we did not have sufficient systematic knowledge of nature—enough of a 
toolkit of trustworthy model building principles—for a simulation to ever be as reliable a source of 





life is a kind of thought experiment. As Swan states: ‘Alife provides a wide variety of means 
for rethinking our conceptions of life and our understanding of evolutionary processes by 
creating imaginative alternatives to what is—allowing us to entertain what might be, or what 
could  have  been,  given  different  parameters—which  is  essentially  how  thought 
experiments work’ (ibid., 688). Others have extended existing analyses of thought 
experiments to computer simulations. For example, on Chandrasekharan et al’s (2012) view, 
computer simulations are an extension of the capacity for mental simulation. They compare 
this with how instruments such as telescopes are used in order to extend our visual abilities. 
Both thought experiments and computer simulations involve an exploration of counterfactual 
situations but because computer simulations can deal with more complex simulations, 
Chandrasekharan et al predict that they will come to replace thought experiments. 
Beisbart and Norton (2012) utilise Norton’s work on thought experiments in order to draw a 
sharp contrast between physical experiments on one hand, and thought experiments and 
computer simulations on the other. Beisbart and Norton argue that like thought experiments, 
computer simulations are arguments. For the argument account, the important difference 
between these practices compared to experiments is that thought experiments and computer 
simulations involve inference, whereas experiments involve discovery. And so, any 
similarities raised above on the Machian analysis are irrelevant to thought experiments and 
computer simulations’ epistemology. I’ll come back to this account in the next chapter when 
considering the ways in which thought experiments can surprise. Similarly, Humphreys has 
separated thought experiments and computer simulations from real experiments, arguing that 
they involve theoretical as opposed to practical manipulation and thus ‘lie much closer to 
theory than to the world’ (1994, 218).  
And so, there has been some developments regarding the similarities (and differences) 
between the three practices. However, I am inclined to agree with El Skaf and Imbert that the 
existing literature ‘offers more a battlefield than a steadily developing domain; in particular, 
it is not completely clear how much the described similarities between these activities are 
deep or shallow and merely rhetorical’ (2013, 3453; see also Cooper 2005). Whether or not 
thought experiments ought to be identified as experiments or not depends largely down to 
what features are emphasised, and what features one takes to be essential to an experiment.5 
But then the discussion gets somewhat “stuck” (see also Arcangeli 2018). And so, my aim in 
 




the rest of this chapter and the next, is to offer a more productive discussion on the 
commonalities of these practices. 
There are many ways in which the existing observations could be meaningfully developed in 
order to build upon the similarities and differences between thought experiments, physical 
experiments and computer simulations that are relevant to their epistemic significance and 
their fruitfulness in science. For the remainder of this chapter, I will turn to important work 
in the philosophy of experiment that has also been picked up on in the computer simulation 
literature (Winsberg 2010). This is Hacking’s view that physical experiments have a “life of 
their own”. In the chapter that follows, I focus on two arguments for the privileging of 
experiments over computer simulations and apply them to the case of thought experiments. 
 
 The Life of an Experiment 
Hacking argues that a key difference between thought experiments and ordinary, physical 
experiments are that the latter, but not the former, have a “life of their own”. He states: 
‘experiments are organic, develop, change, and yet retain a certain long-term 
development which makes us talk about repeating and replicating experiments…I think 
of experiments as having a life: maturing, evolving, adapting, being not only recycled 
but also, quite literally, being retooled. But thought experiments are rather fixed, largely 
immutable. That is yet another respect that they are like mathematical proofs, but good 
proofs have proof ideas that can be used over and over in new contexts—which is not, 
in general the case with thought experiments. They have just one tension to expose… 
Once the thought experiment is written out in perfection it is an icon. Icons, to reiterate, 
do not have a life of their own’ (1992, 307).6  
To understand Hacking’s comments on thought experiments, we first need to look at what he 
means by the “life of an experiment”. His paper on thought experiments does not go into detail 
on experiments and so, I will turn to his Representing and Intervening (1983) to expand the 
above claims.7 In the introduction to his ground breaking text, Hacking states that for a long 
 
6 It is interesting that Hacking compares thought experiments to icons. Sadly, Hacking does not go on 
to give a detailed explanation for this comparison. I’ll say some more about the connection with icons 
at the end of the next chapter. 
7 Bokulich (2001) and Bokulich and Frappier (2018) also explore Hacking’s claims regarding the life 




time, philosophers and historians of science have heavily focused on theories and 
representations, and experiments have been severely overlooked. As a response to this, he sets 
out to ‘initiate a Back-to-Bacon movement, in which we attend more seriously to experimental 
science’ (1983, 150). Representing and Intervening was one of the first philosophical works 
to attend to experiments in scientific practice, and the “life” of an experiment is a powerful 
metaphor which has been subsequently adopted by many. Hacking argues that the lack of 
philosophical and historical analysis of experiment results from seeing experimentation as an 
activity dictated by theory in which the value of experiments consists in their role in testing 
theory. In outlining experiments’ independence from theory, Hacking carves out the space for 
an epistemology of experiment.8  
He cites chemist Liebig and Popper as exemplars of the view that experimentation is a theory-
driven practice. For Liebig, an ‘experiment not preceded by theory, i.e. by an idea, bears the 
same relation to scientific research as a child’s rattle to music’ (1863, 49 in Hacking 1983, 
153). Hacking notes that there is a weak version and a strong version of Liebig’s view. The 
weak version claims that you must have ‘some ideas about nature and your apparatus before 
you conduct an experiment’ (1983, 153). A strong version maintains that testing a theory 
about the experimental object is the only way an experimental result can be significant. Take 
Popper’s view that theoreticians propose well-formed questions to the experimenter whose 
role is to provide definite answers to those questions and thereby assess the validity of a 
theoretician’s claim. For Popper, theory ‘dominates the experimental world from its initial 
planning up to the finishing touches in the laboratory’ (1934, 107 in Hacking 1983, 155). 
Hacking grants the weak claim—experiments should be conducted in light of some 
understanding or ideas about the experimental setup—but sets out to undermine the strong 
version. For Hacking, “theory” is thus more developed than mere ideas surrounding an 
experiment and its apparatus. Hacking aims to show how fundamental research can proceed 
without relevant theory in this latter sense and to defend the independent status of 
experiments.9  
 
a couple of features, and do not draw on Hacking’s work on experiment to flesh out his claims. Here, I 
follow Shinod (2017) and turn to Hacking’s earlier work in order to get clearer on his comparison 
between experiments and thought experiments.  
8 Franklin (1986, 2013) and Franklin and Perovic (2019) also adopt the term “the life of an experiment”.  
9 Hacking does, however, suggest that even the weak version could be challenged: ‘The physicist 
George Darwin used to say that every once in a while one should do a completely crazy experiment, 
like blowing trumpets to the tulips every morning for a month. Probably nothing will happen, but if 




Hacking’s work on experiments set against these views expressed by Liebig and Popper is 
extensive and cannot be fully covered here. But I will highlight a few of the central features 
of the life of experiments, which is sufficient for the comparison with thought experiments. 
 
1.3.1 The Evolution of Experiments 
The first point that we learn from Hacking is that experiments can evolve. Hacking outlines 
how experiments can evolve when instruments develop and become more refined. For 
example, in the development of microscopes. Another sense in which they can evolve is when 
scientists become more adept at observing such as in the case of Caroline Hershel’s tireless 
observations of the night’s sky that resulted in her discovery of many comets, including a 
particularly productive period in which she discovered eight in a single year (1983, 180). An 
example that Hacking discusses in detail is the Michelson-Morley experiment. The aim of the 
experiment was to detect the velocity of the Earth with respect to the ether, a hypothesised 
medium in space for the propagation of light waves. Hacking outlines how a series of 
experiments, beginning with Michelson’s experiment in 1881 and ending in the 1920s have 
been labelled “the Michelson-Morley experiment”. The most famous instance took place in 
1887 and lasted over a year: ‘This  included  making and remaking  the  apparatus  and  getting  
it to  work,  and  above  all acquiring  the  curious  knack  of  knowing  when  the  apparatus  
is working’ (1983, 174). 
Hacking traces the experiment’s history and its relation to various theories of the ether. 
Michelson’s 1881 experiment consisted in splitting a ray of light into two beams by sending 
it through a half-silvered mirror so that the beams travelled at right angles to one another, one 
in the direction of the earth’s motion. The beams were then reflected back into the middle and 
this is where any effect of the ether would be seen; the beam travelling in the direction of the 
earth’s motion should take longer to be reflected back than the beam travelling at a right angle. 
But this effect was not observed. Michelson faced problems with his apparatus in his 
experiment, and he went on to work with Morley, a gifted chemist, to carry out improved 




The experiment failed to show what Michelson and Morley intended, and the results of the 
experiment were initially taken to refute the ether hypotheses. Later, the experiment was 
regarded as support for special relativity (1983, 254).10  
 
1.3.2 The Robustness of Experimental Results 
The second feature of the “life” of experiments that we learn from Hacking is that 
experimental results are robust despite changes in the theory of the phenomena or of how the 
relevant apparatus works. Hacking draws on the example of microscopes. Theories of how 
microscopes work have varied extensively, and Hacking notes that the correct explanation did 
not emerge until 1873 with the work of Abbe (1983, 194). He argues that there has been 
continued belief in the visual representations that microscopes produce despite prominent 
change in the theoretical domain (ibid., 199). For Hacking, this challenges the view that 
experiments are always theory-laden, that is, our observations, what we see in an experiment, 
are determined by whatever theoretical presuppositions we have.11 Such a commitment would 
predict that there would be changes in the results of experiments once new theories are 
introduced and theoretical presuppositions change.  
One reason that Hacking provides for the robustness of experimental results is to do with the 
fact that scientists manipulate their objects of study. For instance, when observing cells under 
a microscope, a scientist might use a glass needle to inject a fluid into the wall of the cell. 
They will observe the needle going into the cell through the microscope, and have predictions 
about the effect this will have, that is, the cell’s shape will change. When the scientist observes 
this, this strengthens their belief that the microscope is producing ‘“true” images which are, 
in some sense, “like” the specimen’ (ibid., 190).12  
Franklin notes that while Hacking’s discussion of “robustness” applies well to this example 
in which we can manipulate the object of study in the above sense, as well as use different 
instruments but yield the same results, this is not so simple for all experiments. In light of this, 
 
10 Hacking (1983, 254-261) presents a more detailed account of the experiment and its relation to 
various theoretical work. See also Franklin and Laymon (2019).  
11 See Schindler (2013) for a detailed discussion of the ways in which observations can be understood 
as theory-laden, and for various responses from the “New Experimentalists”, including Hacking. 
12 Hacking also offers the example of a particular constellation of dots, ‘dense bodies’ in cells, is seen 
with different types of microscopes to argue for the validity of such observations, that is, to show they 




Franklin (1986, 1989) and Franklin and Perovic (2019) outline other strategies that are used 
in order to validate experimental results. Confidence in results can increase when, for 
example: (1) the results are replicated in other experiments, (2) experimental bias is 
eliminated, (3) the system is well isolated and possible sources of error are eliminated and (4) 
the apparatus used is calibrated and is based on well-developed theory. 
 
1.3.3 Experiments Can Precede Theory 
Finally, Hacking sets out how experiments can precede relevant theory. He offers the 
examples of the early development of optics which ‘depended on simply noticing some 
surprising phenomenon’ such as in the case of Bartholin’s discovery of the double refraction 
of light in Iceland spar in 1689. The phenomenon could not be integrated into the current 
theory of optics at the time. Hacking is clear that Bartholin, amongst the other scientists he 
refers to in this discussion, was of course ‘curious, inquisitive and reflective’ and was setting 
out to form theories, but these observations came before theory (1983, 155-156). In addition, 
Hacking offers examples from thermodynamics where the invention and improvement of 
steam engines came before a theoretical explanation of thermal engines; ‘the very word 
‘thermodynamics’ recalls that this science arose from a profound analysis of a notable 
sequence of inventions’ (ibid., 164).  
Now that we have a sense of what is meant by the different dimensions of the “life of an 
experiment”, we can turn to Hacking’s argument that thought experiments do not have a life 
of their own.  
 
 The Life of a Thought Experiment 
As seen, Hacking argues experiments have a life independent of theory. He states: ‘I think of 
experiments as having a life: maturing, evolving, adapting, being not only recycled but also, 
quite literally, being retooled’ (1992, 307). But he denies this for thought experiments; 
‘thought experiments are rather fixed, largely immutable’ (ibid.).  
Why does Hacking regard thought experiments as “fixed”? Hacking argues that while 
experiments perform many roles in science, there is just one role for thought experiments. 




tensions between one vision of the world and another. That is their job, their once and future 
job’ (1992, 307). Furthermore, Hacking argues that a thought experiment has ‘just one tension 
to expose’ (ibid.). As mentioned above, he contrasts this with mathematical proofs as the latter 
can be used in different contexts. Hacking presents the case of Plato’s account of Socrates 
and the slave boy in Meno who is asked to double the size of a square, used as support for the 
view that all learning is recollection. Although this example has been repeated throughout 
history, it does not change. In Hacking’s terminology, we draw the same diagrams and reach 
the same conclusions every time. Hacking grants that thought experiments will go through 
changes in their initial development but the key point is that once they are written out in a 
finalised form, they cease to evolve. This highlights a key difference between experiments 
and thought experiments’ relation with theory. For Hacking, thought experiments are fixed to 
their original context and therefore to the theoretical ideas that they were initially built upon. 
For this reason, they cannot be retooled in the way that experiments can. As Hacking puts it, 
‘what they think is what was once thought’ (1992, 307). It is in light of these qualities that 
Hacking regards thought experiments as “icons”. 
In the previous section, I outlined three ways in which experiments have a life independent of 
theory. I will now show how thought experiments also have a life of their own in accordance 
with Hacking’s criteria.  
 
1.4.1 The Evolution of Thought Experiments 
The first feature of the life of an experiment that I outlined was to do with how they can 
evolve. Can the same be said for thought experiments? Bokulich suggests that the reason why 
thought experiments may appear as static entities is due to the fact that they are often used 
pedagogically. This means that they are generally presented with a lack of attention to the 
context in which they were devised or to how they have changed over time, and therefore 
have become simplified (2001, 304-305). It is also clear that some scientific thought 
experiments have not undergone significant changes since their inception such as Galileo’s 
falling bodies. Galileo may have modified the thought experiment in its initial development, 
but since publishing the example in The Two Dialogues, it has remained stable.13 However, 
there are contrasting cases.  
 




One example of a thought experiment that can be compared to the way in which experiments 
evolve is the clock-in-the-box as presented by Einstein in 1930. Einstein used the clock-in-
the-box in an attempt to undermine Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. The set up of the 
scenario involves imagining a box containing photons. On one of the sides of the box there is 
a shutter which is controlled by a clock. We imagine taking a measurement of the weight of 
the box. We further imagine the clock opening the shutter for the exact amount of time that it 
would take for just one photon to pass through. We then measure the weight of the box again. 
By working out the difference in weight of the box before and after the photon was emitted, 
we can also work out the mass of the photon. Further, by using E=mc2, we can also work out 
the photon’s energy.  Einstein uses the thought experiment to argue that in principle, ‘we can 
measure the photon’s energy and its time of passage to any arbitrary degree of accuracy’. 
Thus, the argument goes, the thought experiment demonstrates that the uncertainty principle 
is incorrect (Bishop 1999, 536).  
Bokulich and Frappier outline the evolution of this example at the hands of Einstein and Bohr, 
starting from its initial formulation in 1927. Bohr (1949) recounted how, before the thought 
experiment was described in the above way, Einstein described a ‘particle passing through a 
narrow slit in a diaphragm that was placed some distance before a photographic plate’. One 
modification was to add in another diaphragm with two slits, between the first diaphragm and 
the photographic plate. Another modification, once the slit had been replaced by a shutter 
attached to a clock (as in the version above), was then presented with a ‘“pseudorealistic” 
diagram of Einstein’s clock-shutter device, with the support bolted to the table and the box 
suspended from the support by a string allowing the box to move up and down’ (Bokulich 
and Frappier 2018, 547). The thought experiment, then, has evolved in a similar way to how 
Hacking argues experiments can evolve. The clock-in-the-box went through a series of 













Another interesting feature of this case is that Bohr did not agree that the thought experiment 
successfully undermined the uncertainty principle. At first, the version of the thought 
experiment presented above baffled Bohr, but he was quickly able to respond to Einstein. By 
concentrating on the practicalities of measuring the photon’s energy at a particular time, Bohr 
argued that in order to weigh the box, the apparatus would have to move in a gravitational field 
which would change the rate of the clock. This thus leads to the indeterminacy that Einstein 
was attempting to falsify. Einstein agreed that Bohr’s reply had successfully shown that his 
thought experiment failed (Bishop 1999, 536). However, despite Einstein accepting the result, 
the thought experiment was not thereby considered a done deal. This example continues to 
evolve. It is still being revised, with different formulations resulting in different theoretical 
conclusions. The impact of the clock-in-the-box therefore remains a contentious issue (Stuart 
2016a, 28).14  
Another example of a thought experiment that evolves is Maxwell’s demon, first devised by 
Maxwell in 1867 to show how the second law of thermodynamics could be violated. I say more 
about Maxwell’s use of the thought experiment in my discussion of the nature of the 
imagination in science in chapter 4. The important point for now is that the example has been 
modified over time, with various critiques and analyses of the scenario presented, and what the 
 
14 More recent reformulations of the thought experiment have been given by Treder (1975), De la Torre 
et al. (2000) and Hilgevoord (1998) 
 
Figure 2: Bohr’s “pseudorealistic 
drawing”of the clock in the box (from 
Bohr 1949) 
Figure 3: Bohr’s depiction of Einstein’s clock in the 




thought experiment shows is still a matter of debate (see Norton (2013) and Earman and Norton 
(1998)).15 
 
1.4.2 The Robustness of Thought Experiments 
The second way in which experiments have a life was to do with the robustness of experimental 
results despite theoretical changes. As seen in the experiment case, Hacking linked the 
robustness of results with the fact that experiments intervene on nature. As thought experiments 
do not intervene on the world, this helps explain why on Hacking’s view, the results of a 
thought experiment are tied to the theory that they were initially built upon. But there are also 
cases of thought experimental results that are robust in that there is agreement on what would 
happen in a thought experiment, but the results are explained by appealing to different theories. 
In Bokulich’s (2001) terminology, how thought experiments can also be “rethought” from 
various theoretical standpoints. We can look to the rocket and thread thought experiment as an 
example. The setup is as follows: 
‘Imagine two identically constructed rockets, B and C, both initially at rest in an inertial 
reference frame, S. The two rockets are arranged one behind the other, 100 meters apart 
in S and they are connected by a thin piece of thread just long enough to connect the 
two rockets… Now imagine that both rockets fire up their engines simultaneously in 
this frame and gently accelerate to relativistic velocities. Once they reach four-fifths 
the speed of light relative to S, they simultaneously stop accelerating, and are now 
moving with a uniform velocity. According to an observer at rest in S, the two rockets 
have been moving in tandem and are still 100 meters apart. The question now is whether 
or not the thread will break’ (Bokulich 2001, 290). 
The thought experiment was initially devised by Dewan and Beran in 1959 who evaluated the 
scenario from the perspective of special relativity. For an observer at S, the thread will be 
Lorentz contracted and can no longer reach the two rockets and so, it will break. The distance 
between the rockets remains the same because they accelerated simultaneously and equally in 
S. Dewan and Beran also show that the thread will also break for an observer on rocket A at 
rest in the rockets’ final inertial frame, S’, but for a different reason. For an observer in S’, the 
 
15 There is thus an interesting comparison to be made with questions regarding the “end” of an 




distance between the rockets increases (the accelerations of the two rockets were not 
simultaneous) but the length of the thread stays the same and therefore breaks.  
For Dewan and Beran, the aim of the thought experiment was to show that Lorentz contraction 
(the phenomenon in which the length of an object is shorter when it is moving than when it is 
at rest) can cause measurable stress on moving bodies. The thought experiment was then used 
again by Bell in 1976. Bell did not dispute the result of the thought experiment; he agreed that 
the thread would break. Rather, he demonstrated how this result could be reached but from a 
different theoretical standpoint. Bell showed how Lorentz’s ether theory could also explain the 
breaking of the thread for an observer at S and S’ (Bokulich 2001, 291-292). This example 
demonstrates that there can be agreement on what a thought experiment shows, but there can 
be different, opposing theoretical explanations of the result.16 
In considering Hacking’s example of the robustness of results in the case of microscopes, I also 
outlined further ways in which experimental results can be validated through drawing on 
Franklin’s work. Given the use of computer simulations and thought experiments in science, 
we also need reason to believe in the reliability of the results they provide. One way in which 
we can do this, which would accord with Norton’s view, as well as Norton and Beisbart (2012) 
(discussed in the next chapter) would be to analyse them as arguments; we assess them by 
checking for validity and soundness. However, another way in which they can be assessed is 
through drawing on the epistemology of experiment. I will not go into detail here, but Stuart 
(2016b) has offered a discussion of what this might look like in the case of thought experiments 
and Parker (2008) and Winsberg (2010) have applied these strategies to computer simulations.  
Focusing on Stuart’s analysis of thought experiments, we can consider how the criteria may 
apply: (1) we check that thought experiment results can be replicated by getting a wide range 
of people to conduct the same example, which is of course a large practice of thought 
 
16 Bokulich ties her discussion of this example to Duhem’s scepticism of thought experiments, or what 
he called “fictitious experiments”, which he rooted in his scepticism concerning crucial experiments, 
that is, those which decide in favour of one theory over another. For Duhem, experimental evidence is 
always underdetermined by theory choice such that an isolated hypothesis is never tested in an 
experiment. Rather, it is always connected with a set of background theories. However, Bokulich states 
that ‘that thought experiments are no more bound to any one particular theory than ordinary physical 
experiments are, and second, they can underdetermine theory choice in the same way too’ (2001, 293). 
That is to say, the interpretation of thought experiments also presupposes background theory and hence, 
thought experiments cannot be “crucial” experiments either. See Buzzoni (2018) for a recent paper that 
challenges the view that Duhem had a general wariness of thought experiments through a discussion of 




experiments; they are written down, shared and analysed by the scientific community, this also 
helps to (2) eliminate bias in their results. (3) We isolate the system in our imagination through 
idealisation and abstraction in order to trust that possible sources of error are eliminated. 
Possible sources of error include ‘inaccurate representations and weak imaginations’ (Stuart 
2016b, 461). Finally (4) the apparatus used is calibrated and is based on well-developed theory. 
As Stuart explains, a greater understanding of our imagination is gained through studies in 
philosophy of mind, cognitive science and psychology. Further, Stuart argues that there are 
good reasons to think that our imaginations are calibrated. This is because uses of the 
imagination are ubiquitous; most of us use our imaginations every day when considering 
hypotheticals and in problem solving, for example (ibid.).  
There is clearly more to be said concerning the ways in which the epistemology of experiment 
can carry over to thought experiments. My aim here was just to indicate some promising work 
in that direction. I’ll now turn to the final feature of the “life” of an experiment. 
 
1.4.3 Thought Experiments Can Precede Theory 
Finally, we saw how experiments can precede theory and can be conducted without the aim of 
testing or supporting established theories. We saw this quality through the examples of 
observing surprising phenomenon, or in the case of theories being formulated in order to 
explain how existing inventions work. It is difficult to see what an analogous case of a thought 
experiment would be with regards to the latter. And we can see that many of the thought 
experiments that are frequently discussed follow some theory. Take Galileo’s thought 
experiments against Aristotle. They start by assuming a theory in Aristotelian physics then 
proceed by showing how it cannot be the case. Similarly, Einstein’s clock-in-the-box thought 
experiment sets out to show an inconsistency in Heisenberg’s quantum mechanics and 
Maxwell’s demon does not precede the second law of thermodynamics, but rather, is 
introduced in order to aid our understanding of it.  
However, we can see that there are cases of thought experiments which have the exploratory 
quality that Hacking highlights for experiments.17 To recall, Hacking does not intend to argue 
 
17 My use of “exploratory” here comes from making a connection to models, in particular, Gelfert’s 
discussion of exploratory models. Gelfert draws an analogy with exploratory experiments, that is, those 
which are conducted in the absence of well-developed theory. He argues: ‘a model always have to 
render an empirical phenomenon amenable to subsumption under a pre-existing theory… an analysis 




that important experimental work can be done without having some ideas in mind about the 
phenomenon under investigation, and he recognises that in the observations he refers to, there 
were some general aims towards developing theories. In light of this, we can consider examples 
of thought experiments that also meet this criterion. One case would be Einstein’s chasing a 
light beam thought experiment. In his Autobiographical Notes, Einstein outlines a thought 
experiment that he performed when he was 16. In the thought experiment, Einstein imagines 
himself chasing after a beam of light at the speed of light and considers what he would observe 
if he caught up to it. This lead to an important realisation. According to Newtonian mechanics, 
if we travelled at the speed of light next to a beam of light, then the light would appear frozen 
or stationary. Just as say, a car would appear at rest to an observer travelling in another car at 
the same speed. But Maxwell’s theory takes light to be an electromagnetic wave, composed of 
oscillating electromagnetic fields. On Maxwell’s theory, the speed of light has a constant value. 
If we experienced a stationary light beam, then the speed of light would not be constant. It 
would instead be relative to inertial reference frames. And so, the thought experiment exposed 
the inconsistency in accepting both Newtonian mechanics and Maxwell’s theory. Einstein 
states how this was an important part of the development of special relativity. He states that in 
the thought experiment, ‘the germ of special relativity theory is already contained’ (1979, 51). 
Another case, also from Einstein, is the elevator thought experiment. Special relativity had only 
accounted for the relativity of uniform motion, and Einstein set out to show how the relativity 
of motion also extends to accelerated motion. The thought experiment allowed Einstein to 
‘proceed to important results precisely when there is no background theory’ (Norton 1996, 
346). It led to the equivalence principle which was a first step in his arrival at general relativity. 
This third feature of experiments brings us to yet another feature discussed by Hacking that I 
am yet to outline; the role of experiments in unexpected discoveries that prompts the 
development of new theories. This is taken up by Morgan (2003, 2005) and leads to her 
distinction between mere surprise and a more significant form of surprise that she labels 
confoundment. This argument contributes to Morgan’s view that experiments have epistemic 
superiority over models and simulations. I will come back to this in the next chapter where I 
 
unavailable, or where—as James Clerk Maxwell put it—it is essential ‘to avoid the dangers arising 
from a premature theory’’ (2016. 75). This practice is not completely “theory free”; scientists utilise 
‘significant background knowledge, including background theories’ (ibid., 78). See also Franklin 




demonstrate how the surprise/confoundment distinction applies to thought experiments, before 
defending a view of how thought experiments can productively surprise.  
In this section, I have aimed to show that thought experiments, too, have a life of their own. 
Consequently, this feature fails as a way to demarcate experiments from thought experiments. 
Rather, responding to Hacking’s comments offers a fruitful way of exploring the 
commonalities between experiments and thought experiments. Continuing the comparison 
with computer simulations, it is worth noting that Winsberg has argued that computer 
simulations also have a life in that they evolve and can be retooled to different ends. He uses 
the example of the ‘piecewise parabolic method’ (PPM) an algorithm that can be used to 
simulate fluid flow. Various versions have been developed to be applicable to a plurality of 
physical systems and it has undergone revisions in order to increase its accuracy; ‘the 
simulation practices for calculating discontinuous compressible flows, in which the PPM has 
figured prominently, has had its own independent history… it has matured, evolved, been 
adapted, recycled, and retooled. It has had a life of its own’ (2010, 48).  
As Bokulich and Frappier (2018) highlight, reflecting on how thought experiments have a life 
of their own leads to issues regarding the identity of thought experiments. As they can be 
retooled in the above sense, this raises the question of when we have an instance of the same 
thought experiment but in a changed form, or with a different interpretation, or when we have 
a new thought experiment. Depending on what a thought experiment is, the view regarding 
their identity conditions will vary. Take Norton’s stance for example. Given that he holds that 
thought experiments are arguments, any example that changes in such a way that the 
reconstructed argument form becomes different, that is, we get different premises and/or a 
different conclusion, would be an instance of a new thought experiment. And so, thought 
experiments are immutable. Of course, we could refer to different particulars or change some 
of the details but this would count as the same thought experiment only as long as the changes 
do not affect its argument form.18  
Questions around identity will also arise for laboratory experiments, as well as for computer 
simulations and models more generally. It is not just a concern for thought experiments and 
does not provide a way of differentiating them from these other practices in science. Because 
of this, while the identity of thought experiments (and whether this is established in a way that 
 
18 See Bokulich and Frappier (2018) for a detailed overview of issues surrounding the identity of thought 




is similar to ordinary, physical experiments) is an interesting issue, I am not going to pursue it 
here. My own view is that thought experiments can undergo significant changes whilst still 
being the same thought experiment. I agree with Bokulich that we should take a liberal stance; 
we should establish whether a thought experiment counts as a version of the same thought 
experiment by attending to any ‘resemblance of the central narratives and a continuity through 
historical connection’ (2001, 286).  
 
 Conclusion 
I began this chapter with a discussion of the ways in which thought experiments have been 
compared with ordinary, physical experiments. While some have taken the “experimental” 
components of thought experiments seriously and consequently, argued that thought 
experiments just are a species of experiment, others have focused on the ways in which they 
differ. I set out how there is a parallel debate concerning the relations between computer 
simulation methods and ordinary experiments which has gained a great amount of interest in 
philosophy of science. Like thought experiments, computer simulations can be said to work by 
the “method of variation” but unlike physical experiments, they do not intervene on the world. 
Bringing these two debates together can shed light on the connections between the three 
practices. I then turned to a prominent account of the “life” of experiments as put forward by 
Hacking. Hacking denies that thought experiments have a life, but I outlined how he is 
mistaken: Thought experiments can evolve in order to become more suited to their purposes, 
thought experimental results can be “robust” in the sense that they withstand changes in the 
theoretical realm and further, thought experiments can precede theory. 
In the next chapter, I continue with my comparisons between thought experiments on one hand, 
and computer simulations and experiments on the other. I consider two arguments for the 
privileging of experiments over computer simulations, the materiality thesis and the argument 





2. Privileging Experiments 
 
 Introduction 
In this chapter, I continue with the comparisons between thought experiments, computer 
simulations and experiments. I present two arguments for the privileging of experiments over 
computer simulations. This is the argument from materiality and the argument from surprise. 
A major proponent of these views is Mary Morgan (2003, 2005) and given her centrality in 
the debate, I predominantly focus on her presentation of the arguments. I demonstrate that 
Morgan’s reasons for privileging experiments has implications for the epistemic status of 
thought experiments, given the similarities between the former and computer simulations as 
outlined in the previous chapter.  
I’ll begin with the materiality thesis which argues that the difference between the object-
target relation in an experiment compared with that in a computer simulation gives reason to 
privilege experimental results; scientists are more justified in saying that they learn about 
their target in an experiment compared to in a simulation. I present worries with this 
argument as presented by those who defend the use of computer simulations against 
Morgan’s claims by undermining the claim that materiality (always) matters. My main focus 
in this chapter is the second argument that Morgan presents; the surprise argument. This is 
my main focus as I argue that there is something distinctive about thought experiments 
regarding how they bring about surprise. For Morgan, there is a particular type of surprise, 
namely “confoundment”, that only experiments can provide. This is a type of surprise that 
is productive; it is potentially disruptive in the sense that it can lead scientists to reconsider 
existing bodies of knowledge regarding their target system. I outline Morgan’s arguments 
before demonstrating how computer simulations and thought experiments can also surprise 
in this sense, and end by demonstrating the ways in which thought experiments importantly 
differ from computer simulations which impacts the way in which they can productively 
surprise.  
 
 The Materiality Thesis 
The first argument I’ll consider in this chapter concerns the relation between what is studied 




The argument is often referred to as the materiality thesis and it has various forms. A strong 
version is put forward by Gilbert and Troitzsch who argue that a fundamental difference 
between an experiment and a simulation is that in an experiment, ‘one is controlling the 
actual object of interest (for example, in a chemistry experiment, the chemicals under 
investigation)’, whereas in a simulation, ‘one is experimenting with a model rather than the 
phenomena itself’ (1999, 13). But we can note that this difference is not as straightforward 
as they assume. There are of course natural experiments which involve interacting with a 
system in nature but often in an experiment, it is not simply the case that ‘one is controlling 
the actual object of interest’. Rather, an experimental system under investigation is artificial 
in the sense that it differs from the natural systems that is the scientists’ ultimate target.  
Take Winsberg’s example of two physicists interested in the interaction of a pair of fluids at 
supersonic speeds. One physicist investigates this via conducting an experiment in a 
laboratory. They have ‘a tank of fluid containing simple spherical and cylindrical shapes, 
bubbles of gas, and a physical mechanism for causing a shock wave to propagate through 
the tank’. The second physicist uses models from fluid dynamic theory in order to build ‘an 
algorithm suitable for simulating the relevant class of flow problems and transforms that 
algorithm into a computer program that runs on her computer’ (2010, 49). In each of these 
cases, the scientist is studying their system—the laboratory setup or the computer program—
to learn about something else. If we take it that the system that the two physicists are trying 
to learn about are the supersonic gas jets which are formed when gasses fall into the gravity 
well of a black hole, then it is clear that neither scientist is controlling the actual object of 
interest in Gilbert and Troitzsch’s sense (ibid., 52).19 
This means that for experiments conducted in a laboratory, there is also work to be done to 
demonstrate that the system informs us of the world outside the experimental setup. In the 
process of conducting experiments and analysing their results, scientists need to show why 
their experimental system is informative of their ultimate target, that is, they need to establish 
its external validity. And this is the subject of extensive discussion in the epistemology of 
experiment and science studies more generally. It is not a simple case of a scientist having 
immediate access to the target. 
 
19 Winsberg also highlights that it is unclear as to what it means to “experiment with a model”, given 
that models are abstract entities. Instead, what is “manipulated” in a computer simulation is a computer, 
a physical entity. See Parker (2009) for an argument that computer simulations are material experiments 




And so, there is a need to acknowledge that both simulations and experiments involve 
studying an object that “stands in” for the system that the scientist is ultimately interested in. 
But for Morgan, the force of the materiality claim comes from recognising a core ontological 
difference: the object in an experiment replicates part of the world it stands for (albeit in a 
way that is domesticated, that is, simpler to manipulate), whereas the object of study in a 
simulation only represents the world outside the simulation. And so, there is no “shared 
ontology” between object and target in a simulation. Guala characterises this difference by 
stating that in an experiment, ‘the correspondence holds at a ‘deep ‘material’ level’, and the 
same causal processes are present. On the other hand, in a simulation, ‘the similarity is 
admittedly only ‘abstract’ and ‘formal’’ (2002, 66).  
Morgan makes a persuasive case through discussing examples of experiments and models in 
economics. She highlights similarities between models and experiments and argues that 
models (and simulations) also have a “life of their own”.20 They are ‘autonomous 
instruments of investigation’ from theories and are said to ‘mediate’ between theory and the 
world (Morgan and Morrison 1999). However, Morgan argues that the difference between 
the relationship between object and target in experiments compared to simulations has 
consequences for the epistemic status of these practices; ‘The fact that the same materials 
are in the experiment and the world makes inferences to the world possible if not easy…The 
shared ontology has epistemological implications. We are more justified in claiming to learn 
something about the world from experiment because the world and experiment share the 
same stuff’ (2005, 323). In other words, ‘on the grounds of inference, experiment remains 
the preferable mode of inquiry because ontological equivalence provides epistemological 
power’ (ibid., 326). On Morgan’s view, it is more difficult to establish a computer 
simulation’s external validity, that is, how suited the object is as a stand in for the target and 
how valid scientists’ inferences are from the experimental setup to the natural world, 
compared to the external validity of a physical experiment where a scientist has a version or 
sample of the target phenomenon. 
Morgan focuses on economic experiments, but the claim is taken as carrying over to all 
sciences. Take cases of learning about how a new drug may affect the human body. It appears 
 
20 While Morgan speaks in terms of the comparison of models and experiments, I follow Parke (2014), 
Parker (2009), and Winsberg (2010) amongst others and take Morgan to be clearly speaking broadly of 
models thus including computer simulations, and consequently, that her arguments regarding the object-




that in such a case, testing the drug on human volunteers, or at least other mammals such as 
mice, may give us a better indication of the drugs’ effects than if we carried out a computer 
simulation. As we saw in Winsberg’s example presented above, in both cases (the physicist 
conducting the experiment and the physicist using a computer simulation) the scientist is 
manipulating an object that is different from the target, that is, the intergalactic gas jet. Yet 
in the experiment, the physicist is manipulating something that composed of fluids which 
‘really have different densities, and they really flow past each other at supersonic speeds’ 
(2010, 56). The thought is that this offers assurance that in at least some ways, the results of 
the experiment will be applicable to the target. The computer simulation, however, lacks 
these shared material features with the target. As Winsberg explains the view, computer 
simulations can only be reliably informative ‘in virtue of being suitably programmed; the 
reliability of the results depends entirely on having chosen the right model and the right 
algorithm’ (ibid.). It appears that the materiality claim will also have implications for the 
external validity of thought experiments. In Guala’s terminology, thought experiments are 
also an instance of a formal, rather than a material, analogy.  
Despite its intuitive plausibility, there are many problems with the materiality argument that 
have been highlighted in the computer simulation literature. For example, Parke (2014) has 
discussed issues establishing exactly what “sharing the same stuff” means. An uncharitable 
way of interpreting it would be the same stuff at a fundamental level. But, Parke explains if 
this was all that was meant then we could say that all biological experiments would have 
material continuity to whatever target system in the sense that ‘their objects and targets are 
made of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur’ (ibid., 523). Another 
way is to understand the claim as meaning that there are certain degrees of object-target 
correspondence. At the highest degree, the object in an experience would be identical to the 
target system. Laboratory experiments would not meet this, but natural experiments (if we 
take them to be experiments) might qualify as in such cases, there is no control of the system 
involved. Another level of material correspondence, Parke explains, would be an ‘object that 
is a token of the same relevant ontological category as the target, at a sufficiently fine-grained 
level for the purpose at hand’, for example chemists using study samples of an element to 
learn about its properties in general or one living organism of one species to learn about 
another (but both say, mammals). Further removed, would be instances of say using a plastic 




Somewhere along this ‘various degrees of material correspondence’, we might try to locate 
other types of simulations, including analogue simulations. This might be a difficult task 
given that analogue simulations are cases in which another physical system is used to 
simulate a target system. Often this is because the target system is often impossible or 
difficult to test. For example, Dardashti et al. (2017) discuss the difficulties of testing 
Hawking radiation, that is, the radiation predicted to be released by black holes. Given that 
scientists cannot construct black holes to test this nor can the radiation be detected through 
observation (as it is too weak), an analogue system has been developed. Unruh (1981) 
proposed the use of fluids to simulate black holes because there are relevant similarities 
between the two, labelling the set up a “dumb hole”. He highlighted that fluids could move 
so fast that it would mean that sound waves would have to move faster than the speed of 
sound in order to escape from them. This is analogous to how black holes have a horizon in 
which light cannot escape.21 A key issue regarding analogue simulations is how they relate 
to both computer simulations in that that they can be said to involve a ‘programming’ of a 
system, albeit a physical one (Dardashti et al. 2017, 74). Another central question is how 
they relate to physical laboratory experiments (in the sense that it is the use of a physical 
system that is different from the ultimate target system).  
And so, it appears that there might be degrees with regard to what material correspondence 
consists in and one way of interpreting the materiality thesis is to claim that we should be 
able to locate different research practices somewhere along this continuum. But, as Parke 
goes on to argue, establishing how well a research programme meets object-target 
correspondence is really difficult. Even if we can pin down how well material 
correspondence has been achieved between object and target, there are other difficulties with 
the materiality thesis. By drawing on the case of weather forecasting, Parker (2009) 
highlights the sheer difficulty of setting up and carrying out a laboratory experiment in order 
to make temperature predictions of various cities given the complexity of the temperature 
structure of the atmosphere. Given their historical reliability at providing at least 
approximately accurate temperature predictions for the target cities, Parker argues that 
scientists are more justified in drawing conclusions about their target when utilising a 
computer simulation. This is despite the material similarity that holds between the 
experimental setup and the target (2009, 492). So there will be technical reasons as to why 
 





we cannot experiment on a system at all, or with the same level of experimental control that 
we can with a simulation. And this is the same for thought experiments; many thought 
experiments cannot be realised as a physical experiment.22  
Parker has further argued that we ought to focus on relevant similarities, rather than on 
material similarities. What counts as a relevant similarity is dependent upon what scientists 
are trying to find out about their target system: ‘the relevant similarities might be formal 
similarities, material similarities or some combination of the two, depending on the type of 
experiment and the target question a hand. But, crucially, having experimental and target 
systems made out of the same materials does not guarantee that all of the relevant similarities 
obtain’ (2009, 493). With reference to the weather forecasting example above, Parker 
explains in the case of a laboratory experiment that is materially relevant to the target system, 
relevant similarity can fail to obtain. For example, one feature that has to be similar to the 
target in the experiment is the various dimensionless parameters of fluid flow. But as some 
of the values of the parameters ‘depends on other things other than just which fluid is being 
used—e.g. on such things as the depth of the fluid and the size, shape, roughness and 
movement of any container holding it’ then this means that even when the same materials 
are used, there will be reason to maintain that relevant similarity has not been met.23 
Similarly, Frigg and Reiss have discussed how in some cases, ‘it is structural properties that 
enable reliable inferences and such properties can be shared between physical systems and 
mathematical models’ (2009, 609) They offer the example of the stability of an ankle joint. 
This is not dependent upon the material components of the bones but rather on the shape of 
the joint which can be successfully captured in a model (ibid., 610).   
The upshot of this is that there will be particular situations in which an experiment will take 
epistemic priority over a computer simulation or a thought experiment in virtue of its 
 
22 Parker acknowledges that Morgan’s claim could be best understood as an “all other things being 
equal” claim: ‘Ceteris paribus, inferences about target systems are more justified when experimental 
and target systems are made of the “same stuff” than when they are not’ (2019, 492). And so, we should 
understand the claim to be that if an experiment could be performed, then scientists would be in a better 
position to make inferences about their target than in the case of a simulation. But Parker goes on to 
explain the difficulties in determining what the “all else” that must be equal is. Instead of trying to suss 
out what this could be, Parker moves on to her other worry with the materiality claim; it is relevant 
similarity that ought to be focused on. 
23 See also Roush (2018) for a recent defence of the epistemic priority of experiment that does not rely 
on the materiality thesis and depends instead on the property of natural kinds. Further, drawing on 
Parker, Currie and Levy argue that the experimental object must share focal properties with the target 
but these do not need to be materially similar ones. For instance, a focal property might be the property 




material similarity with the target system. It might be that this is particularly apparent in 
cases in which  scientists do not know much about their target system. However, the notion 
that the materiality argument applies in general is problematic. Therefore, against Morgan, 
ontological equivalence does not necessarily provide epistemological power. 
 
 The Value of Surprise 
Now that I have discussed Morgan’s materiality thesis, I’ll turn to my main focus of the 
chapter which is her second argument for privileging experiments. This is the surprise 
argument which states that computer simulations do not have the capacity to surprise us in 
the same way that physical experiments can. This is said to have consequences for their 
epistemic status. Morgan’s argument is yet to be applied to thought experiments, but I’ll 
demonstrate how it carries over before saying more about the ways in which thought 
experiments can surprise in a productive way.  
As previously mentioned, surprise is underexplored in the philosophy of science. The way 
in which surprised has been spoken about can be characterised as one of the following two 
forms 1) surprising phenomena or 2) surprising or novel predictions. An example of the first 
would be Becquerel’s accidental discovery of radioactivity. As Bedessem and Ruphy 
discuss, Becquerel was studying a crystal that contained uranium in order to assess how 
uranium crystals are affected by light. But he noticed something surprising; the crystal had 
fogged a photo plate which happened to be left next to it. This led to the hypothesis that 
uranium is radioactive (2019, 3). An example of the second sense in which surprise has been 
considered in philosophy of science would be the case of Fresnel’s theory of light that was 
used to make the novel prediction of the bright spot (Douglas and Magnus 2013). The sense 
of surprise that I discuss is related to (1), that is, surprising phenomena. This is orthogonal 
to discussions of novel and successful predictions and their place in debates regarding 
scientific realism and so I will not say anything about surprise in the sense of (2).  
In presenting the distinction between surprise and confoundment, Morgan focuses on the 
comparison between modelling and experiment in economics. However, Boumans (2012), 
Parke (2014), Currie (2018) and Beisbart (2018) have extended the discussion to computer 
simulations and their use across science. Morgan distinguishes between ‘mere surprise’ and 
‘confoundment’ (or ‘productive surprise’ (Currie 2018)) and argues that the latter carries 




behaviour but one that can ultimately be explained by existing theory. Whereas in cases of 
confoundment, a type of surprise emerges that can force the scientific community to re-
evaluate their theories in a radical way. As Morgan states, confoundment consists in results 
‘which are both surprising and unexplainable within the given realm of theory’ (2005, 324).  
Morgan claims that while both simulations and experiments can achieve mere surprise, only 
the latter can achieve confoundment. This is explained by highlighting key differences 
between the objects of study in experiments compared to those in computer simulations. The 
surprise argument is presented alongside Morgan’s claims regarding the materiality of 
experiments. As we have seen, Morgan grants that both simulations and experiments involve 
studying a system that “stands in” for the system that the scientist is ultimately interested in. 
But she argues that there is a core ontological difference; the object in an experiment 
replicates part of the world it stands for (albeit in a way that is domesticated, that is, simpler 
to manipulate), whereas the object of study in a simulation only represents the world outside 
of the simulation. 
This ontological difference then underpins that between confoundment and ‘mere’ surprise 
via the issue of control: As physical experiments are said to capture or reproduce the parts 
of the natural world the scientist is interested in, the object in an experiment is a version of 
the object or system in nature. This means scientists are not in complete control of the 
experiment’s results. In a computer simulation, on the other hand, scientists are studying 
something artificial that they programmed themselves and over which they, ultimately, retain 
control. This thought is echoed by Sniegowski, who states: ‘Although surprises do emerge 
in simulations, in general what goes into a simulation is well known and surprises are not 
anticipated. In contrast, surprises and exceptions to anticipated results are fairly common in 
experimental systems’ (quoted in Parke 2014, 527). 
The relation between the materiality thesis (the view that experimental results are more 
reliable due to the object and target being made of the “same stuff”) as discussed in the 
previous section and the surprise argument is worth attending to. While Morgan presents the 
two in the same paper, and regards them as related, it does appear that they are independent 
arguments. Similarly, Parke argues against the materiality claim, but then presents another 
way in which experiments could be privileged, that is, due to their capacity to surprise in the 
confounding sense, which demonstrates that she also understands the arguments as distinct. 




that experiments can confound has to do with materiality. I take it that what is relevant for 
Morgan’s surprise claim is that in an experiment, scientists are studying a material system 
and therefore a system that they themselves have not programmed. Hence, there is a certain 
freedom that the system has when compared with simulations. This is different from the 
claim that confoundment is rooted in the material similarity between object and target. 
Morgan does not discuss analogue simulations, and analogue simulations have not been 
considered in the existing responses to Morgan’s surprise argument. But it does appear that 
on Morgan’s view, analogue simulations can also confound since they too are a material 
system (granted that for Morgan, it appears there will be more difficulties in establishing 
their external validity). Furthermore, treating the two arguments as separate allows for the 
surprise argument to be considered even though there are difficulties with the materiality 
thesis as seen above.24 
To see the difference between surprise and confoundment, and why Morgan takes it that only 
experiments can achieve the latter, I will start with outlining how simulations can merely 
surprise on her view. Scientists are often ignorant about their simulations and even if they 
know everything about the starting assumption of their models and the rules for how the 
system will change over time, these can be very complex, and they will not know all the 
consequences of the conditions that they started with. And as Morgan highlights, finding out 
what follows from the initial conditions is the goal of running the simulation, and sometimes 
what follows can be unexpected. However, she states: ‘The constraints on the model’s 
behaviour are set, however opaque they may be, by the scientist who built the model so that 
however unexpected the model outcomes, they can be traced back to, and re-examined in 
terms of, the model’ (2005, 325). That is to say, in computer simulations, the model used 
necessitates the result of the simulation. And so, a simulation’s result can be fully explained 
by its design and implementation and hence is under the control of the scientists’ involved. 
Consequently, simulations cannot confound. 
As mentioned, Morgan argues that it is only physical experiments (and not simulations) that 
can confound. This is because the behaviour of the object that is being investigated in an 
 
24 Currie’s discussion of surprise presents Morgan’s two arguments are more closely intertwined. On 
his view, the surprise argument focuses on results that are not only surprising, but also tell us something 
about our target system. One way of making this connection to the target system would be through the 
materiality claim, but see Currie and Levy (2019) for how Currie’s view differs from Morgan. In his 
paper on surprise, Currie shows how simulations can also surprise in a productive sense in that they 




experiment is not completely controlled by the design of the experiment, and therefore, when 
we intervene on nature, genuinely new phenomena can emerge: 
 ‘Such new behaviour patterns, ones that surprise and at first confound the profession, 
are only possible if experiments are set up with a certain degree of freedom… [so that 
its] behaviour is not totally determined by the theory involved, nor by the rules of the 
experiment’ (Morgan 2005, 324). 
There is, then, this important condition of “no over-control” in the case of experiments that 
have the potential to confound rather than merely surprise. In conducting a physical 
experiment, a scientist sets out to discover how a system will respond to an intervention. But 
if the system is over-controlled, then the system will not be able to react in this way. Instead, 
its behaviour is dictated by the set up and, as Beisbart puts it, ‘nature doesn’t have anything 
to say’ (2018, 187).  When experimental set-ups meet this condition of “no-over control”, 
then scientists can gain results which are not implied by the assumptions of the set up. We 
can consider again the example of Becquerel and the fogged photo plates—the world can 
surprise us, and physical experiments, despite being tamed in a sense, maintain this quality.  
To summarise Morgan’s argument: In a computer simulation, surprising results only arise 
because we do not have epistemic access to all the consequences of our model before we run 
the simulation. But knowing the facts about the experimental design in an experiment is not 
always enough to explain the surprising results. Even within the setting of a laboratory there 
can be ‘potential for independent action’ (2005, 325). And when there is, we can be 
confronted with new phenomena that are both surprising and, importantly, ‘unexplainable 
within the given realm of theory’ (ibid, 324).  
As I noted above, Morgan has limited her discussion of surprise and confoundment to 
economics. In particular, Morgan refers to Chamberlin’s classroom experiments on how 
markets work. In these experiments, students were told that they were either buyers or sellers, 
and they were presented with cards with numbers on. These numbers represented the 
maximum buying price or the minimum selling price, taken from a supply and demand 
model. As Morgan states, the ‘numbers generated by the model, and the ‘rules’ of the market, 
provided some constraint on the subject’s behaviour but also allowed them freedom to trade 
at some range of prices’. The students moved around the room, so that buyers and sellers 
could engage with each other and then trade at an agreed price. The results of the experiment 




predicted’. Morgan explains how these experiments were not merely surprising, but 
confounding: ‘To Chamberlin, the recalcitrance of his results—the phenomena of a pattern 
of behaviour—seemed not just surprising, but sufficiently un-expected and startling enough 
to make him think seriously about a fundamental assumption in microeconomics. On the 
basis of his results, he came to doubt that there was even a tendency towards equilibrium’ 
(2005, 326). 
An interesting question is whether the difference is particularly stark when applied to 
economics given the complexity of people and their behaviour in decision making. And so, 
an issue to consider is whether some of Morgan’s claims ought to be taken as domain specific 
and do not carry over to all of the sciences, or have more weight in certain cases over others. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned, those who have discussed Morgan’s account have not limited it 
to economics and the core thought remains. That is, we lose some general openness to nature 
when we conduct a simulation and this can affect the type of surprise that can arise.  
To summarise, the epistemic value of confoundment lies in the fact that the relevant 
phenomena cry out for explanation. Confounding results are disruptive in a productive way: 
they have the potential to force us to think seriously about our existing theories and to 
motivate new research in order to find a way of accommodating the surprising results. 
Ritson, in her discussion of novelty at the Large Hadron Collider, has a similar view to 
Morgan. She states ‘the kinds of novelty framed as most valuable are those that violate 
expectations and are difficult to incorporate into existing structures of knowledge’ (2019, 1). 
For Morgan, it is only experiments that can achieve confoundment and this is one reason to 
privilege the experiments over computer simulations. I will now apply Morgan’s view to 
thought experiments. 
 
 Surprise and Confoundment in Thought Experiments 
What does Morgan’s distinction between surprise and confoundment mean for thought 
experiments? On one hand, there are clear examples of thought experiments that have 
produced unexpected and significant outcomes. Take Einstein’s chasing a beam of light 
example, as presented in the previous chapter. This thought experiment exposes the 
surprising tensions between Newtonian mechanics and Maxwell’s equations. On the other 




with the world. And so, we can ask: Should the surprise that arises from thought experiments 
be considered a less valuable kind of surprise as Morgan argues for computer simulations?   
First, I shall show that depending on the account of what a thought experiment is, and how 
they work, there are alternative views as to how they can surprise us (and whether they can 
confound). I begin by outlining what the surprise/confoundment distinction might look like 
on Brown’s platonist view of thought experiments, before turning to Norton’s account which 
maintains that thought experiments are arguments. I then suggest an alternative position 
which attends to the role that the imagination plays in thought experiments that demonstrates 
how they can bring about confoundment in a distinctive way. 
 
2.4.1 Brown’s View: Thought Experiments and Platonism 
As I discussed in the introduction, Brown argues that there is a particular group of thought 
experiments that provide knowledge of the world through “transcending empiricism”; they 
allow us access to the laws of nature that exist as platonic entities. Brown presents Galileo’s 
famous thought experiment against Aristotle as an illustrative example. The thought 
experiment undermines Aristotle’s theory that heavier bodies fall faster than lighter ones by 
a reductio ad absurdum, and also generates a new theory, making it, what Brown labels, 
both a destructive and a constructive thought experiment. Galileo asks us to imagine 
attaching two balls together, a heavy cannonball and a lighter musket ball, and dropping 
them from the leaning tower of Pisa. What does Aristotle’s theory predict? Both that the 
combined balls will fall faster than the heavier one on its own, as the combined object is 
heavier, and that the combined object will fall slower, as the lighter ball is inclined to fall 
slower and so, will drag the heavier body back. From this, Galileo proposes a new theory; 
all objects fall at the same speed.  
Brown states that in this example, ‘we have a transition from one theory to another which is 
quite remarkable. There has been no new empirical evidence. The old theory was rationally 
believed before the thought experiment, but was shown to be absurd by it. The thought 
experiment established rational belief in a new theory’ (1986, 10). For Brown, this is a priori 
knowledge; the belief in Galileo’s theory is not based on new empirical data and importantly, 





As seen, Brown takes the analogy between thought experiments and physical experiments 
seriously. Thought experiments involve quasi-observation; a system is represented and then 
observed by the mind’s eye in a way that is analogous to physical experiments. And if we 
think about Morgan’s distinction between surprise and confoundment (when applied to 
thought experiments) on Brown’s view, it appears that platonic thought experiments can also 
confound. This is because, despite relying on non-experiential perception, this class of 
thought experiments produce results that cannot be traced back to or explained in terms of 
the initial conditions of the thought experiment. And so, for Brown, the insights gained from 
platonic thought experiments are not simply a matter of  ‘seeing old empirical data in a new 
way’ (ibid., 11) (by inferring the new theory from already known data) but rather, involve 
genuine discovery.  
As mentioned, Brown’s platonist view has not been popular in the literature, given its 
metaphysical commitments. And in what follows, I will go on to explore alternatives to his 
way of characterising thought experiments, including the type of surprise that they can bring 
about. Before I do, I want to outline a similar thought regarding the links between surprise 
and mind-independence that comes up in the philosophy of mathematics and the ontology of 
scientific theories, as discussed by Simons (unpublished) and Leng (2011), and French and 
Vickers (2011) and French (2020a) respectively.  
We saw that Brown compares his view to mathematical platonism, in particular, he refers to 
Gödel’s platonist position. As Leng (2011) and Simons (unpublished) discuss, the 
phenomenon of surprise can motivate a commitment to abstract objects in mathematics. The 
thought is that the phenomenology of mathematical theorising, explained as a feeling of 
discovery as opposed to creation, is best explained by platonism which maintains that 
mathematicians are indeed observing a mathematical reality that lies outside human minds. 
Similarly, in 1905, Einstein published a paper in which he derived his famous equation 
E=mc2. Over seventy years later, Popper discussed this derivation, arguing that Einstein 
‘must have been surprised’ to have obtained the equation from the core principles of special 
relativity. For Popper, this surprise offers support for his view that theories are ‘real’ in some 
sense. While they are not platonic objects (as they can have a causal effect on the world, are 
created and are subject to change), they do exist as abstract entities in ‘world 3’ along with 
artworks and social institutions. World 3 is ‘the world of products of the human mind’ 




Popper states that theories exist as hypotheses plus their logical consequences. They cannot 
be mental representations as it is not possible to have a ‘full understanding of all the 
possibilities inherent in a theory’ (ibid). Instead, they must be mind-independent: ‘something 
objective and objectively existing—an object we study, something we try to grasp’ (ibid.). 
And so, Popper took this aspect of surprise (as in the case of Einstein’s derivation) to be 
evidence for the reality of theories. In the same sense that the physical world includes 
unexpected and surprising phenomena, theories too have hidden features which can be 
revealed to us. Given that the surprise that arises from physical objects depend on their 
independent existence (as in the Becquerel case), the mind-independence of theories explains 
how we can be surprised when we explore and discover more things about them (French and 
Vickers 2011, 797). I’ll come back to this below. For now, we can consider an alternative to 
Brown’s view. 
 
2.4.2 Norton’s View: Thought Experiments are Arguments 
As already noted, Norton’s advocates the view that thought experiments are arguments. In 
answering the question of how they can have novel empirical import, Norton claims that 
there is ‘only one non-controversial source from which this information can come: it is 
elicited from information we already have by an identifiable argument… The alternative to 
this view is to suppose that thought experiments provide some new and even mysterious 
route to knowledge of the physical world’ (1991, 129). Thought experiments give us 
knowledge about the world because we draw on previous knowledge. Starting from this, an 
argument leads us to new beliefs, and if sound, this provides knowledge.  
Norton’s view is often separated into two claims. The first is a reconstruction thesis (context 
of justification claim): The epistemic power of a thought experiment is that of its 
reconstructed argument form. Norton provides support for this by reconstructing many 
thought experiments into arguments, noting that we can do so without losing anything 
epistemically, and he argues that no case cannot be handled in such a way. The second claim 
is about the performance of a thought experiment (context of discovery claim): Norton takes 
it to be the case that the conduct of a thought experiment just is that of an argument. 
Revisiting Galileo’s thought experiment, it can be reconstructed as an argument (uncovering 
an inconsistency in Aristotle’s physics) as follows: 




(ii) Weight is additive 
(iii) Natural speed is mediative 
From (ii) and (iii), we get the negation of (i)   
This reconstruction is limited to the ‘destructive’ part of Galileo’s thought experiment. But 
as I outlined when discussing Brown’s view, the thought experiment is also a ‘constructive’ 
dimension. That is, it introduces a new theory that all bodies fall at the same speed. Norton 
grants that this part of the reconstruction is more difficult than the previous steps and 
concedes that this is where Brown’s platonist view is at its most compelling. However, 
Norton points out that the move to the new theory depends on the addition of an assumption 
(which he takes Brown to hold that we make this tacitly when we conduct the thought 
experiment) that ‘the speed of fall of bodies depends only on their weights’ (Norton 1996, 
342). He goes on to outline how this assumption is problematic. Salviati (Galileo’s 
mouthpiece) was not able to make such an assumption at that time, as it would involve 
assuming away the medium in which the bodies fall. This is because the ‘broader focus of 
discussion, the very point that raised the question of falling bodies, is the possibility of the 
existence of a vacuum. To assume the possibility of a vacuum at this point would be to beg 
the main question under discussion’. And Salviati goes on to allows that the same weight of 
the same material, for example gold, would fall differently depending on its shape (ibid., 
344). Because of this, Norton concludes that ‘this final step now looks more like a clumsy 
fudge or a stumble than a leap into the Platonic world of laws’ (ibid., 345).  
In a paper with Beisbart, Norton (2012) claims that computer simulations are also arguments 
(see also Beisbart 2012, 2018). The thought is that computer simulations raise a parallel issue 
to the above question: How do they provide knowledge about a real-world target without 
any observation of that target? Beisbart and Norton’s answer is that thought experiments and 
computer simulations provide knowledge in the same way: we build what we know into their 
construction, that is, the description of the thought experiment or the assumptions of the 
computer simulation, and this knowledge is then transformed through a logical process. Like 
Norton, Beisbart reconstructs computer simulations into arguments, and argues that their 
epistemic force is not thereby lost. And further, that ‘the reconstructing argument is executed 
when a computer simulation is carried out’ (2012, 419-420). I will not consider any problems 




knowledge) but I will come back to some of the worries of the argument view when applied 
to thought experiments.25  
Returning to surprise, it appears that on this view, thought experiments can only achieve 
mere surprise in Morgan’s sense; as all of the implications of the thought experimental setup 
are not known, these can be surprising. In Galileo’s thought experiment, if we limit the 
example to its destructive component, we can say that the contradiction in Aristotelian 
physics was already, in some sense “there”; the thought experiment simply exposed it. But 
still, it was surprising. However thought experiments, like computer simulations, do not 
involve new observations of the world and instead they transform existing knowledge. 
Beisbart and Norton (2012) characterise this distinction as one between ‘discovery’ and 
‘inferring’; thought experiments and computer simulations allow us to explore what we 
already know. But because of their lack of contact with the world, we cannot discover 
anything that falls outside of our existing knowledge.26 
As French and Vickers (2011) discuss in the context of theories, Wittgenstein dismissed the 
value of surprise in deductive contexts. In his Remarks of the Foundations of Mathematics 
(1978), Wittgenstein asserts that mathematical reasoning does not involve discovery as on 
the platonist view. He argues (in contrast with conducting an experiment or more generally, 
interacting with mind-independent objects) that we can explain the reason why people might 
be surprised in cases of drawing conclusions through logical reasoning by pointing to their 
limitations:  
"The demonstration has a surprising result!"--If you are surprised, then you have not 
understood it yet. For surprise is not legitimate here, as it is with the issue of an 
experiment. There--I should like to say--it is permissible to yield to its charm; but not 
when the surprise comes to you at the end of a chain of inference. For here it is only a 
sign that unclarity or some misunderstanding still reigns’ (ibid., 111). 
Here, Wittgenstein argues that surprise can be explained away by pointing out how 
mathematicians (and people more generally) have epistemic limitations: As Simons explains 
 
25 See Lusk (2016) and Boge (2019) for critical discussions of Beisbart and Norton’s view of 
simulations. 
26 This is not to say that Beisbart and Norton take it that we cannot gain new knowledge from thought 
experiments and computer simulations. They emphasise that ‘the results inferred were not known prior 
to investigations’ (2012, 409). And in the context of thought experiments only, Norton states even if a 
hypothesis ‘is in some sense implicit in the premises, it can still be novel in the sense that it was 




‘a proof is too long to keep all its steps in mind, so something is lost from an individual’s 
view’ (unpublished, 7).27 Whereas if a mathematician could hold the whole proof in their 
mind then they would see how each step would follow and hence, they would not be 
surprised. If we were to follow this line, along with Norton’s presentation of thought 
experiments as arguments, then there might seem to be little of any interest to say about 
surprise in this context. French and Vickers use Wittgenstein’s dismissal of surprise to 
undermine Popper’s view, suggesting that the reason why surprise might arise from 
theoretical derivations lies in scientists’ cognitive limitations. They argue that own our 
thoughts can surprise us ‘if we accept that those thoughts (or their propositional 
representations) have consequences we haven’t deduced yet…we have certain beliefs plus 
certain rules for generating new beliefs therefrom, not because the new beliefs actually 
already exist and we discover them as we make our inferences’ (ibid., 797). This line of 
thought thus allows a resistance to the view that surprise motivates a realist picture of 
theories as world 3 entities (or a commitment to the laws of nature as platonic entities, as on 
Brown’s view of thought experiments).  
However, it is important to note that Norton’s reconstructions are not limited to deductive 
arguments; they can also include inductive steps, as in the example of Einstein’s elevator as 
mentioned in the previous chapter. The first two steps of Norton’s reconstruction go as 
follows: ‘(1) In an opaque chest, an observer will see free bodies move identically in case 
the box is uniformly accelerated in gravitation free space and in case the box is at rest in a 
homogenous gravitational field. (2) Inductive step: (a) the case is typical and will hold for 
all observable phenomena and (b) the presence of the chest and observer are inessential to 
the equivalence’ (1991, 137).28  
And so, Norton’s view of thought experiments allow for steps that are ampliative; they go 
beyond what is stated in the premises. The same holds for his and Beisbart’s account of 
 
27 Leng also draws on Wittgenstein’s notion of the ‘hardness of the logical must’ in order to argues that 
any feelings of discovery in mathematical theorising can be explained by seeing them as ‘sudden 
realisations of what had to hold, given the constraints’. These constraints are not necessarily ‘imposed 
by an independent realm of objects about which our theories must assert truths’ but rather, arise from 
what questions we are setting out to answer, and what options count as appropriate given these questions 
(2011, 64).  
28 As mentioned in the introduction, Norton’s notion of logical reasoning in thought experiments has 
expanded over the years to include steps beyond deduction and induction to informal inferences and 
reasoning from analogy. Here, I will not discuss this further given the criticism that it renders the 
argument account ‘vacuously true’ (Brendel 2018, 287; see also Stuart 2016). I come back to this in 




computer simulations; these can also transform the assumptions in the model in a way that 
preserves the probability of truth (2012, 411). 
What is the epistemic value of the surprise we can gain from thought experiments on the 
argument view? In contrast to Brown, Norton’s view is that the information we gain through 
deductive and inductive inferences do not constitute genuine discovery as in the case of 
experiments. And Beisbart has explicitly endorsed Morgan’s view when discussing the 
epistemic status of simulations. Beisbart offers the example of the Michaelson-Morley 
experiment that undermined the view that the earth has a non-zero velocity with respect to 
the ether. As Beisbart argues, this experiment ‘has a complicated set-up, and a number of 
assumptions are needed to interpret its data as having implications about the ether. But this 
does not imply what the result of the experiment is’. If in place of this experiment, a 
simulation was used, it would not have confounded as there would be an assumption 
regarding the earth’s velocity with respect to the ether in the simulation’s programming 
(Beisbart 2018, 12). Similarly, we could say that a thought experiment would not give us the 
confounding result.  
And so, there are clearly cases in which an experiment only could confound. Further to this, 
there are cases of thought experiments that may bring about mere surprise, in the sense that 
they result in some unexpected behaviour, but do not confound. That is to say, the result can 
be explained by existing theory. One example, discussed in the previous chapter, is Dewan 
and Beran’s rockets and thread. The thought experiment draws out a physical implication of 
special relativity. As Bokulich explains, ‘one might understand the special theory of 
relativity, and know the laws that this theory postulates, but still not be aware that they imply 
the existence of relativistic stress effects’ (2001, 301). What the rockets and thread thought 
experiment does is makes these consequences (which otherwise might have remained 
hidden) explicit.29  
However, it can also be highlighted that thought experiments can surprise in a disruptive 
way. That is, in a way that can force us to re-evaluate our existing theories. In the case of the 
reconstructed argument form of Galileo’s thought experiment, although there are no new 
empirical discoveries being made, the scenario we are asked to imagine exposes a 
 
29 Another example of a thought experiment that reveals a surprising consequence, but perhaps cannot 
be said to meet Morgan’s sense of confoundment, is Schrödinger’s cat. The thought experiment is 
introduced to demonstrate a bizarre feature of the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics 




contradiction in Aristotelian physics. We could just dismiss this along Wittgenstenian lines, 
but this would overlook how the result of the thought experiment cannot be explained within 
the domain of the old theory and prompts the development of a new theory. A similar claim 
has been made in the context of simulations. Currie and Parke give examples of confounding 
simulations that produce results that not only go against expectations, but also ‘promote 
changes to, or re-examinations of, explanatory resources pertaining to the target’ (Currie 
2017, 654).30 This therefore puts pressure on Morgan’s argument that the different sources 
of surprise impact the epistemic status of the feature under consideration.  
I agree that there is a difference between thought experiments and computer simulations on 
the one hand, and experiments on the other, in that the surprise arises in a different way. 
However, all can be disruptive. At this point, it is helpful to drawn on Currie’s account of 
surprise in simulations. As we have seen, physical experiments involve bringing our 
theoretical knowledge into contact with the world (granted the differences between an 
experimental object and the target) and we gain new empirical results. When experiments 
meet the condition of “no over control”, they have the potential to bring about results that 
can force us to revise our theoretical knowledge. That is, they can confound. Simulations 
importantly differ from experiments in certain respects. As Currie states, the design and 
running of a simulation is a way ‘of filling out, making explicit, and probing our theoretical, 
conceptual and empirical ideas’ (2018, 656). This is still a way of generating knowledge—
and can bring about productive surprises—but unlike the experiment case, it does not involve 
this ‘contact with new empirical results’ (ibid). Like simulations, thought experiments also 
probe our theoretical, conceptual and empirical ideas rather than generating knowledge 
through bringing theoretical knowledge into contact with the world. And thus, they also 
differ from experiments in important respects. However, I will now look to important 
differences between thought experiments and computer simulations which illustrates how 
 
30 Parke outlines the ABM (agent-based model) Sugarscape. This model had “hidden features” that were 
previously unknown. In this example, the surprise (in the confounding sense) ‘consists in the emergence 
of familiar macrostructures from the bottom up…from the simple local rules… The fact that these are 
sufficient to generate the phenomena is the surprise. The object of study that looks very simple has 
generative properties that one would have never known about until studying it’ which in turn prompts 
questions regarding the features of the object of study (2014, 531-531). Similarly, Currie outlines a 
simulation that uses a computer model to work out the gait of a sauropod. The simulation productively 
surprises (that is, confounds): ‘What is surprising is how it walked: no known animal combines an 
elephant-like stride with knuckle-walking. So, the results went against expectations insofar as there was 
no expectation for that gait to emerge. It wasn’t, for instance, a pre-existing hypothesis to be tested’ 





they probe this knowledge in different ways. And this has implications for how they bring 
about productive surprises.  
 
 Thought Experiments, the Imagination and Surprise 
One view which highlights some of the differences between computer simulations and 
thought experiments is that computer simulations are simply more complex thought 
experiments. Di Paolo et al (2000) characterise simulations as ‘opaque’ thought experiments. 
By this, they mean that each explore hypothetical scenarios, but in simulations this is done 
via a computer and scientists do not follow each step. Similarly, Lenhard (2018) has argued 
that due to their complexity and opacity, simulations are more likely to surprise than thought 
experiments. And this forms part of Chandrasekheran et al’s (2012) view that thought 
experiments will be replaced by computer simulations. Depending on what you take a 
thought experiment or a computer simulation to be, such a view could supplement Beisbart 
and Norton’s argument view.  
In one sense, it seems that simulations are more transparent in that we know that they work 
by many simple steps. As Beisbart and Norton highlight, the imagination does not enter into 
the picture, which for them, can cloud the fact that ultimately thought experiments work by 
‘prosaic inference’, and are arguments (2012, 409). However, what Lenhard means by the 
transparency of thought experiments is that they ‘have to meet high standards of 
intelligibility, because the whole process takes place in cognition. If it is ever unclear what 
happens next, that is, if one cannot comprehend why a certain outcome should happen, the 
thought experiment fails’ (2018, 485). This contrasts with a computer simulation, which are 
not opaque ‘because it would be unclear how one step follows from its predecessors’ but 
rather, ‘it is the multitude of interrelated steps that can render the overall process opaque’ 
(ibid., 489). Lenhard references Morgan, but he does not discuss the distinction between 
surprise and confoundment. And so, it is difficult to see whether he takes the differences 
between thought experiments and simulations to impact whether they can merely surprise or 
confound. I take his view to be that i) surprise is valuable in science, including in simulations 
and thought experiments (even if in these cases, it is limited to mere surprise, that is, 
unexpected behaviours) and ii) we are more likely to get surprising results from computer 




One of the examples Lenhard discusses is Schelling’s (1978) model of social segregation 
which shows how individual’s preferences regarding their neighbours lead to segregated 
neighbourhoods. The neighbourhood is represented by a grid, made up of individual cells. 
Each agent is a member of one of two groups (say, based on race) and is located within a 
cell on the grid. Agents are then able to move around the grid, that is, relocate, until their 
preference regarding their neighbours is met. The strength of the agent’s preferences for 
neighbours within their own group can be altered. In cases where agents preferences are very 
strong, or even consist in wanting a neighbourhood entirely made up of others in their own 
group, then segregation will happen very quickly. But as Lenhard explains, what is surprising 
about Schelling’s model is that even when the preference for neighbours of own group-type 
is low—when agents are happy with neighbourhood that is a mix of their own group and the 
other group (but not too dominated by the other group)—segregation still occurs. Lenhard 
explains:  
‘What does “too dominated” mean? Reasoning does not help here, one needs to try 
out and actually perform a great number of iterations. In the model, one cell is 
inspected after the other and it is determined whether inhabitants want to move. After 
all cells have been checked, the process starts over. After many iterations, an 
equilibrium will occur and then one can see whether segregation has happened or not. 
The intriguing question is how weak preferences have to be to prevent segregation. 
This question can be answered only by exploratory trials with varying parameter 
values’ (2018, 491). 
Here, Lenhard highlights how the important aspect of Schelling’s model is not that 
segregation can occur, but rather, how weak the preferences have to be in order for a 
neighbourhood to become segregated. The simulation’s explanatory power is rooted in its 
ability to determine such parameters. Lenhard highlights that we could not get this from a 
thought experiment; ‘everything depends on the actual range of parameters that generate 
segregation. This range can be determined only by a great number of iterations’ (ibid.). 
Similarly, Chandrasekharan et al have argued that unlike computer simulations, thought 
experiments ‘do not naturally support the simulation of counterfactual scenarios beyond the 
one generated by the specific scenario and its elements, as the mental simulation process is 




In discussing the Michelson-Morley example as presented by Beisbart, we saw that an 
experiment only (and not a simulation) could bring about the sense of surprise that the 
example brings about. Similarly, we can grant that in some cases, a thought experiment in 
place of a computer simulation would not produce the surprising (possibly confounding) 
outcome and we can explain this by referring to the differences in their complexity compared 
with simulations. But here I want to argue that we should not be too quick to regard the 
surprise in the context of thought experiments as less valuable than either experiments or 
computer simulations. 
Firstly, characterising computer simulations as more complex or opaque thought 
experiments misses something important about the latter. Thought experiments can be 
surprising despite their simplicity. Galileo’s thought experiment had such significance in the 
history of science yet is a simple imagined scenario, involving the behaviour of bodies being 
dropped from a tower. Again, a comparison can be drawn here with surprise in the context 
of theoretical derivations. We cannot explain away the surprise that arises from Einstein’s 
derivation by appealing to its complexity; Einstein’s paper in which he derives E=mc2 is 
only three pages long.  
A second difference between simulations and thought experiments involves attending to the 
richness of the imagination with regards to the latter, which brings about surprise in a 
distinctive way. Before I say more about this, it is interesting to note that the Wittgensteinian 
dismissal of surprise in deductions as introduced can also be linked to a claim that he makes 
about the imagination. According to Wittgenstein, the imagination cannot provide us with 
new information, it ‘does not instruct us about the external world’ because it is subject to the 
will (1980, §80). Whereas physical objects in the world (and our perceptions of them) are of 
course not up to us in this sense, and thus can turn out differently to what we expect once we 
further study them and find out more about them. As in the case of mathematics, Wittgenstein 
states that in imagining we are creating, as opposed to observing or discovering. It is not just 
Wittgenstein who has made such a claim. For example, Sartre claims ‘it is impossible to find 
in the [mental] image anything more than what one puts into it; in other words, the [mental] 




the features of what one imagines, since one put them there’ (1990, 92). This mirrors the 
view of simulations presented earlier; our imagination gives us only what we put into it.31 
It appears that most of this discussion has been directed towards the imagistic imagination, 
that is, the imagination in terms of mental images (whether visual, auditory and so on). 
However, in her discussion of these arguments, Stock (2006) has argued that such a position, 
if true, would also apply to the propositional imagination, that is, imagining that something 
is the case. I turn to the nature of the imagination in science in the following chapter and say 
more about this distinction there. But the thought is that if the contents of our imaginings are 
up to us, and further, are “transparently accessible” then it means that you cannot be mistaken 
and hence cannot be surprised by such imaginings, whether they are of a propositional or of 
an imagistic nature.  
We have already seen how logical reasoning in the case of simulations and arguments can 
bring about surprise and thus we can put pressure on the thought that our mental contents 
and their consequences are fully accessible to us. Further, Stock (2006), Todd  (2020) and 
Kind (2016) have offered responses to the claim when thinking about the role of imagination 
in learning more generally. And through focusing on scientific thought experiments we can 
see that it is just not obviously the case that we have clear access to our imaginings and the 
connections between them. Let’s return to Galileo’s thought experiment. So far, I’ve 
analysed the thought experiment through the lenses of both Brown’s platonist and Norton’s 
argument account. While I have granted that deductive reasoning can lead to productive 
surprises, I’ll now show how Norton’s reconstruction of the destructive component of 
Galileo’s thought experiment is not as straightforward as he sets out.  
Gendler has complicated the issue of whether the thought experiment shows Aristotelian 
physics to be inconsistent. This is because, she argues, it is unclear whether all the 
propositions in the reconstructed argument form ought to be considered part of Aristotle’s 
theory. In particular, it has been asked why we should consider (iii) as part of the theory—
that natural speed is mediative, or more specifically that ‘Natural speed is a property such 
that if a body A has natural speed 1, and a body B has natural speed 2, the natural speed of 
the combined body A-B will fall between 1 and 2’ (1998, p. 404). Without this assumption, 
the inconsistency claim is unfounded. As a result, there are various logically possible ways 
 
31 Here, I just offer a brief idea of what the claims surrounding surprise and imagination consist in. 
Stock (2006) offers a thorough investigation, breaking down the views into separate claims in order to 




out for the Aristotelian. For example, they can ask—are the bodies that are tied together one 
object or two? If one object, then it will fall at the speed that is proportional to the combined 
weight. Indeed, it has been argued that an Aristotelian could have chosen this option—as 
there is no commitment at the time on this issue (Vickers 2013, 196).  
Gendler takes from this the idea that the thought experiment is indispensable; it cannot be 
reconstructed into an argument as on Norton’s view without losing its demonstrative force.32 
This suggests that the imagination allows kinds of jumps that cannot be accommodated 
within the framework of more formal reasoning. A crucial issue in debates regarding 
imagination and learning revolves around whether and how the imagination can be 
appropriately constrained in order for us to gain insights about the world. The point I want 
to emphasise here is not that the imagination is totally unconstrained when it is fruitful in 
science but rather that the imagination can allow for reasoning that is less restrictive than 
that in arguments or computer simulations and this has the potential to bring about productive 
surprises.  
In presenting Morgan and Beisbart’s arguments, I outlined how experiments’ capacity to 
confound is dependent upon them meeting the condition of no over-control. Whereas in the 
examples of confounding simulations presented by Currie and Parke, we see that 
simulations’ capacity to surprise does not depend on such a condition. As Currie explains, 
simulations ‘do not need freedom to produce [productive] surprise. Rather, careful control 
allows us to bring our ideas and hypotheses together, and it is in these new combinations that 
new knowledge arises’. While I argued that thought experiments also ‘probe’ existing 
knowledge, there is a sense in which attending to their use of imagination demonstrates how 
like experiments, thought experiments (at least in some cases) should not be too-over 
controlled. While of course thought experiments in order to be successful necessitate us to 
control our imaginings in the right kind of ways33, Gendler’s discussion of the Galileo 
example shows that if we restricted our reasoning in thought experiments to deductive or 
inductive steps from initial set up of the scenario, then we would not get a result that has 
 
32 For Gendler, the result of Galileo’s thought experiment is justified because it taps into our previously 
unarticulated knowledge regarding the world. In this sense, her account denies the claim that mental 
images (or imaginings more generally) are constituted by the person who is imagining (which was key 
to Wittgenstein’s scepticism) since the background beliefs that contribute to the formation of the 
imagining come from the world and the imaginer’s experience of it, rather than solely from the imaginer 
themselves.  
33 In the next chapter, we will see how accounts that emphasise the potential epistemic value of 




been hugely productive in the history of science. As Stuart states in the context of constraints 
on imaginings in science (and their limits): ‘Either we reject Galileo’s use of imagination as 
part of sanctioned scientific progress, or we reject the idea that imagined scenarios should 
not always follow the rules of logic’ (forthcoming, 11).  
Understanding thought experiments as merely involving argumentative reasoning fails to 
fully capture their potential to productively surprise, a feature that at least partly characterises 
their role in scientific practice. Importantly, attending to the role of the imagination gives us 
a way of capturing this sense of surprise without committing to Brown’s platonist view of 
thought experiments.  
 
 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented two arguments for the privileging of experiments over computer 
simulations: The materiality thesis and the argument from surprise. I demonstrate how each 
can be applied to thought experiments, given their similarities with computer simulations. 
While the materiality thesis may be persuasive, I outlined how it ultimately fails. To begin 
with, it is unclear how we might go about assessing how materially similar an experimental 
object is to its target system. Further, there are clear cases in which the relevant similarity is 
not a material one. Hence, experiments cannot be automatically privileged for this reason. I 
then turned to my main focus; the argument from surprise. This is the view that experiments 
can “confound” that is, surprise in a productive way, whereas computer simulations can 
merely surprise that is, display unexpected behaviours. I outlined how this argument applies 
to different views on thought experiments, before demonstrating that we need to look to the 
ways in which the imagination plays a role in thought experiments in order to understand 
how thought experiments can be a distinctive source of productive surprise. While thought 
experiments can be said to “probe” our existing knowledge, the way in which they do so 
cannot always be characterised in terms of a process of deductive or inductive inferences.  
To end, I want to return to a statement from Hacking as presented in the previous chapter. 
Hacking regards thought experiments as “icons”. He argued that while they might be 
repeated at different times throughout history, ‘what they think was once thought’. I have 
outlined how, against Hacking, thought experiments have a life of their own. They are not 




While I disagree with Hacking’s claims, I do think it is interesting that he draws the 
connection with icons.34  
Icons are of great significance within various religions and depict holy people, such as Jesus 
or Mary, or a scene as described within a religious text. Icons are importantly simple, and 
have been used throughout history to convey parts of religious orthodoxy to a broad 
audience. Furthermore, in depicting holy people or events, the thought is that icons also 
maintain a certain connection with them. As Kenna explains, an icon is a ‘“true likeness” in 
an analogical sense, and what it is true to is not the outward form but the “sanctity and glory 
of its prototype” in which it shares’ (1985, 349). That is to say, icons are not just images of 
the divine, but rather are meant to give both access to, and knowledge of, the divine.  
In chapter 5 and 6, I discuss the relations between thought experiments and literary fictions. 
As we shall see, a view put forward by Egan in the context of these relations argues that we 
read thought experiments in “allegorical” terms; each of the concrete elements of a thought 
experiment “stands in” for a more abstract concept. He states that the ‘concrete story in the 
text is like a map whose purpose is exhausted by helping us see our way more clearly through 
the abstract territory it maps’ (2016, 144). Icons also share this quality. For example, colour 
is often used in a symbolic way. For example, the use of gold in Byzantine works which 
‘imbues the figure of the saint or the surroundings with God’s power and grace’ (Kenna 
1985, 352) or the use of colour of Mary’s clothes; her blue cloak which symbolises purity 
and was also the colour of Byzantine royalty, which is worn over red which symbolises her 
devotion to motherhood.  Hence, they rely on their audience knowing how to “decode” these 
various elements.   
While Hacking describes thought experiments as “icons” to deny their life, I argue that 
Hacking’s paper actually reveals some crucial aspects of their value which I will now go on 
to explore. The life of thought experiments and hence their epistemology is bound up their 
appeal to the imagination. I turn to the imagination in the next two chapters. Secondly, there 
 
34 And at the end of the paper, Hacking also mentions works of art. In considering how the same thought 
experiment can be replicated ‘from generation to generation’ Hacking states: ‘But is this life? Is it not 
like acting a part in a play? Olivier brought new life to Othello, but no matter how profound the power 
of Othello or Lear, those characters do not have a life of their own’ (1992, 307). It is interesting that 
Hacking uses a play to make this point. We might think that artworks such as paintings would be more 
useful to Hacking’s aims given that Shakespeare’s plays are not just repeated but undergo vastly 
different performances in order to emphasise various themes. In this sense, plays seem to very much 




are interesting connections to be made between thought experiments and artworks. In 
chapters 5 and 6, I discuss the comparisons between thought experiments and literary 









3. The Scientific Imagination 
 
 Introduction 
The previous chapters focused on the ways in which thought experiments compare with other 
practices such as experiments and computer simulations. In considering the value of surprise 
in science, I argued that attending to how thought experiments call upon our imaginative 
capacities shows how thought experiments can productively surprise in a way that differs 
from experiments and simulations. In this chapter and the one that follows, my aim is to build 
a new account of the imagination in the conduct of thought experiments. I begin with an 
overview of discussions of the imagination in science including reasons why we might be 
sceptical that the imagination has a part to play in the scientific realm. The most prominent 
accounts in philosophy of science that make reference to the imagination are those that 
understand modelling as a process of creating and analysing fictions, and some accounts 
extend that analysis to thought experiments. While there is a broad literature on fictions and 
make-believe in science, an important issue has, for the most part, been neglected. This is the 
question of what kind of imagination is involved in scientific modelling and thought 
experiments. Answering this is my central concern in the two chapters that follow. 
To do this, I utilise discussions of the imagination in philosophy of mind and aesthetics in 
order to provide a starting point for thinking about the different forms the imagination can 
take. As mentioned, explicit discussions of the nature of imagination in thought experiments 
(and modelling) are limited, but I demonstrate that the default position takes the imagination 
as imagistic. That is to say, when engaging with thought experiments, we form pictures in our 
mind of the scenario described. I then discuss a recent paper that addresses this question head 
on, and provides an alternative to the assumed view. This is Salis and Frigg’s propositional 
account which sets out to demonstrate that imagery plays no important role. This account is 
embedded within a “models as make-believe” view that offers a comparison between models 
and thought experiments on one hand, and works of literary fiction on the other, by drawing 
on Walton’s framework of mimesis as make-believe.  
The aim of this chapter is to offer an overview of current discussions of the imagination in 




imagination in science. While I agree with Salis and Frigg that we ought to include the 
propositional imagination in our analysis of the scientific imagination, I do not think this tells 
the whole story. Consequently, I present a different proposal. I argue that we ought to reject 
monistic approaches to the type of imagination involved in scientific thought experiments, 
and instead adopt a pluralist stance. On this view, we need to attend to the function of the 
thought experiment in order to address what kind of imagination the example invites. I outline 
a number of examples to demonstrate that my pluralist stance best captures the ways in which 
scientists use thought experiments for a range of purposes.  
To begin, we can think more generally about connections between science and imagination. 
 
 Science and the Imagination 
Discussions of the imagination have been limited in philosophy of science. Why might this 
be the case? One reason is that we typically associate the imagination with creativity and the 
arts, practices that we often regard as standing in sharp contrast with science. We can imagine 
things that we know are not the case; we can escape and explore other worlds, whether in the 
context of our engagement with fictions such as novels and films which invite us to imagine 
alternative worlds and characters and their lives or by playing games of make-believe as 
children. Furthermore, we celebrate artists and their abilities to richly conjure up new worlds 
and ideas. The imagination as characterised in this sense, that is, as aiding us to look beyond 
the world as it is, is part of why we value our imagination, and the imaginations of others, so 
highly.35 We can note that ‘creative’ is often used interchangeably with ‘imaginative’.36 This 
connection can be traced back to Kant who took genius to consist in an imaginative activity 
that is not restricted by rules. Genius is ‘a talent for producing that for which no determinate 
rule can be given, not a predisposition of skill for that which can be learned in accordance 
with some rule, consequently that originality must be its primary characteristic’ (1781/2000, 
186).  
Kant argued that scientists, unlike artists, cannot fall under the category of genius; scientific 
discovery radically differs from the creative acts that he attributes to the arts. Kant claimed 
 
35 This kind of imaginative activity has been labelled the transcendent use of imagination and has been 
contrasted with so-called instructive uses, that is, those that enable us to learn something new about the 
world (Kind and Kung 2016, 1). 




that Newton, for example, while clearly a ‘a great mind’ could ‘make all the steps that he had 
to take, from the first elements of geometry to his great and profound discoveries, entirely 
intuitive not only to himself but also to everyone else and thus set them out for posterity quite 
determinately’ (1781/2000, 187). Here, the thought is that the process of scientific discovery 
can be outlined in a systematic way, following step-by-step methods and rules and hence, is 
something that can be taught and passed on to others. Whereas ‘one cannot learn to write 
inspired poetry’ (ibid. 187-188). For Kant, the faculty for creativity in art is innate rather than 
something that can be learned. Further, unlike the process of scientific discovery, artistic 
creativity cannot be explained to an audience of artworks, nor is it intuitively accessible to the 
artist themselves.   
The issue of what creativity consists in is widely disputed but many have accepted the notion 
that creativity and imagination are closely linked. While there has been important work on 
heuristics in philosophy of science (see Schickore and Steinle 2006), the Kantian view of how 
scientific discovery works has long been discarded. Further, contemporary accounts of 
creativity tend to broaden their scope beyond artistic geniuses and recognise that creative 
activity is also of significant import in science (Wenzel 2018). We clearly praise scientists for 
their innovative uses of imagination that lead to important and often surprising discoveries 
and insights. Take, for example, Friedrich Kekulé’s vision of ouroboros, the symbol of a snake 
holding its own tail in its mouth, which he claimed led him to the idea that the structure of a 
benzene molecule is ring-shaped. Or Nikola Tesla’s description of the creative processes that 
led to his inventions that involved visualising his constructions and augmenting them in his 
mind’s eye, without the aid of physical drawings of their design (Kind 2016, 154).  
So there seems to be at least some role for imagination in science; the imagination can be 
crucial in the process of coming up with theories, can lead to interesting lines of research and 
can contribute to the formation of new technologies and inventions. But perhaps the reason 
why philosophers have been dismissive of the import of imagination in science is because it 
clashes with how we think scientists make epistemic progress, and what we take scientific 
methodology to consist in.  
One way in which this can be articulated is by appealing to the renowned distinction between 
the context of discovery and the context of justification as introduced by Reichenbach (1938). 
This distinction separates questions about how new ideas are generated from questions about 




issues surrounding the context of discovery may be interesting for psychological or 
sociological studies of science, but not for philosophical ones. This is because such issues do 
not have any impact on the epistemic value of those ideas generated. We can see this 
expressed in Popper’s work:  
‘The initial state, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to 
call for logical analysis not to be susceptible of it. The question how it happens that a 
new idea occurs to a man—whether it is a musical theme, dramatic conflict, or a 
scientific theory—may be of great interest to empirical psychology; but it is irrelevant 
to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge’ (1934/2002, 7-8).  
For Popper, justification ought to be bracketed from any references to the mental activities 
that produced the hypothesis in question as the latter are not susceptible to logical analysis. 
Discovery is thus subject matter for psychology, rather than philosophy. We saw that Kant 
overlooked the imagination (in the creative sense) in science as he took discovery as being a 
rational procedure that differed from creative genius in the arts. Those who adopt the 
distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification, dismiss creativity 
for the opposite reason: It is because scientific discovery is not subject to rational analysis 
that it cannot be the proper subject matter for philosophy. Scientists may conjure up different 
theories and ideas about the world in their imaginations. However, this alone gives no reason 
to think that any of these are true. In the same sense that I can happily fantasise about being 
in the winning team of the World Cup but this does not give me any reason to believe that this 
has or will actually happen.  
And so, even if the imagination sometimes plays an essential role in science, say in coming 
up with new scientific theories or raising possibilities, ultimately these must be tested and 
evaluated before we can claim that they that carry any evidential significance. That is, before 
we can say they are justified. In light of this, philosophers of science tended to focus on the 
features of scientific practice that follow the generation of new ideas (including the 
involvement of the imagination), emphasising that justification should be the central concern. 
However, in the second half of the 20th century, the discovery-justification distinction came 
under scrutiny. There is a huge literature on the distinction and its problems.37 For my 
purposes, it is enough to note that in light of historical and sociological studies of science, as 
 




well as attending to scientific practice, philosophers have emphasised the difficulties in 
separating the features involved in discovery from those that are involved in justification, 
claiming that this shows how the distinction collapses (Kuhn 1962, Nickles 1980, Post 1993). 
Another way in which it has been challenged is to demonstrate that discovery is not a wholly 
unconstrained realm, either by attempting to set out a logic of discovery or by demonstrating 
that it is at least a process that can be subject to analysis. And this can be done whilst 
maintaining that the Kantian view is overly simplified and ought to be rejected. As a 
consequence, discovery becomes a legitimate topic for philosophers of science. Many of those 
who have provided accounts of discovery have utilised developments in cognitive science to 
do so (Nersessian 2009, Thagard 1984).  
Furthermore, attitudes towards imagination in science are beginning to change. In recent 
years, we have seen books dedicated to exploring issues that connect art and science and often 
make references to the role of fiction and imagination in thought experiments and models 
(Frigg and Hunter 2010, Frappier et al. 2012, Bueno et al. 2018, Ivanova and French 2020). 
There has also been a volume dedicated purely to investigating the scientific imagination 
edited by Levy and Godfrey-Smith who, in the introduction to the collection, state how the 
imagination is important in ‘conceiving new theoretical ideas, in exploring the explanatory 
resources of these ideas, and in working out how to bring theoretical ideas into contact with 
empirical constraints’ (2020, 2). Additionally, there has been a boom in studies of the 
imagination’s epistemic role outside of philosophy of science, including the ways in which it 
can aid decision-making and provide a way of acquiring modal knowledge (Kind and Kung 
2016, Gendler and Hawthorne 2002).  
There has therefore been an increase in philosophical attention towards the epistemic value 
of imagination. In the next section, I’ll outline some of the discussions in which the 
imagination has received most attention in philosophy of science. This is via accounts that 
regard models as imaginary entities.  
 
 Models as Fictions 
Modelling is a central part of scientific practice. Models can be material—as in cases of ball-
and-stick models used in chemistry, or the hydraulic scale model of the San Francisco Bay 




from philosophers of science.38 In such cases, it is argued, the “face-value practice” of 
modelling is one of scientists describing and engaging with “missing systems” (Thomson-
Jones 2010). For example, frictionless pendulums, models of the solar system in which the 
planets are perfectly spherical, predator-prey models where the system has just two species, 
and the assumptions of ideal, rational agents in economic markets. Scientists often talk about 
these idealised and simplified models as if they were real, concrete systems, yet they engage 
with them knowing full well that they do not describe anything that actually obtains in the 
world. So a question arises: How do we make sense of this aspect of scientific practice?  
A set of views have attempted to answer these questions by comparing models with fictions 
in art. Traces of this view have been present for a long time in philosophy of science, such as 
in the work of Vaihinger’s philosophy of the “as if” (1911/2004), and more recently in 
Cartwright’s How the Laws of Physics Lie (1983) in which she offers an analysis of models 
(including Galilean thought experiments) as works of fictions, especially fables and 
parables.39 A helpful summary of the approach is provided by Frigg, who claims: 
‘The core of the fiction view of model-systems is the claim that model-systems are akin 
to places and characters in literary fiction. When modelling the solar system as 
consisting of ten perfectly spherical spinning tops physicists describe (and take 
themselves to be describing) an imaginary physical system; when considering an 
ecosystem with only one species biologists describe an imaginary population; and when 
investigating an economy without money and transaction costs economists describe an 
imaginary economy. These imaginary scenarios are tellingly like the places and 
characters in works of fiction like Madame Bovary and Sherlock Holmes. These are 
scenarios we can talk about and make claims about, yet they don’t exist’ (Frigg 2010, 
101).  
There are various versions of this approach but the core agreement is that understanding 
models as fictions helps us accommodate the face-value features of modelling as described 
above. The views are set against alternative proposals such as those who take model systems 
to be abstract objects. These systems are defined by scientists’ model descriptions, and the 
system is taken to represent a real system (Giere 1999, 2004). The abstract object view has 
been popular in philosophy of science, with different variations provided. For example, some 
 
38 Although see Toon (2012, 2016) for a discussion of the imagination in physical modelling. 




have offered a more formal approach than Giere in which models are set theoretic structures 
(Suppes 1960) which has been adopted by the semantic approach (French and Ladyman 
1999), or they are understood as mathematical structures more generally (Weisberg 2013). 
Such accounts, it is argued, fail to capture the ways in which scientists talk about models. In 
modelling, it does not seem that scientists are simply going through various mathematical 
calculations in their mind. Rather, they are engaging their imaginations in order to 
contemplate the concrete scenarios that the model describes (Toon 2016, 454).40  
Those who advocate for the fiction view of models are not merely highlighting that the 
systems we imagine are idealised or depart from accurate representations of the world. Rather, 
the claim is that modelling involves engaging with fictions in a way that is analogous to our 
engagement with fictions in art, such as reading literature and watching films. A prominent 
version of the models as fiction view takes models (and/or thought experiments (Meynell 
2014; Salis and Frigg 2020)) as examples of make-believe, and draw on Walton’s (1990) 
framework developed in the context of representation in art. Make-believe is ‘the use of 
(external) props in imaginative activities’ (Walton 1990, 67). For example, the book Harry 
Potter functions as a prop that mandates the games of make-believe associated with the 
wizarding world and its characters. Applied to scientific models and thought experiments, the 
view is that models or thought experiment narratives function as “props” that guide 
imaginings.  
The prescriptions to imagine licensed by a work of fiction fix the content of the fictional 
world. Some of what is “true in the fiction” will be explicitly stated by the text (these are the 
primary truths), whereas other truths are implied. For example, we take it as “true in the 
fiction” of Harry Potter that Hermione has blood in her veins, even though this is never made 
explicit in the book. When we are engaging with fictions, we “fill in” the gaps of the fictional 
world. We do this through principles of generation. For example, the Reality Principle 
authorises the use of real-world truths to fill in the background of a story.41 This operates in 
the case of Hermione; we rely on real world truths about humans to fill in the background of 
her character. As it is never stated otherwise, we assume that she has blood in her veins. Or, 
in the cases where parts of the story are set in London, we take it to be true in the fiction that 
London is the capital of England even if it is not stated in the work. Another principle that 
 
40 Although see Weisberg (2013) and French (2020a, 2020b) for discussions of imagination in abstract 
model views. 




Walton highlights is the mutual belief principle according to which we are prescribed to 
imagine the content of any of the mutual beliefs of the author’s society (unless explicitly 
excluded). For example, Salis and Frigg state that many of the implied truths of Dante’s 
Divine Comedy ‘are generated from the primary truths of the story and the medieval belief in 
the main tenants of the Ptolemaic geometric system’ (2020, 35-36). It is important to highlight 
that Walton emphasises how these principles are not limited to these (1990, chapter 4). For 
instance, the genre of a work might affect what we take to be the implied truths; ‘experienced 
readers of whodunnits immediately recognise that the obvious suspect is not guilty’ (Friend 
2020, 112).42  
The Waltonian framework applied to science means that in the case of models and thought 
experiments, scientists fill in the gaps and there is general agreement regarding what these 
inferred propositions are. As Frigg states it is ‘true that the Newtonian model-system 
representing the solar system is stable and that the model-earth is moves in an elliptic orbit; 
but none of this is part of the explicit content of the model-system’s original specification’ 
(2010, 102). Further to this, if we imagine something that departs from these (explicit or 
implied) prescriptions, then this constitutes a misuse of our imagination in this context. For 
example, while I am able to imagine that Hermione’s skin turns blue whenever she is angry, 
this would not be an imagining that is authorised by the novel. Some imaginings are therefore 
authorised, while others are not (Walton 1990, 51). Similarly, while predator-prey models 
allow for some variation with regards to what particular species are imagined (for example, I 
could choose between foxes and rabbits, bears and fish, or lions and zebras), it would be a 
misuse of my imagination if I imagined, say, foxes as the prey and zebras as the predator 
(Friend 2020, 114). Make-believe is thus a constrained activity and proponents of this view 
highlight how this makes it appropriate for science. The practice of modelling (or the conduct 
of a thought experiment) is a matter of finding out the implied truths of the scenario 
described—that is, finding out what follows from the explicit prescriptions.  
The Waltonian accounts of modelling are often divided between direct and indirect views.43 
According to the former, when scientists represent the world they do so in an indirect way, 
 
42 I revisit genre in chapter 6 where I consider the view that thought experiments are a genre of fiction. 
43 See Toon (2016), Frigg and Nguyen (2016), Friend (2020) and French (2020a) for recent criticisms 
and responses of the two approaches. Other views outside of the Waltonian framework can be 
considered direct or indirect. For example, Giere’s abstract object view is an example of the latter. I do 





via a model system. For example, Frigg argues that in reading the description of the 
Newtonian model of the solar system, ‘we imagine an entity which has all the properties that 
the description specifies. The result of this process is the model system, the fictional scenario 
which is the vehicle of our reasoning: an imagined entity consisting of two spheres, etc.’ 
(2010, 133). Once the model system is imagined it is then connected with the target system. 
For example, the scientist might specify that ‘the sphere with mass me in the model system 
corresponds to the earth and the sphere with mass ms to the sun’ (ibid., 134). Then the scientist 
can translate facts about the model system into claims about the target system (ibid., 135).  
In contrast, on direct views such as those proposed by Toon (2012, 2016) and Levy (2012, 
2015), models such as the Newtonian model of the solar system represent their targets directly 
rather than via a model system. That is to say, the model prescribes us to imagine things about 
the actual solar system such as imagining that the sun is perfectly spherical. For the direct 
view, model descriptions are thus ‘descriptions to imagine the world in a certain way’ (Toon 
2016, 458). One way in which the difference between the two views can be seen is by 
highlighting that those who defend the indirect view often compare models to fictional 
characters such as Madame Bovary or Sherlock Holmes, as seen in Frigg’s outline of the 
position above. Whereas on the direct view, models are more like works of historical fiction 
in the sense that the latter represent real places and people. For example, Toon compares 
model descriptions to works such as Graves’ I, Claudius which prescribes us to imagining 
propositions (whether true or false) about the actual emperor Augustus (ibid.).  
In this section, I have outlined views that highlight how models are fictional or imaginary 
entities, some of which have applied a prominent view of representation in the arts to shed 
light on the practice of modelling. While this view outlines how modelling involves props 
that prescribes imaginings, there is still a lot to be said about what these imaginings actually 
consist in. In the beginning of Mimesis and Make-Believe, Walton himself admits the sheer 
difficulty in pinning down what the imagination is. He asks: ‘What is it to imagine? We have 
examined a number of dimensions along which imaginings can vary; shouldn’t we now spell 
out what they have in common?—Yes, if we can. But I can’t’ (1990, 19). And so, the question 
I want to focus on for the remainder of these two chapters is the following: What is meant by 
“imagination” in the scientific context? This question, I argue, is central to discovering the 
ways in which the imagination functions in science. To make progress on this question, I will 





 The Varieties of Imagination 
It is widely recognised that the term ‘imagination’ picks out various acts and is too broad for 
a single characterisation. Given what Kind (2013) refers to as the ‘heterogeneity’ of the 
imagination, we can consider what different forms it can take. In philosophy of mind, there 
have been many different suggestions as to how the imagination can be categorised. To take 
just a few examples, some have distinguished between spontaneous imaginings, those that 
occur without conscious effort, and deliberate imaginings, those that require such effort 
(Walton 1990). Others have distinguished between dramatic imaginings, those that involve 
adopting a perspective (including emotional responses) and hypothetical imaginings, those 
that involve seeing what follows from a given proposition (Moran 1994). Yet another 
distinction, as mentioned above, is between transcendent imaginings, those that are involved 
when we engage in fantasy and escape from the world, and instructive imaginings, those that 
are constrained in such a way that enable us to learn about the world (Kind and Kung 2016).  
It is not always clear whether and how the various distinctions between kinds of imaginings 
overlap with one another. This is further complicated by the fact that the applications of 
imagination in philosophy are vast. Imagination has been brought in to explain certain features 
in ethical reasoning, modal epistemology, mindreading (predicting and explaining others’ 
mental states), metaphors, fiction, and of course, thought experiments and models. To avoid 
confusion, I will limit myself to certain ways in which different forms of imagination have 
been distinguished which are most useful for thinking about the nature of the imagination in 
thought experiments and models. 
One way to categorise the imagination, which follows the distinction Salis and Frigg present 
in their account of the scientific imagination, is to distinguish between 1) ‘propositional 
imagining’ and 2) ‘objectual imagining’ (Yablo 1993). Take the example of imagining a vase 
of flowers on a table. If we propositionally imagine this, then we imagine that there is a vase 
of flowers on a table. Propositional imagination consists in imagining that something is the 
case and does not require us picturing in our minds the flowers on the table. This kind of 




propositional attitudes such as belief and desire, but it is the comparison with belief that is 
most relevant to the scientific cases.44  
We can compare propositional imagination to imagination in the second sense, that is, 
objectual imagination. Here, we imagine a vase of flowers on a table by forming an image in 
our minds of the flowers on the table. This kind of imagination is often defined as being 
“perception-like” or having a “quasi-sensory” character. The thought here is that imagining 
in this sense has a phenomenal quality that is similar to ordinary perception. This kind of 
imagination is not limited to visual imagery; we can have mental imagery that correlates with 
other sense modalities as well. For example, I can imagine the smell of the flowers, or I can 
imagine a certain piece of music in this sensory way.  
This should be distinguished from cases in which an imagining is about a perceptual 
experience, that is, imagining seeing-X, or imagining hearing-X, imagining feeling-X and so 
on (Arcangeli 2019, 4). For example, imagining seeing a vase of flowers on a table, or 
imagining hearing a dog barking. In these cases, imagery has perception as part of its content. 
But mental imagery does not require this. Rather, the key feature is that imagery has a 
character that is similar to perception, whether visual or auditory and so on (Currie and 
Ravenscroft 2002, 27). And there is a propositional analogue here too. We could imagine that 
we are seeing the vase of flowers. This would be an instance of the propositional imagination 
as perception is part of the content of the imagining, as opposed to the imagining being 
perception-like. Similarly, imagining in a way that is belief-like (in the case of the 
propositional imagination) can be distinguished from imagining believing-X which would be 
a case in which belief is part of the content of the imagining. 
In propositionally imagining that there is a vase of flowers on the table, we imagine in a way 
that is similar to believing that there is a vase of flowers on the table. This is similar 
 
44 There is also a rich debate regarding the relation between propositional imagination and supposition 
given that the latter also involves considering a hypothetical. For some, such as Salis and Frigg (2020) 
and Arcangeli (2018), supposition is a type of imagining. Others argue for a discontinuity between 
supposition and imagining, including Balcerak Jackson (2016) whose work I look at in the next chapter. 
Whether or not supposition counts as a form of imagining, it has been differentiated from propositional 
imagining for various reasons. For example, some have claimed that supposition does not usually bring 
about affective responses whereas the imagination can (Weinberg and Meskin 2006). Others have 
argued that it is not subject to imaginative resistance. For example, while I can suppose that something 
morally reprehensible is morally right, I cannot imagine it to be (Gendler 2000). Others have claimed 
that supposition is less constrained; we can suppose, but cannot imagine, contradictions. See also French 




phenomenologically speaking, but it is also different. That is, we (at least usually) recognise 
the difference between having a belief and having a propositional imagining. And similarly 
for perception; our objectual imaginings are phenomenally similar to when we perceive 
something, but we recognise the difference between actually seeing, and having a mental 
image of, the vase of flowers. Thus, the qualifier that it is “quasi” sensory. There is therefore 
a distinctive phenomenology to imaginings compared to their counterparts.  
Imaginings are also often differentiated from these other attitudes by highlighting how it has 
a voluntary nature. That is to say, there is a certain freedom to our imagination (as seen in the 
creative use of imagination presented at the beginning of the chapter). We may not be able to 
choose to imagine whatever we want to, but we are free to imagine things that we know are 
not the case.45 For example, I can happily imagine that right now there is a pink elephant sat 
next to me as I write this. This clearly differs from perception in which I do not have the same 
kinds of choice regarding what I want to see and hear and so on.46 And neither can I choose 
what I believe; belief (when it is working properly at least) is evidence sensitive. It makes no 
sense to say that I choose to believe that there is a pink elephant sat next to me.  
This freedom is clearly part of the value of our imagination and is what allows us to create 
and engage with the types of scenarios that scientific models and thought experiments present 
to us. But it is also part of why there might be scepticism regarding the use of our imaginations 
to inform us about the world. If the imagination is not by nature reality-orientated (in that I 
can choose to imagine things that I know are not the case) then we might worry that it just is 
not in the business of providing us with knowledge. As a response to this, those who have 
defended the role of imagination in acquiring knowledge have pointed out how we ought to 
(and can successfully) constrain our imaginings if it is to produce anything of epistemic worth. 
As seen, the need for constrained imaginings in science is part of the motivation for a 
Waltonian view. As Amy Kind puts it: 
 
45 There are various involuntary constraints on our imagination. For example, embodied constraints 
such as in Nagel’s (1974) classic example of it being impossible to imagine what it would be like to be 
a bat (see Jones and Schoonen (2018) for a discussion of embodied constraints on imagination). Another 
case is the phenomenon of imaginative resistance as mentioned above in which we cannot imagine 
certain things to be true. For instance, as indicated in the above footnote, Gendler (2000) gives cases of 
difficulties in imagining morally deviant worlds as morally good. Finally, there are discussions 
regarding the imagination’s role in modal epistemology which takes imagination to be constrained by 
possibility in a significant way (see Gendler and Hawthorne (2002)).   
46 There are of course cases in which we can shift our perception to see say, the same image in different 




‘when we constrain our imaginings to fit the facts of the world as we know them, we 
are using an epistemic procedure that is much more akin to scientific experimentation 
than it is to mere flights of fancy. Although our imaginative experimentation will not 
be fool proof, neither is scientific experimentation. But in both cases, when we proceed 
cautiously, the beliefs that we arrive at will...usually be justified’ (2018, 244). 
Now that we have an idea of the different forms the imagination can take, in particular the 
difference between propositional and objectual imaginings, we can now turn to existing views 
of the imagination in scientific thought experiments.  
 
 Thought Experiments and Imagery 
It is clear that thought experiments appeal to our imaginative capacities. Thought experiments 
often begin with an invitation for us “imagine”, “consider” or “suppose” followed by a 
description of a state of affairs. However, little attention has been paid to the question of what 
kind of imagination is involved in the conduct of a thought experiment. It has typically been 
taken to be like forming a picture in the mind’s eye; an objectual, in particular, a visual form 
of imagination.47 We can see a commitment to this view in the works of (to take just a few 
examples) James R. Brown, Tamar Gendler, Nenad Miščević and David Gooding: 
‘Thought experiments are carried out in the mind and they involve something akin to 
experience; that is, we typically “see” something happening in a thought experiment’ 
(Brown 2004a, 25) 
‘in the case of imaginary scenarios that evoke certain sorts of quasi-sensory intuitions, 
their contemplation may bring to us new beliefs about contingent features of the natural 
world that are produced not inferentially, but quasi-observationally; the presence of a 
mental image may play a crucial cognitive role’ (Gendler 2004, 1154) 
‘When a reader encounters a description of a situation, she builds a model, a quasi-
spatial “picture” of it’ (Miščević 1992, 220) 
‘visual perception is crucial because the ability to visualise is necessary to most if not 
all thought experiments’ (Gooding 1992, 285) 
 




We can take Gendler’s account as an example. As indicated in the quote above, Gendler 
focuses her analysis of the imagination in thought experiments on mental images. Not only is 
mental imagery involved in their conduct for Gendler but in some cases, it plays a key role. 
She acknowledges that the imagination (in the imagistic sense) might not play an essential 
role in all thought experiments—in some cases, the role may be merely heuristic. But against 
Norton’s view that thought experiments are just arguments, she presents cases in which 
visualisation or “quasi-observation” is key to the success of the example. Following Mach, 
Gendler presents Stevin’s inclined plane to illustrate her view.  
 
Figure 4: Stevin’s Chain (from Gendler 2004) 
Stevin used the thought experiment in order to establish the force that is required to prevent 
an object on a frictionless, inclined plane from sliding down. We are asked to imagine fourteen 
balls (of equal weight and size) threaded on a string and laid on top of a triangular prism of 
unequal sides. What would happen? If we imagine this scenario in accordance with the 
diagram on the right, then we can see that there are three options: i) the chain remains in a 
state of static equilibrium, ii) the chain moves to the right (because the incline is steeper) or 
iii) the chain moves to the left (because there are more balls and so, the string is heavier on 
that side). Stevin argues that the answer is (i), the chain remains in a state of static equilibrium 
and shows how the diagram on the left shows this to be the case. As we can see, in this diagram 
the chain is a closed loop. If the string moved (as in (ii) or (iii)) and was not in a state of static 
equilibrium, then it would be in a state of perpetual motion. Given the impossibility of 
perpetual motion machines, the force on the string must be balanced in each scenario.48 From 
 
48 As Sorensen (1992, 54) discusses, in Mach’s outline of how this thought experiment works, he 
highlights how a key assumption, that there can be no perpetual motion, strikes us not just logically but 
also psychologically; ‘He feels at once, and we with him, that we have never observed the motion of 
the kind referred to, that a thing of such character does not exist’ (Mach 1976, 34). Given that Gendler 





this, Stevin concludes that the force needed to keep an object in place along an inclined plane 
is inversely proportional to the length of the plane.  
Gendler argues that cases such as this show that not all thought experiments work by 
deductive or inductive reasoning. She states: 
‘presumably there’s a way of reconstructing this reasoning process as an argument: I 
will leave that task to others… Contemplation of an imaginary scenario (the cut string 
laid atop the prism) evokes certain quasi-sensory intuitions, and on the basis of these 
intuitions, we form a new belief about contingent features of the natural world (that the 
weight of four balls offsets the weight of three balls). This belief is produced not 
inferentially, but quasi-observationally: the presence of the mental image plays a crucial 
cognitive role in its formation’ (2004, 1162).   
We can see then that the imagination in thought experiments is typically associated with 
mental imagery and for some, this is crucial in understanding how thought experiments 
perform their function. And as Salis and Frigg (2020) note, those who discuss imagination in 
the context of modelling, whilst not offering an explicit analysis, tend to associate it with 
mental imagery. For instance, on Levy’s Waltonian view of models, imagining ‘typically 
involves having a visual or other sensory-like mental state—“a seeing in the mind’s eye”’ 
(2015, 785).  
It is worth noting that there are some thought experiments that might be said to employ other 
sensory modalities. One example, that comes from philosophy, is Strawson’s thought 
experiment that asks us to imagine a purely auditory world. But as we can see from the above 
quotations that the type of imagery relevant to scientific thought experiments is typically taken 
to be visual. This may be because many have drawn comparisons with ordinary experiment 
(as seen in chapters 1 and 2). For example, Sorensen states that a ‘thought experiment is a 
limiting case of experiment in which the question is to be answered by reflection on the 
experimental design rather than by execution. Imagination substitutes for perception. The 
reliability of the thought experiment’s answer depends on how well imagination can fill a role 
originally intended for perception’ (2018, 31). Brown explains that it is possible to have 
thought experiments that rely on imagined sounds or smells as what is important is ‘that it be 
experiencable in some way’ (2011, 17). However he highlights that sight is our most 
important sense, and in experiments, the primacy of visual perception is typically assumed. 




experiment and an ordinary experiment] is that the perception is not a sense perception but, 
rather, is an intuition, an instance of seeing with the mind’s eye’ (2004a, 35).  
Miščević, quoted above, as well as Nersessian (2007, 2018) apply the cognitive science 
literature on mental modelling to thought experiments.49 Given that this offers a detailed 
account of the reasoning involved in conducting thought experiments, and that Salis and Frigg 
takes this as the most developed defence of the imagistic view, it is worth spending some time 
on their approach. “Mental model” is a technical term used in cognitive science and 
technology. It can be traced back to Craik (1943) and has been developed as an account of 
reasoning by Johnson-Laird amongst others. Johnson-Laird summarises their function in the 
following way: 
‘…mental models play a central and unifying role in representing objects, states of 
affairs, sequences of events, the way the world is, and the social and psychological 
actions of daily life. They enable individuals to make inferences and predictions, to 
understand phenomena, to decide what action to take to control its execution, and above 
all to experience events by proxy; they allow language to be used to create 
representations comparable to those deriving from direct acquaintance with the world; 
and they relate to the world by way of conception and perception’ (1983, 397) 
Mental models are temporary structures that are constructed in working memory to carry out 
a specific reasoning task. Like physical models and diagrams, they are iconic representations 
which means that their structure corresponds to the structure of the state of affairs that they 
are taken to represent. As Johnson-Laird notes above, mental models are used in many 
contexts. An example that Nersessian discusses is creating mental models that help us produce 
reliable beliefs about whether a piece of furniture will fit through a doorway. The idea is that 
we tackle this problem by rotating a mental token that approximates the shape of the object, 
such as a sofa or a table, in a way that is ‘constrained by the boundaries of the doorway-like 
token’ (2007, 128). And as a result, we gain new information about whether the furniture will 
fit through the door. Similarly, operations ‘on thought experimental models require 
transformations be consistent with the constraints of the domain, which can be tacit or explicit 
for the experimenter’ (Nersessian 2018, 319). In order to be successful, not only does the state 
of affairs need to be represented accurately, but so do the transition rules for how the system 
 
49 Gendler (2004) also links her account with developments in cognitive science and psychology but is 




changes over time: ‘Causal coherence, spatial structure, and mathematical consistency are 
examples of kinds of constraints’ on what transformations are legitimised (ibid.). 
The proponents of the view recognise the importance of language in constructing the model. 
And they attend to the narrative presentation of many thought experiments.50 But they stress 
that the operations used in the performance of a thought experiment are on the model that is 
constructed, rather than on linguistic representations. Iconic representations therefore contrast 
with linguistic or formal representations that are used in logical and mathematical operations. 
In the latter cases, we reason using formal rules of inferences which refer to the objects or 
states of affairs descriptively. Iconic representations, on the other hand, are taken to represent 
demonstratively. The thought is that in the case above, the model “shows” us in that it allows 
us to “see” that the furniture will or will not fit through the door.  
As mentioned, Salis and Frigg locate the mental model accounts within the imagistic group 
and it is clear that the view differs significantly from their propositional account that I turn to 
in the next section. However, it is important to note that there is some variation with regards 
to the role of mental imagery in different versions of the views. For Miščević, thought 
experiments consist in building a quasi-spatial “picture” of the scenario described ‘in front of 
one’s inner eye’ (1992, 220). Nersessian’s account is slightly different in that it does not 
involve ‘pictures in the mind’ (1992, 294); it can be a matter of forming more abstract 
analogical representations. In making this point, Nersessian refers to Bohr who utilised 
thought experiments but also claimed he was unable to visualise well.51 Yet, Nersessian 
highlights, the reasoning involved is of a non-propositional nature; ‘inferences subjects make 
are derived from constructing a mental model of the situation, rather than by applying rules 
of inference to a system of propositions representing the content of the text’ (ibid, 293).  
While I agree that the mental model accounts have offered important insights on the types of 
reasoning involved in thought experiments, and have offered a perspective that lies 
somewhere between the extremes of Norton and Brown, there are some difficulties with the 
position. The view often goes from examples of reasoning in everyday contexts—say, the 
 
50 In light of their connection with narrative, mental models are also said to be involved in our 
engagement and understanding of (fictional or non-fictional) stories (Matravers 2014). 
51 It is interesting to consider what to make of such statements regarding the testimony of particular 
scientists when it comes to offering an account of the imagination in science. It may well be that certain 
scientists (including those who produced thought experiments) are not able to visual well or lack 
conscious mental imagery altogether, or do not find mental imagery useful. I show in the next chapter 




mental rotation task as presented above—and then generalises to thought experiments. This 
is because, the argument goes, they similarly involve problem solving tasks. I do not want to 
claim that mental models are not involved in the conduct of (any) thought experiments. 
However, as it stands, there is a lack of a detailed outline of how the mental model accounts 
explain various examples from science. Because of this, a core problem for these views is that 
the theory lacks an explanation as to whether all scientific thought experiments utilise mental 
models in the way set out for the more general tasks, and if not all scientific cases do, which 
ones rely on mental models and why.  
As a consequence, the fruitfulness of the approach is undermined. Furthermore, within 
cognitive science, the mental model framework is highly contested and many aspects are 
largely speculative, which Nersessian herself acknowledges (see also Arcangeli 2010, Cooper 
2005, Meynell 2014). Because of this, I leave the mental model views to one side and speak 
in terms of the imagination and the various forms it can take. As the mental model theorists 
often refer to imagination, I will pick up on some of their claims in the next chapter. But 
avoiding talking in terms of mental models and instead focusing on imagination means that 
we can steer clear of providing an account that relies upon a commitment to a specific model 
of the mind.  
We can see, then, that many accounts of thought experiments that highlight a crucial role for 
the imagination have characterised it in broadly imagistic terms. I’ll now turn to a view of the 
imagination that departs from such accounts.  
 
 The Propositional Alternative 
Salis and Frigg (2020) begin their paper with the observation that I have outlined above. This 
is that while there is talk of imagination in science, there is a lack of detailed analysis 
regarding what type of imagination is involved in the scientific realm and usually it is equated 
with mental imagery. Salis and Frigg develop an account of the scientific imagination that 
they apply to both scientific models and thought experiments. Although they agree that both 
models and thought experiments involve the imagination, they propose that imagery (of any 
sensory modality) is unnecessary for their performance. For them, it is only the propositional 
form of the imagination that is relevant in the scientific domain. Salis and Frigg take it that 
thought experiments and models ‘involve the same kind of imagination’ (ibid., 19). As 




and Frigg discuss are part of the thought experiment literature, I will focus on the details of 
their account as applied to thought experiments.52  
Salis and Frigg note that it is not only advocates of the imagination in science that assume an 
imagistic form of imagination. They also demonstrate how those who have been critical have 
taken the imagination to consist in mental images and argue that this has been central to any 
scepticism regarding the imagination in science. Take, for example, Norton’s argument view. 
Salis and Frigg argue that Norton has no place in his system for imagination, but when he 
makes any references to imagination, or dismisses the “picturesque” qualities of thought 
experiments, it appears that he has in mind an imagistic form of imagination.53 They argue 
that their propositional account can circumvent such opposition.  
While I have outlined the features of the propositional imagination earlier in this chapter, it is 
worth mentioning some of the details of Salis and Frigg’s conceptualisation of this kind of 
imagination.54 The core features that the propositional imagination exhibits, that is, the 
features that are necessary and sufficient conditions for “imagining-that”, are: 
(i) Freedom. As Salis and Frigg state that ‘we are not free to believe whatever we want, 
but typically we are free to imagine whatever we want’ (2020, 30). As previously 
mentioned, we may not be able to imagine whatever we want to imagine, but the 
important point is that we are free to imagine things that we know are not true. Whereas 
to ‘believe that p is to hold p as true at the actual world, and whether the actual world 
makes p true or false is not up to us’ (ibid.).  
 
52 In the next chapter, however, I do offer a discussion of the differences between models and thought 
experiments. This includes how the nature and role of imagination may differ in the two practices.   
53 They also attribute such a view to Weisberg who rejects the fiction view of scientific models. 
Weisberg describes the imaginings in such views as ‘mental pictures’ (2013, 51). I’ll go through 
Weisberg’s objections in the next chapter. See also McLoone (2019) for a defence of the propositional 
imagination in modelling as a response to Weisberg.  
54 Salis and Frigg include counterfactual reasoning, supposition and dreaming as species of 
propositional imagination. Dreams are set to oneside, and Salis and Frigg favour make-believe over 
counterfactual reasoning and supposition. In the case of the former, this is because possible worlds are 
complete whereas models are not: ‘Claims about the date of the Battle of Waterloo…are neither true 
nor false in, say, Einstein’s elevator TE’ (2020, 42). See also Friend (2017) for an outline of the 
differences between possible worlds and the Waltonian framework. Further, Salis and Frigg highlight 
the tensions in the literature regarding gaining knowledge from counterfactuals (see Williamson 2020 
for discussion).  In the case of supposition, Salis and Frigg argue that it fails to be constrained enough 
to be appropriate in the scientific context: ‘One can suppose anything, and as long as no further 




(ii) Mirroring. The inferences that we carry out when we propositionally imagine are 
similar to those operating in belief (ibid). For example, when we believe someone is 
human, we also believe that they have blood in their veins. Similarly, to recall an earlier 
example, when we imagine Hermione, we also take it as fictionally true that she has 
blood in her veins. 
(iii) Quarantining. Given that imagining that p does not mean that we believe p, this feature 
highlights how we take any effects of our imaginings to only apply within the imagined 
context, that is to say, our imaginings do not motivate action. For example, if I imagine 
that there is a ferocious animal chasing after me, I am not going to run away as I would 
do if I believed there to be. Further, if we learn anything from our imaginings, then this 
is only when we export them to the real world. Salis and Frigg give the example of 
reading a work of Dickens which prescribes us to imagine that many people were 
treated badly in the Victorian era. We might also believe this to be true, but such 
‘“exports” are, however, one step removed from the imagination’ (ibid., 31). 
To demonstrate their view, Salis and Frigg provide an example from Galileo, namely his 
thought experiment which was used to answer the question: ‘is a force required to keep an 
object moving with constant velocity?’ Galileo asks us to imagine a frictionless U-shaped 
cavity. If a ball is dropped from one side, it will continue to move until it recovers the original 
height it was dropped from on the other side of the cavity due to the law of equal heights. We 
then imagine that the second side of the U-shaped bend is flattened, so that the ball is now 
being dropped from a height and then travels along a straight line. The law of equal heights 
still applies yet the ball can never recover its original height and so, it will continue moving. 
This thought experiment exposes a contradiction in Aristotle’s theory that moving objects will 
come to a stop. From this, Galileo establishes the law of inertia; no force is needed to keep an 
object moving with constant velocity.55 
Against the imagistic views, most notably, the works of Gendler and Nersessian, Salis and 
Frigg argue that the importance of mental imagery has been overstated. They state that mental 
imagery is insufficient: ‘When considering Galileo’s cavity we do not seem to have a 
perception-like representation of the cavity being frictionless or the lack of air resistance. 
 
55 In order to draw the connection between thought experiments and models, Salis and Frigg offer a 
model version of Galileo’s thought experiment in which we can derive a ‘mathematically rigorous 




Likewise, we cannot form a perception-like representation of the concept of force without 
having a theoretical definition, which is usually given in linguistic and formulaic symbols’ 
(ibid., 29). Here, Salis and Frigg highlight how many steps in a thought experiment are best 
captured in terms of the propositional imagination, as opposed to as mental images.  
Focusing on Galileo’s thought experiment, it can be asked: What would it be like to have a 
perception-like representation of the cavity being frictionless? It seems correct to say, as Salis 
and Frigg do, that we cannot have a visual image of frictionlessness.56 But we could consider 
how we might represent absences in our imaginations. In this case, we would imagine the 
state of affairs but in such a way that we subtract fiction from the visual mental image we 
produce. In the Two New Sciences, Galileo through Salviati, provides descriptions of 
experiments previously performed to help convince Simplicio that certain mathematical 
results apply to nature and to make certain theoretical claims plausible. In one section, he 
describes cutting a channel along a piece of wood and states ‘having made this groove very 
straight, smooth and polished as possible, we rolled along it a hard, smooth, and very round 
bronze ball…’ (1914, 178). Here, it is plausible to suggest that Galileo helps us imagine the 
effects of frictionlessness, that is, what it would look or feel like, by providing us with 
descriptions whereby friction is reduced as much as possible.57 
Turning to Arcangeli’s The Two Faces of Mental Imagery (2019) provides a way of 
considering this difference.58 Arcangeli draws a distinction between two different senses of 
mental imagery which she argues have often been conflated in the imagination literature. 
Mental imagery can be understood as sensory imagination which is a psychological attitude 
or mode that re-creates perception as on, for example, Currie and Ravenscroft’s view as 
previously discussed (2002). In this sense, mental imagery is a perception-like attitude such 
as when we imagine seeing or smelling flowers. But the relationship between mental imagery 
and perception can also be understood in a different way. As Arcangeli explains, on 
 
56 Going back to Brown’s statement above, that should not necessarily consider the mental imagery 
thought experiments produce as being limited to visual imagery, it could be suggested that Salis and 
Frigg are too quick to conclude that no kind of mental imagery is irrelevant in imagining 
frictionlessness. It is difficult to describe what frictionlessness might look like, but perhaps that is 
because another sense modality is more important when detecting friction. For example, we could 
imagine what frictionlessness might feel like, thus having an image of a different sense modality in this 
case, namely a tactile one. 
57 The importance of what Galileo might be asking us to do will become apparent when I outline my 
pluralist account.  




definitions such as Gaut’s, where imagery ‘is a matter of having sensory perceptions’ (Gaut 
2003, 272), mental imagery is placed ‘on the content, rather than on the attitudinal level of 
our mental life’ (Arcangeli 2019, 7). Here, mental imagery is a type of sensory content. On 
this understanding having ‘a mental image of a flower would be bringing to our mind a 
sensory (i.e. visual, olfactory) presentation of a flower without the stimulation of our vision 
or olfaction by an external flower’ (ibid., 8). 
Arcangeli states that the two senses of mental imagery often go together. In such cases, 
sensory imagination has mental imagery as its content. But Arcangeli offers one way in which 
it is possible for them to come apart. She demonstrates this through the example of recalling 
or desiring (that is, having an attitude that is different from sensory imagining) food that is 
currently cooking in the oven. Here, a desiring of the food, say, may involve a mental image 
of the food inside the oven, that is to say, such a mental image is the content of the attitude.  
If we return to Galileo’s thought experiment, we can also see how the distinction that 
Arcangeli offers can allow for an instance of sensory imagination without a mental image of 
a particular aspect of the imagined content, in this case, frictionlessness. In the second sense 
of mental imagery, that is, as a type of mental content, it does appear that we cannot 
imagistically imagine frictionlessness. That is to say, we cannot form an image in our minds 
of frictionlessness, and this is what Salis and Frigg point out. However, what Arcangeli’s 
distinction opens up is a way in which we could consider how we can imagistically imagine 
frictionlessness in the first, attitudinal sense. The thought here is that we can entertain the 
concept “frictionlessness” in a way that is perception-like. We do this by imagining how a 
certain state of affairs would look in the absence of friction and so on.  
Putting to one side potential issues with this particular point, we should acknowledge that 
Salis and Frigg are correct to say that in order for thought experiments to be successful, we 
must have certain conceptual knowledge and thought experiments are going to include steps 
that are best captured as propositional reasoning.59 Further to maintaining that mental imagery 
is insufficient, Salis and Frigg take it to be unnecessary. They state ‘it would be implausible 
to argue that individuals with a poor imagistic ability could not derive the correct outcome of 
Galileo’s TE (or, for that matter, of any TE). Presumably, one could perform the TE and draw 
 
59 This point has also been developed by Arcangeli (2010) who, states that the imagination in thought 
experiments is not limited to a pictorial kind, and argues that a broader notion of the imagination is 
present in the work of Mach. See also Reiss (2002) for an argument against the view that thought 




the relevant conclusion by understanding the propositional content of the argument underlying 
it’ (2020, 40).60 They argue that it is a propositional form of the imagination, imagining that 
something is the case, that is necessary for conducting thought experiments, insisting that we 
‘need to grasp the relevant concepts, with or without forming a mental image of the objects 
and the transformations they stand in for’ (ibid.). They generalise this claim to cover all cases 
of the scientific imagination in modelling and thought experiments.  
Salis and Frigg address head on the question of what kind of imagination is involved in 
scientific thought experiments and models and offer a useful taxonomy, drawing on 
philosophy of mind and aesthetics, in order to shed light on this question. I agree with them 
that we should think beyond mental imagery when discussing the imagination in science and 
they successfully illuminate the essential role of the propositional imagination. In the next 
section, however, I set out worry with their approach. And in chapter 4, I develop my own 
view of the nature of the imagination in science.  
 
 Propositional Imagination and Argumentation 
An initial problem with Salis and Frigg’s account is that there are close connections between 
the propositional view of the imagination in thought experiments that they set out, and 
Norton’s argument view. To recap, Norton analyses thought experiments as arguments and 
maintains that all thought experiments can be reconstructed into argument form without any 
epistemic loss, and that the ‘actual conduct of a thought experiment consists in the execution 
of an argument’ (2004, 50). Norton has reconstructed many thought experiments into 
arguments and holds that there are no examples that cannot be handled in such a way. 
Consequently, their typical narrative form and any of their creative, or to use Norton’s 
terminology, “picturesque” qualities, are deemed epistemically redundant.  
Salis and Frigg argue that Norton’s view misses the importance of the imagination and the 
use of imagined particulars. They state that characterising thought experiments as arguments 
‘presupposes a propositional kind of imagination’ (2020, 25) and ‘the arguments leading to 
the general conclusions involve imagined scenarios and particulars’ (ibid., 37). However, it is 
 
60 Salis and Frigg do, however, acknowledge in a footnote that whether any thought experiments would 
be difficult for those who have limited imagistic capacities ‘would be an interesting empirical question’ 
(2020, 50 fn 24). In the next chapter, I will say more about aphantasia, that is, the inability or reduced 




difficult to see how their account departs in any significant respect from an argument view 
when it comes to the types of reasoning involved in thought experiments. In their analysis of 
Galileo’s case, which is the only thought experiment they discuss, they state: ‘Galileo 
deliberately imagines a certain hypothetical scenario, he develops a deductive reasoning 
leading to a contradiction, and he quarantines its content since he explicitly invites us to 
imagine a non-actual situation’ (ibid., 38).  
Their view actually comes out stricter than Norton’s in certain ways. Norton has expanded 
his notion of argument involved in thought experiments over the years. His position is broad; 
valid logical inferences go beyond deduction and induction to include informal reasoning and 
even reasoning with imagery. For example, a picture can be a premise in an argument as seen 
in some mathematical cases. Thought experiments are governed by a ‘very general notion of 
logic’ (Norton 2004, 54). As we saw in the introductory chapter, there is a worry with 
Norton’s view that the notion of argument becomes so broad that his position ends up trivial—
the claim amounting to the idea that there is some reasoning or inference involved (Stuart 
2016b, Brendel 2018). In light of this, I understand the argument view of thought experiments, 
as many have done in the literature, to be restricted to a narrower sense of argument. 
The worry is that either Salis and Frigg’s propositional account, although insisting that there 
is a role for imagination, is stricter than Norton’s (broad) argument view, or it is difficult to 
see what the distinction between Salis and Frigg’s propositional account, and Norton’s 
(narrow) argument view is.  
Salis and Frigg do of course situate their account within a broader framework of modelling 
and representation in general. They endorse the claim that models and thought experiments 
are examples of make-believe, that is, they are representations that function as ‘props’ that 
prescribe imaginings. However, given my claim that their account is strongly aligned with 
Norton’s narrow view, what is the role for make-believe? And what is the relation between 
propositional imagination, argument, and make-believe?  This is not to say that characterising 
thought experiments as arguments necessarily means that they cannot be fictions in the 
Waltonian sense. As Friend demonstrates, Walton’s category (what Friend calls Walt fiction) 
is broader than how we usually apply “fiction”. She states that ‘Walton is not interested in our 
ordinary conception of fiction. He is concerned with representational art more generally, 




as fiction’ (2011, 164). But if this is all that is meant, what do the advocates of this view think 
they are getting from treating thought experiments as make-believe?  
The problem is that it is hard to see the benefit of treating thought experiments as fictions in 
the Waltonian sense over Norton’s narrow view if the nature of the imagination is 
propositional (belief-like) and thought experiments involve deductive reasoning.61 Meynell 
gave an earlier account of thought experiments as make-believe, and raises a similar concern. 
She argues that if we were to maintain that the imaginings prescribed follow the logical form 
of beliefs, and the relations between beliefs, then it is not clear how they would differ from 
Norton’s background assumptions (2014, 4165). As a consequence, Salis and Frigg will be 
subject to the types of worries that have been aimed at Norton’s account. Meynell instead 
emphasises the importance of experiential language, and the use of pictures as aids for thought 
experiments which gives insight into the nature of the imagination involved which I return to 
in the next chapter.  
Perhaps this worry can be responded to by further considering which principles of generation 
are involved in thought experiments. That is, by thinking about how we get from those truths 
that are explicitly stated to those that are implied. Salis and Frigg do not offer any discussion 
of thought experiments beyond the Galilean case, but they do suggest that the principles of 
generation involved in scientific models and thought experiments need not be restricted to the 
reality principle (where we “fill in” what is given as fictional truths based on the real world) 
or the mutual belief principle (where we constrain our implied truths in line with the beliefs 
of the community in which the fiction originated). At the end of the paper, they suggest, with 
reference to Meynell’s work, that other principles could be involved depending on the context 
in which the model or thought experiment is being used.  
However Meynell’s Waltonian view of thought experiments differs significantly from Salis 
and Frigg. When Meynell raises the possibility of a variety of principles of generation—the 
‘conventions, aliefs, habits of mind, and primed expectations’ that work with ‘background 
 
61 A parallel worry is raised by French who considers a version of the models as fictions view that takes 
the imaginings involved to be of a conceptual nature in order to get around worries concerning our 
abilities to visualise. French states ‘in the context of this review of fictionalism, how is conceptual 
imagination  to be demarcated from the kinds of conceptual explorations that advocates of the Semantic 






beliefs to create TE content’—she states that these are not reducible to belief-like reasoning.62 
She states ‘the content of these imaginings and the ways in which they are produced and 
provide insight simply does not have a propositional or argumentative form’ (ibid., 4165). It 
would thus be interesting to see how a more flexible approach to the principles of generation 
involved in scientific thought experiments would be fleshed out on a propositional view of 
imagination, and whether this offers a way of highlighting how the view departs from 
Norton’s picture.  
And so, a defender of the models as make-believe view that takes the imagination as 
propositional might be able to overcome the worry presented in this section and demonstrate 
how their account differs from, or is a better version, than Norton’s view, through offering a 
more detailed account of the principles of generation involved. But this remains to be seen. 
In the next chapter, I will not say much more on the make-believe aspect of Salis and Frigg’s 
account. My focus instead is on the type of imagining involved in science.  
 
 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have outlined some of the existing discussions regarding the imagination in 
science. Despite the increasing attention given to the imagination’s role in science, especially 
in the practice of modelling as seen on the models as fictions view, the question regarding 
what the nature of the imagination in this domain has been largely overlooked. Focusing on 
thought experiments, I demonstrated that most have assumed the imagination as taking an 
objectual form; we have pictures in our minds of a state of affairs described by the thought 
experiment. I then turned to a recent account that is set against this assumption, and explicitly 
addresses the type of imagination involved in models and thought experiments. This is Salis 
and Frigg’s propositional view. While I agree with them that we should also include 
propositional imagination in our analysis of thought experiments, I presented an initial worry 
with the view which arises given the close connections between this propositional picture and 
Norton’s argument view which states that thought experiments involve deductive and 
inductive reasoning. In light of this, the account will be open to the worries raised against the 
 
62 Aliefs are ‘associatively linked content that is representational, affective and behavioural’ (Gender 
2008, 642). The connections between aliefs are not logical as with beliefs (or make-beliefs), but rather 
come in “associated chains”. Aliefs can contradict a person’s beliefs. For example, I might believe that 
I am very safe on a flight, but I have an alief that I am in danger. See Currie and Achino (2012) for a 




Nortonian picture. Whether or not this particular problem can be overcome, I will now turn 
to my pluralist account of the imagination in science. I argue that this can better accommodate 






4. A Pluralist Account of the Imagination in Science 
 
 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we saw how it is increasingly accepted that the imagination has some 
role in science, yet the question of what is meant by the imagination in this context is under 
explored. I outlined how the imagination in thought experiments has been characterised in 
terms of the objectual imagination, in particular, in forming mental pictures of the scenario 
described. I then discussed Salis and Frigg’s recent objections to this assumption, and I set 
out their alternative view. They argue that mental imagery is neither a sufficient nor a 
necessary type of imagination for the conduct of scientific models and thought experiments. 
Instead, it is the propositional form of imagination that is required. I agree with Salis and 
Frigg in that we should not equate the scientific imagination with mental imagery, and they 
are correct to emphasise importance of the propositional imagination in this context.  
However, in this chapter, I present a different view of the nature of imagination in thought 
experiments. I argue that while we ought to acknowledge the role of the propositional 
imagination in science, and more generally, attend to the nature of the imagination more 
closely, it is incorrect to take the objectual imagination out of the picture altogether. Instead, 
I propose a pluralist account. I begin with considering the differences between thought 
experiments and models which has implications for the ways in which the imagination is used 
in their conduct. I then restrict my focus to thought experiments and argue that when we 
consider various examples and their role in scientific practice, we can see that different 
thought experiments invite different types of imagination.  
 
 Thought Experiments, Models and Mental Images 
Although my main focus in this chapter concerns thought experiments, I will begin by 
suggesting that there are relevant differences between thought experiments and models that 
can impact the nature and role of the imagination in their use. This thus undermines a “one 
size fits all” account of the scientific imagination and puts pressure on those that seek to 





Salis and Frigg are right to stress similarities between thought experiments and models and 
they show that bringing the two together offers a fruitful way of thinking about the 
imagination in science. Both involve creating and engaging with idealized hypothetical 
scenarios, and because of this, some have argued that ‘models are often experiments in 
thought’ (Cartwright 2010, 19), or that models are cases of “extended cognition” (Thoma 
2016).63 Further, it is often claimed that they share important similarities with experiment: 
They offer a description of an initial set up which is then manipulated for us to consider what 
would happen. Yet they each depart from experiment in that they do not involve intervention 
in the world. Salis and Frigg also acknowledge some distinctions between thought 
experiments and models, such as the fact that the former does not include the ‘formal 
apparatus’, that is, mathematical reasoning to provide a formal proof, which is present in the 
latter. I agree that scientific models involve the imagination in some way, and refer to 
imaginary objects or systems, and I do not want to insist on a strict distinction between models 
and thought experiments. However, I want to note that we should attend to their differences 
when giving an account of the nature of imagination involved in their use. 
A key strength that Salis and Frigg claim for their account is that moving the focus away from 
mental imagery can aid in avoiding scepticism around the imagination in science. They state 
that the imagination is ‘dismissed because of its allegedly imagistic character’ (2020, 18). As 
Salis and Frigg cite Weisberg (2013) as holding this view, and because he offers the most 
developed form of the worry surrounding “mental pictures” in the models as fictions view, 
we can focus on his discussion.64 Weisberg presents examples of models that are 
unimaginable, in the sense that we cannot hold images in our mind of what they describe. He 
argues that although ‘it is relatively easy to imagine [to form “mental pictures” of] the content 
of finite, deterministic, individualistic models like a population of genes undergoing 
assortment, it is unclear that this could generalize to more complex cases’ and importantly, 
this ‘rules out the possibility of equating such models with imagined fictional scenarios and 
undercuts Waltonian versions of the fictionalist position’ (2013, 63).  
 
63 These points echo the ways in which some have drawn connections between thought experiments 
and computer simulations as presented in chapter 1.  
64 McLoone (2019) also defends a propositional account of imagination in modelling, and his paper is 
set up against Weisberg’s criticism that some models are about “unimaginable” (in the sense of 




Take the case of the Lotka-Volterra model which describes the dynamics between predator-
prey populations. Weisberg states that on a fictionalist picture, this model is an imaginary 
system of two interacting, concrete and discrete organisms. But the problem is that the 
equations that describe the model do not refer to individual organisms but rather to 
populations. And the size of these populations are not a discrete quantity; they may vary 
continuously. How could we visualise this? Other examples that are presented as problematic 
for fictionalists are cases of models that involve probabilistic elements. The thought is that 
we could imagine, that is, form an image in our mind, of a single instantiation, say a predator 
dying, but this does not represent the probability of the death (ibid., 63). And we can also 
include models that have properties far removed from concrete systems, such as models in 
statistical mechanics that describe infinite degrees of freedom, or models in physics that have 
more than three spatial dimensions as discussed by French (2020a, 173).65  
And so, the question is whether or not such instances of unvisualisablity in the case of models 
also occurs in the case of thought experiments. To answer this, it is helpful to consider some 
of the differences between models and thought experiments. As already noted, models have 
an underlying formal apparatus. But the imagination is sufficient for conducting thought 
experiments in that no calculations on paper nor a computer are required when we carry out, 
for example, Galileo’s thought experiments.66 To use Thoma’s phrase, ‘the phenomenon is 
established purely in the imagination’ (2016, 136). Thoma discusses this in the context of 
what she labels “hidden” thought experiments in economics. The example she focuses on is 
Banerjee’s (1992) model of herd behaviour which is preceded by a short story. Thoma argues 
that stories such as this have typically been analysed by philosophers as a part of the formal 
model that follows them. However, Thoma argues that this is mistaken; these “stories” are 
 
65 Although Weisberg rejects the fictionalist view of models (and in part, because of their worries 
regarding the limits of imagination), it is important to note that he does not argue that imagination 
(characterised in an imagistic sense) has no role in the scientific domain. For Weisberg, mental pictures 
help when thinking about models. Weisberg regards these imaginings not as the model, but as the “folk 
ontology” of models, which is essential to modelling and therefore must be included in philosophical 
accounts of modelling. They can aid the development of models, and are useful in cases of using 
multiple models that are mathematically different, but share many features in common when described 
at the concrete level (2013, 68-70, see also French 2020a, 174). As my pluralism does not commit to 
the Waltonian framework, what I go on to say about the imagination in thought experiments could be 
adapted to accommodate models taken as mathematical structures as on Weisberg’s view. Todd (2020) 
offers a defence of imagistic imagination in modelling against Salis and Frigg.  
66 It might be the case that there are certain instances in which scientists could see what happens in their 
model by just thinking or imagining about the assumptions of their model and so, some models will be 




actually instances of thought experiments that have independent evidential significance, and 
differ in significant respects, from the models that are introduced after them.  
Banerjee sets out to explain “herd behaviour”. This is where a group of people all act in the 
same way despite individuals having different information regarding what is the best decision 
to make. Banerjee shows that this can occur even in cases where there is no preference for 
following what others are doing (which is how herd behaviour has typically been explained). 
The thought experiment goes as follows: 
‘Most of us have been in a situation where we have to choose between two restaurants 
that are both more or less unknown to us. Consider now a situation where there is a 
population of 100 people who are all facing such a choice.  
There are two restaurants A and B that are next to each other, and it is known that the 
prior probabilities are 51 percent for restaurant A being the better and 49 percent for 
restaurant B being better. People arrive at the restaurants in sequence, observe the 
choices made by the people before them, and decide on one or the other of the 
restaurants. Apart from knowing the prior probabilities, each of these people also got a 
signal which says either that A is better or that B is better (of course the signal could be 
wrong). It is also assumed that each person’s signal is of the same quality. 
Suppose that of the 100 people, 99 have received signals that B is better but the one 
person whose signal favors A gets to choose first. Clearly, the first person will go to A. 
The second person will now know that the first person had a signal that favored A, 
while her own signal favors B. Since the signals are of equal quality, they effectively 
cancel out, and the rational choice is to go by the prior probabilities and go to A. 
The second person thus chooses A regardless of her signal. Her choice therefore 
provides no new information to the next person in line: the third person’s situation is 
thus exactly the same as that of the second person, and she should make the same choice 
and so on. Everyone ends up at restaurant A even if, given the aggregate information, 
it is practically certain that B is better’ (1992, 798-99). 
Thoma argues that in this thought experiment ‘we can imagine ourselves in the relevant choice 
situation, and visualize what it would be like to stand in front of the two restaurants, one of 
which is gradually filling with people’ (2016, 9). Whereas the formal model that follows the 




the story to be convincing’ (ibid., 10). I do not want to say that all thought experiments need 
to be visualised, as I have set out, I agree with Salis and Frigg that some thought experiments, 
or some aspects of their performance, can be conducted in the absence of mental imagery. I 
will say more about this in the next section and consequently what to make of statements such 
as visualisation being “crucial” for a thought experiment. But I do think that attending to the 
differences models and thought experiments highlights how these two practices differ when 
it comes to the ways in which the imagination is involved in their use.  
We can also see this difference via attending to the type of idealisations involved in models 
and thought experiments. For example, Thoma highlights how Banerjee’s thought experiment 
does not ask us to imagine perfectly rational agents. Rather, the thought experiment works 
because we can imagine ourselves in this situation and consider the types of choices we would 
make, and therefore we see it as likely that agents would act in this way. Whereas the model 
assumes perfectly rational agents that have common knowledge of the other agents’ 
rationality. How could we imagine this? We cannot intuitively access the preferences of this 
type of agent nor could we put ourselves in their shoes and think what it would be like to be 
such an agent. And as Thoma states, common knowledge ‘is shorthand for an infinite number 
of mental states. And it is at least not realistic that humans can have an infinite number of 
mental states’ (2016, 137).  Further, in the model, the agents do not have a simple choice 
between A and B. Rather, there is a continuum of options.  
Reiss (2018) also discusses idealisations in thought experiments in comparison with other 
practices in science. Thought experiments involve what Reiss labels “Galilean idealisations”, 
where these are taken to be causal idealisations, that is, those that isolate a single causal line 
to consider the question “what would happen if?”. For example, in Galileo’s falling bodies, 
air resistance and other forces that would affect the speed of the bodies are idealised away in 
order for us to see how the scenario would unfold. Mathematical idealisations, which are 
introduced on pragmatic grounds to make problems mathematically tractable, cannot be 
incorporated into thought experiments whereas they are essential in many types of modelling. 
This is because the former succeed without formal apparatus, that is, without 
‘mathematization or calculation’ (ibid., 472). While I do not think that all thought experiments 
require us to form mental images, I do think that in light of these differences between models 
and thought experiments, a weaker version of Thoma’s claim could be provided. This is that 
thought experiment scenarios are at least possible to imagine in an objectual sense. Along 




consider Stevin’s chain, Galileo’s falling bodies, or Newton’s bucket to name just a few 
examples.67 These scenarios describe elements that we are able to picture in our minds, and 
we can manipulate our visual imaginings as the scenario unfolds.  
However, it is important to recall Salis and Frigg’s point that certain elements of the scenario 
described in a thought experiment cannot be visualised and instead involve only the 
propositional imagination. I suggested a way around their example of forming a mental image 
of frictionlessness. But perhaps there are other cases that provide stronger support for the 
point that Salis and Frigg want to make. Let’s consider a case discussed in chapters 1 and 2; 
Dewan and Beran’s rocket and thread thought experiment. This example includes a step in 
which we have to imagine that the two rockets reach four-fifths of the speed of light (as 
Lorentz contraction is only noticeable when objects travel near the speed of light). It seems 
clear that in this step, we imagine that, as opposed to form a visual imagining of the rockets 
travelling at that speed. Similarly, we can consider Einstein’s thought experiment in which he 
gets us to imagine chasing a beam of light and to consider what we would see. Given that we 
cannot see beams of light, then it may appear difficult to make sense of imagining this scenario 
in an imagistic way.68  
I take it that there are cases of thought experiments that are more difficult to visualise than 
others and the set up of thought experiments do require certain background and conceptual 
knowledge. But unlike the cases of models that Weisberg and French present, the scenario 
described in these examples can still be largely visualised. In the Dewan and Beran example, 
we can clearly form a mental image of the setup of the thought experiment, that is, of the two 
rockets, one in front of the other, linked together by a thread. We can form an image of the 
rockets accelerating, and then moving at a uniform velocity. We can also imagine the 
perspective of the two different observers—one at the starting point, one at the finish point. 
And in Einstein’s thought experiment, we may not be able to form an accurate imagining of 
what we would see, and so the example differs from say, Galileo’s falling bodies or Newton’s 
bucket in which the concrete elements of the scenario are familiar objects that we have 
experience with. However, Einstein’s thought experiment does not require a detailed or 
accurate image of such a scenario, and mental images can be more or less substantive. The 
 
67 I look to Newton’s bucket in the next chapter. 
68 Stuart provides a discussion of the light beam example in the context of “accurate” imaginings in 
science. Clearly, this scenario does not involve an accurate representation of the target system. Not only 
can we not “see” lightwaves, but travelling at that speed would cause someone to explode (and hence 




images we form when we imagine travelling next to a beam of light depend upon background 
beliefs concerning Newton and Maxwell’s theories, but when we have these concepts, we can 
then form an objectual imagining of what we would see according to each of the theories.  
Thought experiments describe scenarios that can be imagined in a visual way, (granted that 
there might be degrees to this visualisability), even if this is not always required. It is difficult 
to think of a scientific thought experiment that involves imagining a scenario that include any 
of the problematic features that Weisberg and French highlight above in the context of 
modelling such as continuous populations. This is at least partly due to the fact that thought 
experiments rely on our imaginative capacities and do not involve complex calculation and 
so on as in the case of models. Thus, there are differences with regards to the type of 
imagination involved in various areas of scientific practice and therefore, we should not be 
too quick to assume that an analysis of the nature of imagination in modelling could easily 
carry over to thought experiments, or vice versa. In the remaining sections, I turn to the varied 
nature of the imagination across scientific thought experiments. 
 
 Invitations to Imagine 
In the previous chapter, we saw that the imagination in thought experiments has typically been 
taken to be an objectual form. Salis and Frigg propose a different, propositional view. I agree 
with Salis and Frigg that the imagination in thought experiments should not always be 
characterised in terms of imagery, and it can be a matter of entertaining propositions. We can 
also hold that some aspects of conducting individual thought experiments will not require 
sensory imagination. But I disagree with the scope of this claim. While we can attempt to 
rationally reconstruct thought experiments into a propositional or argument form, the idea I 
wish to defend is that at least sometimes, this will lead us to miss important features involved 
in their use in scientific practice. This includes the ways in which scientists call upon our 
imaginative capacities to convince us of an outcome or help us understand a theory or 
problem. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Salis and Frigg note that ‘it would be implausible to argue 
that individuals with a poor imagistic ability could not derive the correct outcome of Galileo’s 
TE (or, for that matter, of any TE)’ (2020, 40). What should we make of this? As Salis and 
Frigg recognise in a footnote to this point, this would be an interesting empirical question. 




have problems with conducting certain scientific thought experiments? Given that no such 
research has been done, we cannot say either way. And detailed study of “aphantasia”, that is, 
a condition in which there is an inability (or a reduced ability) to have voluntary mental 
imagery, has only recently emerged. While discussions of the phenomenon can be traced back 
to Galton (1880), the term was coined just a few years ago in 2015 by Zeman et al. It is said 
to affect around 2% of people. The term is applied to a range of cases; most people surveyed 
by Zeman et al still had involuntary mental imagery, for example, when dreaming (2015, 378-
379). Some people did not experience any mental imagery, whereas for others, mental 
imagery was significantly less vivid than the controlled group. Further, there was variation 
with regards to whether imagery in all sensory modalities is affected. In addition to this, there 
is discussion around whether aphantasiacs still have unconscious (as opposed to non-existent) 
mental imagery (Nanay 2018, 127).  
Given that this research is still in its infancy, and that we cannot answer whether there are 
scientific thought experiments that those who have aphantasia could not successfully carry 
out, it is going to be difficult to argue for the necessity of imagery in (some) thought 
experiments, or deny it altogether.69 And further to this, it is plausible that some people will 
find reasoning via visualising more useful than others, and may even require this form of 
imagination in order to arrive at an outcome. Whereas for others, accompanying imagery will 
not or cannot be present, or if it is, it will not always be necessary.70 In light of this uncertainty, 
I argue that we should shift our attention towards a different, but related, issue. This is the 
question of: What do thought experiments ask us to do? What kind of imaginative engagement 
do they invite? This will help us see cases in which objectual imagination may play a 
significant cognitive role. 
Here, I draw on Balcerak Jackson (2016) who argues that imagining, conceiving and 
supposing are ways of thinking about often hypothetical objects or scenarios, but they are 
 
69 There are studies on aphantasia and reasoning and problem solving. For example, Zeman et al have 
looked into the effects of aphantasia and hyperphantasia (an abundance of mental imagery) on memory, 
face recognition abilities, as well as differences in methods (for example, whether conscious visual 
imagery was utilised) when responding to questions such as “how many windows are in your house?”. 
Those with aphantasia reported using ‘a range of alternative strategies including the use of avisual 
spatial imagery, kinaesthetic imagery and amodal ‘knowledge’’ (2020, 9). See also Watkins (2018) for 
a perspective on mental imagery (or a lack of mental imagery) in scientists and Jacobs et al (2018) on 
aphantasia and working memory.  
70 This therefore allows my account to accommodate instances of individuals such as Bohr who utilise 




three different cognitive activities that each play distinct epistemic roles.71 I will stick to the 
broader distinction introduced in the previous chapter, between objectual imaginings and 
propositional imaginings. There is debate surrounding whether suppositions should be 
included under the umbrella term “imagination” which Balcerak Jackson denies. For some, 
such as Frigg and Salis, although they distinguish make-believe from supposition, they hold 
that both fall under the category of imagination. For my purposes, I need not go into this. My 
aim is to show that in the spirit of Balcerak Jackson’s account of the difference between 
imagination, supposition and conceiving, different thought experiments invite different types 
of cognitive activity. It is also important to keep in mind that often ‘suppose’, ‘conceive’ and 
‘imagine’ appeared to be used in an interchangeable way. One of Balcerak Jackson’s aims is 
to demonstrate how terminological choice ought to matter.72  
We can now see what Balcerak Jackson takes the difference to consist in. She gives the 
example of a thought experiment from ethics, Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist case in 
defence of the right to abortion, as an instance of inviting us to imagine a situation obtaining 
(as opposed to merely supposing or conceiving). Or in the terminology I am adopting, an 
example that invites us to form an objectual imagining. In this thought experiment, you are 
asked to imagine waking up in the morning and finding yourself back to back in bed with an 
unconscious famous violinist. He has a fatal kidney ailment and it turns out that you are the 
only person who has the right blood type to help. You have been kidnapped, and the violinist’s 
circulatory system has been plugged into yours so that your kidneys can be used to extract 
poison from his blood as well as your own—to unplug you would be to kill him. But never 
mind, you are informed by the doctors and medical staff, this is a temporary state; he needs 
to be plugged into you for just nine months.  
 
71 A central aim in Balcerak Jackson’s paper is to get clearer on the nature of conceiving. She provides 
Chalmers’s zombie thought experiment as a case that asks us to conceive which on Balcerak Jackson’s 
view, is a matter of simulating what a reasoner would be rationally committed to in the situation 
described. I am yet to find a scientific case that asks us to “conceive” in the particular sense that 
Balcerak Jackson defines and so I leave this part of her discussion out for the purposes of this chapter.  
72 Thought experiments are introduced using a variety of terms—‘imagine’, ‘picture’, ‘suppose’, 
‘consider’ and so on. It seems that these terms are also used interchangeably. Does it matter that 
scientists do not always ask us to ‘imagine’ the scenario described? Weisberg (2013) notes that 
sometimes ‘imagine that’ or ‘visualise the following’ and so on is not in science, often modelers will 
just stipulate that certain expressions stand in for elements of the target system. But as Odenbaugh 
(2015, 287) notes, even in spheres that we more readily accept as engaging imagination—literary 
fiction, games of make-believe and so on—‘imagine that’ can be replaced by other terms. See also 




Here, Balcerak Jackson argues, ‘unless you vividly represent the scenario from the 
perspective of the experiencing subject, you do not really follow the invitation to imagine it’ 
(2016, 45), we can specify that this is in the sense of ‘objectual’ imagining. The correct 
engagement with this scenario is a matter of putting ‘yourself in the shoes of the person 
waking up in the hospital’; imagining seeing the violinist attached to us, feeling a certain 
way—surprised, scared, anxious and so on. If instead, Balcerak Jackson states, we were 
invited to suppose (or more generally, propositionally imagine) that the scenario had obtained 
‘it would have been perfectly in accordance with the request for you simply to take the 
situation as obtaining, without representing it as being experienced from the first-person 
perspective, and in fact without representing it in any particular way at all’ (2016, 46).73  
In contrast to the case of imagining the violinist, Balcerak Jackson gives the example of 
supposing that there are finitely many prime numbers. This request does not expect us to 
imagine this is the case in the same way the violinist thought experiment does. We are not 
asked to picture or to simulate an experience of finitely many prime numbers, or to adopt a 
certain perspective so that we see or feel or sense that there are finitely many prime numbers. 
Instead, we are asked to use our ‘ability to think a thought with a particular content’ (ibid., 
51). To take another example of a thought experiment used in philosophy, we could consider 
Howell’s “Google Morals” in the context of moral deference:  
Suppose those wizards at Google come out with a new app: Google Morals. No longer 
will we find ourselves lost in the moral metropolis. When faced with a moral quandry 
or deep ethical question we can type a query and the answer comes forthwith (Howell, 
2014). 
As with the case of supposing finitely many prime numbers, this also seems to invite merely 
a propositional form of imagination, with no mental imagery or experiential component 
required. Even if we did imagine ourselves using the Google Morals app, or picture what it 
might be like, it seems that this would be unnecessary for the thought experiment to achieve 
 
73 While I draw on Balcerak Jackson in order to develop my pluralist account, I actually have 
reservations regarding the role of objectual imagination in the violinist thought experiment. What seems 
to be important in this case is that we have some link to affect, and this contributes to the persuasiveness 
of the thought experiment. However, I take it that we could propositionally imagine that we are attached 
to the violinist and so on, which would also give us the link to affect. Further, the outcome of the thought 
experiment isn’t one that seems tied to us “seeing” something in our imaginings. Rather, we form a 
moral evaluation. However, this issue is not significant for my argument and I take my examples below 




its function. What we are asked to do is to propositionally imagine that there is a Google 
Morals app, and to consider its moral implications. 
This emphasises the importance of paying close attention to particular examples. Salis and 
Frigg rely on one case and then generalise to all other scientific thought experiments. 
Similarly, the mental model theorists often talk in very general terms about reasoning in 
problem solving contexts to then make claims about scientific thought experiments. I argue 
for a pluralist view: if we look to a range of cases, and think about what their function is, we 
can see that there are different requirements of our imaginative capacities when engaging with 
different thought experiments. The focus of the discussion here then is the point at which the 
thought experiment has been designed by scientists in order to communicate, put pressure on, 
or explain an idea or theory. This is in contrast to theorising about the processes that went on 
in the minds of a scientist who initially conducted a thought experiment that was part of an 
important discovery. And so, the issue I want to focus on is to do with how scientists might 
invite a certain type of imagination in order to aid readers or listens of thought experiments 
to arrive at an outcome.  
 
 The Case for Pluralism 
 
4.4.1 Propositional Imagination 
Let’s begin with a case of a scientific thought experiment that seems to invite us to 
propositionally imagine only, where any objectual or experiential component is unnecessary. 
We can look to one of Darwin’s “imaginary illustrations” presented in On the Origin of 
Species as an example: 
‘Let us take the case of a wolf, which preys on various animals, securing some by craft, 
some by strength and some by fleetness; and let us suppose that the fleetest prey, a deer 
for instance, had from any change in the country increased in numbers, or that other 
prey had decreased in numbers, during that season of the year when the wolf is hardest 
pressed for food. I can under such circumstances see no reason to doubt that the swiftest 
and slimmest wolves would have the best chance of surviving, and so be preserved or 




The function of the thought experiment is to demonstrate Darwin’s theory’s explanatory 
potential, as opposed to provide evidence in support of natural selection (Lennox 1991). Here, 
as with the ‘Google Morals’ case, it seems that we are not required to picture the wolf and the 
properties it is described as possessing, nor does the thought experiment ask us to adopt a 
perspective of the scenario. The language is descriptive, the thought experiment refers to 
concrete objects and processes, and it is of course possible to visualise aspects of it. But I 
think a Salis and Frigg-type analysis would be right in this case: to succeed, the thought 
experiment merely requires that we grasp its propositional content—we imagine that there is 
a wolf and so on, with no mental imagery of a wolf or phenomenal component of seeing or 
feeling a wolf required.  
Another example that does not appear to invite the objectual imagination, this time from 
economics, comes from Hume: 
‘For suppose, that, by miracle, every man in GREAT BRITAIN should have five 
pounds slipt into his pocket in one night; this would much more than double the whole 
money that is at present in the kingdom; yet there would not next day, nor for some 
time, be any more lenders, nor any variation in the interest [rate]’ (1777, 299). 
As with the wolf and deer example, we could form an image of this in our minds by visualising 
the money being slipped into people’s pockets and so on. But the thought experiment does 
not seem to invite such an imagining nor can it be said that forming an image of the scenario 
would help the reader or listener of the thought experiment to understand Hume’s point. 
Rather, what is key to this thought experiment is that ‘we understand the doubling of the 
money stock is indeed simultaneous, that people with more money in their hands will take 
some time to change their behaviour, that institutions are rigid’ and so on (Reiss 2002, 27). 
And so, there are clear examples of thought experiments that seem to invite propositional 
imagination (even if we can visualise the scenario described). Now we can think about cases 
in which the invitation also includes the objectual imagination.  
 
4.4.2 Objectual Imagination 
There have been many examples of thought experiments, or thought experiment-type 
reasoning, that cannot be reduced to a (narrow) argument form. For instance, those that 




(Cooper 2005, 223) or rotating mental images of shapes as discussed by the mental model 
accounts.74 But I will focus on examples from the scientific domain. To begin, we can consider 
Maxwell’s demon. Maxwell introduced his ‘neat fingered being’ to show that the Second Law 
of Thermodynamics has only statistical validity (Earman and Norton 1998).  
At the point in which Maxwell introduces the thought experiment in A Theory of Heat, he has 
already established his statistical theory of heat. He states: ‘We have already shown that heat 
is a form of energy that when a body is hot it possesses a store of energy, part at least of which 
can afterwards be exhibited in the form of visible work’ (1871, 308). As Stuart (2016a) 
discusses, the thought experiment is not used to offer support to the theory. Rather, its aim is 
to aid our understanding of the theory. Understanding is a topic of significant interest in 
current philosophy of science, and there has been a huge amount of research in recent years 
highlighting the value of understanding in science, as well as its relation to knowledge (De 
Regt et al 2009, De Regt 2017, Elgin 2017, Khalifa 2017). As noted in the introduction, the 
ways in which thought experiments contribute to understanding has largely been overlooked 
and instead, the focus has been on how they bring about new knowledge.  
There are many ways in which we could utilise this literature to shed light on thought 
experiments (see Stuart 2016a, 2018 and Meynell 2020 for discussion) and I will come back 
to scientific understanding in the final chapter when thinking about thought experiments’ 
aesthetic qualities. But one way of drawing on this literature is through attending to how some 
philosophers of science have drawn links between scientific understanding and visualisation. 
This includes a prominent account of understanding as developed by de Regt (2014, 2017) in 
the context of theories. In particular, he discusses visualisation in the context of twentieth-
century theoretical physics.75 
 
74 For example, there are studies in which participants are presented with a pair of images and asked 
whether the images are identical. The two figures are presented from different angles and participants 
report answering the question through forming mental images that allowed them to rotate the figure in 
their minds to see if they could make it match the other image. And these types of tasks often take 
longer when the images needed rotating to a higher degree (Nersessian 2018, 314). 
75 Visualisation is of significant import to De Regt. Other prominent accounts of understanding also 
mention mental images. For instance, Khalifa discusses the explanation of scattering phenomena. 
Feynman’s model added a mechanical interpretation to the existent purely mathematical explanation 
which allows for a simple mental image. But unlike for De Regt, this is not central for Khalifa; ‘the 
value of qualitative insight (a shared language, visual images, etc.) is exhausted by its facilitation of 
good old-fashioned hypothesis testing’ (2017, 45). See also Elgin (2017, chapter 7) for a discussion of 




A key notion for De Regt is intelligibility; ‘the value that scientists attribute to the cluster of 
qualities of a theory (in one or more of its representations) that facilitate the use of the theory’ 
(2017, 40). While not essential for achieving understanding, one of the qualities included in 
this cluster is visualisability which de Regt argues is an effective tool for understanding. 
Briefly put, de Regt’s view is that scientists often prefer visualisable over abstract theories 
and further, find pictorial representations useful in understanding. He further states that this 
is to be expected given that ‘seeing is for humans plausibly the most important way of 
grasping the world around us’ and so ‘when we want to extend our grasp of the world beyond 
what we observe directly, we prefer to rely on our well-developed visual skills and employ 
visualization as a tool for understanding’ (ibid., 257).76 Thought experiments are one way in 
which theories can be made intelligible. And it appears that in the demon case, Maxwell 
deliberately engages our non-propositional imagination to help us understand the statistical 
basis of the second law of thermodynamics.  
Let’s see how visualisation or more broadly, objectual imagination, may help in this case. 
Maxwell’s thought experiment is outlined as follows: 
‘[I]f we conceive of a demon whose faculties are so sharpened that he can follow every 
molecule in its course, such a being, whose attributes are as essentially finite as our 
own, would be able to do what is impossible to us. For we have seen that molecules in 
a vessel full of air at uniform temperature are moving with velocities by no means 
uniform, though the mean velocity of any great number of them, arbitrarily selected, is 
almost exactly uniform. Now let us suppose that such a vessel is divided into two 
portions, A and B, by a division in which there is a small hole, and that a being, who 
can see the individual molecules, opens and closes this hole, so as to allow only the 
swifter molecules to pass from A to B, and only the slower molecules to pass from B 
to A. He will thus, without expenditure of work, raise the temperature of B and lower 
that of A, in contradiction to the second law of thermodynamics’ (Maxwell 1871, 338-
339).77 
 
76 The problems raised by Weisberg in the context of unvisualisable models may apply to some theories. 
Here, I am just concerned with De Regt’s account in so far as it can be useful for considering how 
thought experiments increase understanding and so, I need not respond to such worries here.  
77 Some of the language may be confusing for our aims here as Maxwell uses both ‘conceive’ and 
‘suppose’, but as highlighted above, these are often used interchangeably in the context of thought 
experiments. Because of this, I take it to be best to understand the invite to be a general one of ‘imagine’, 
and then we can consider whether it is best thought of as a propositional or an objectual kind. See French 




The thought experiment describes a demon who can control a door separating a box of hot 
gas with faster moving molecules, and a box of cold gas with slower moving molecules. The 
demon can selectively open the door so that heat flows from the cold gas to the hot gas, 
making the hot side hotter, and the cold side colder. This violates the second law and therefore 
demonstrates that the Second Law can only have statistical validity.  
We can adopt the position of the demon who has this capacity greater than our own, and we 
can form a visualisation of the box and the molecules from the demon’s perspective. 
Alternatively, we can imagine this without taking on the perspective of the demon, but rather 
by visualising the demon and his movements in the vessel. It is clear that in this thought 
experiment, although we could never do what the demon does (given his “sharpened 
faculties”) and we may have a problem visualising seeing molecules in the way the demon 
does, we do not have a problem with visualising the state of affairs described. And in fact, 
much of the value of thought experiments lies in how they provide us with scenarios that 
makes something difficult easy to grasp, and as mentioned, do not appeal to mathematical 
reasoning to succeed. This therefore contrasts to the difficulties with forming mental pictures 
of some model descriptions as outlined above, that is, those that involve probabilities or 
perfect rationality.  
Stuart states that a crucial part of how Maxwell’s demon aids our understanding is because it 
relates the second law of thermodynamics to experiences that we already have: ‘We may have 
trouble imagining a being that can see molecules, but if we imagine ourselves in an analogous 
position say, in control of a sliding door, surrounded by molecules which act like medium 
sized rubber balls, we understand the scenario perfectly’ (Stuart 2016a, 27). This results in us 
understanding that the fact that we will not experience violations of the second law is down 
to our lack of capacity to do what the demon does, that is, track the individual molecules. And 
thus, the theory is made intelligible to us; we understand how such violations could be 
possible.  
And so, reflecting on the role that thought experiments can play in understanding allows us 
to see how the objectual imagination can play a significant role in their usage. What other 
candidates are there for thought experiments that ask us to do more than to consider a set of 
propositions? That is, those that ask us to put ourselves in a particular situation, visualise a 




Firstly, we can consider thought experiments in which we are asked to imagine different 
perspectives on the same scenario. For example, Einstein’s elevator which revealed the 
connection between gravity and accelerated frames of reference underpinning his general 
theory of relativity. In Einstein’s and Infeld’s The Evolution of Physics they introduce 
‘idealized experiments created by thought’. These ‘may sound very fantastic’ but they ‘help 
us understand as much about relativity as possible by our simple methods’ (1938, 226). In this 
thought experiment, we are to imagine an inertial co-ordinate system (c.s.) in which an 
elevator is being pulled upward with a constant force. ‘Since the laws of mechanics are valid 
in this c.s., the whole lift moves with a constant acceleration in the direction of the motion’ 
(ibid., 231). We then consider what is going on inside the elevator from the perspective of 
two different people, one inside the elevator, and one outside: 
‘The outside observer: My CS is an inertial one. The elevator moves with constant 
acceleration, because a constant force is acting. The observers inside are in absolute 
motion, for them the laws of mechanics are invalid. They do not find that bodies, on 
which no forces are acting, are at rest. If a body is left free, it soon collides with the 
floor of the elevator, since the floor moves upward toward the body . . . . 
The inside observer: I do not see any reason for believing that my elevator is in absolute 
motion. I agree that my CS, rigidly connected with my elevator, is not really inertial, 
but I do not believe that it has anything to do with absolute motion. My watch, my 
handkerchief, and all bodies are falling because the whole elevator is in a gravitational 
field’ (ibid, 231). 
Einstein and Infeld then consider a way of determining which observer is right. We are asked 
to imagine a light ray entering the elevator horizontally through a window which reaches the 
opposite wall. The outside observer (who believes in the accelerated motion of the elevator) 
argues that the light ray would enter horizontally but as the elevator moves upwards, it would 
travel (relative to the elevator) not in a straight line towards the opposite wall, but rather in a 
slightly curved line. Whereas the inside observer (who believes that the whole elevator is in 
a gravitational field) states ‘there is no accelerated motion of the observer, but only the action 
of the gravitational field. A beam of light is weightless and, therefore, will not be affected by 
the gravitational field’ (ibid, 233). The light beam will enter horizontally and then travel in a 




The thought experiment thus gets us to shift our imagination between the two perspectives, 
allowing us to consider what they would observe and to consider the differences between their 
descriptions of the light beam’s path. Einstein and Infeld go onto explain that there is a 
mistake in the inside observer’s description: ‘A beam of light carries energy and energy has 
mass’ (ibid., 234). Because of this, the light beam will bend ‘exactly as a body would if it was 
thrown horizontally with a velocity equal to that of light’ (ibid.). Thus, we see how ‘the 
problem of general relativity theory is closely connected with that of gravitation and why the 
equivalence of gravitational and inertial mass is so essential for this connection’ (ibid., 235). 
Secondly, we can consider thought experiments that involve spatial reasoning. One example 
as discussed in the previous chapter is Stevin’s chain, where we can imagine the movement 
of the balls on the thread. Further, Starikova and Giaquinto (2018) discuss how 
mathematicians reliably imagine using visual mental imagery (that differs from applying 
mathematical rules) in examples of thought experiments in knot theory, graph theory and 
geometric group theory, and these contribute to mathematical knowledge. Like De Regt, they 
highlight how visualisation allows us to utilise our past perceptual experiences in order to 
problem solve. For example, some thought experiments require us to consider whether various 
knot diagrams are diagrams of the same knot. To do this, ‘one must perform one or more 
trials, a trial being a finite sequence of steps, each of which consists of (a) visualizing a 
deformation in 3-space of a knot as represented by one seen diagram and (b) drawing (or 
otherwise producing) another knot diagram corresponding to the projection of the knot at the 
end of the visualized deformation so far’ (2018, 260).78 
Thirdly, we can attend to the fact that many thought experiments are presented alongside 
images. Again, think of Stevin’s chain which is often accompanied by a diagram. The picture 
of the fourteen balls on a thread hanging over the prism is an aid for our imagination—the 
image allows us to grasp immediately what the described scenario looks like, what its most 
essential features are, and thus helps constrain our imaginings. Further, we can combine our 
imaginations and what the image presents to us in order to manipulate the static image and to 
reason through the thought experiment, considering the ways in which the balls on the thread 
will move. Thought experiment descriptions, then, can point us towards certain points of the 
picture that they are presented alongside which directs our attention in the right way. Treating 
 
78 While these cases are dependent upon background knowledge regarding how mathematical 
definitions link with the physical objects imagined, once we have this, we can carry out visual thought 




this thought experiment as relying solely on propositional reasoning fails to recognise the 
ways in which the image—whether in our minds or presented in front of us, or both—has a 
significant cognitive role. We can compare this with the Darwin example outlined above. It 
would be difficult to see how an image of what the thought experiment describes—that is, the 
interaction between wolves and deer—would contribute to the imaginative exercise that the 
thought experiment narrative prompts.   
Meynell (2018, 2020) offers a detailed account of the function of images that accompany 
scientific representations, including thought experiments.79 She highlights how the use of 
pictures could be especially useful when the audience of the thought experiment is not a 
scientific expert; in her discussion of Einstein’s train, she argues that the ‘imaginings are 
counterintuitive from a common sense perspective…Many thought experimenters will have 
to work against their own habits of mind and quite possibly implicit beliefs in order to imagine 
as they are directed’ (2018, 506). And so, perhaps for some, especially those who are more 
familiar with the theoretical background of a thought experiment, the image will be 
superfluous in obtaining the outcome. Whereas for others, an image or diagram will play an 
important role in guiding the imaginative activity.  
More generally it can be highlighted that readership may impact what kind of imagination (or 
whether an external image) is appropriate. Returning to the example of Maxwell’s demon, it 
is interesting to note that Maxwell first presented the demon thought experiment in various 
letters to other scientists including physicists Tait and Strutt (Klein 1970, 86). Later, it was 
published (in the form presented above) in The Theory of Heat. The end of the book included 
a caption of the work by the publishers who described the series it was a part of as ‘text-books 
of science adapted for the use of artisans and of students in public and science schools’. 
Further, they were meant to be comprehensible to the ‘working man’, and theories should be 
‘reduced to the stage of direct and useful application’ (Maxwell (1871), discussed by Klein 
(1970, 89)). The book itself was considered very difficult, even by those trained in physics 
and therefore can be regarded as ill-suited to the purpose the publishers had in mind. But if 
we attend to the context of the demon thought experiment, namely that it is situated in a text 
that is meant for a wide readership, then we can see the benefit of offering an example that 
 
79 Meynell argues that thought experiments that are ‘inherently spatial, relational and causal’ are those 
that are best displayed pictorially (and thus mere linguistic representations are limited). This also 
explains why many physics thought experiments, yet not many philosophical ones, are presented 
alongside pictures (2018, 502). See also Sheredos and Bechtel (2020) for a discussion of graphics and 




has a visualisable character; it can aid students to better engage with the otherwise complex 
subject matter. Similarly, consider Galileo’s thought experiments as presented in the 
Dialogues. This was not just aimed towards other scientists but rather to a more general 
community. As a consequence, when Salis and Frigg and Norton talk of what the conduct of 
a thought experiment consists in, and argue that it is a matter of propositional and/or 
argumentative reasoning, this is too simple; the performance of a thought experiment might 
be different depending on who it is that is imagining the scenario.  
And so, while there might be thought experiments that appear to merely invite our 
propositional imagination, there are clearly also those that invite objectual imaginings as well, 
some of which may be presented with images which aid our imaginations. I want to end by 
emphasising that I do not think this is a case of either or. In fact, we can think about how the 
different types of imagination may work together when we are conducting thought 
experiments. The propositional imagination may play a crucial role in presenting the scenario 
which then directs certain objectual imaginings that follow. And imagining in an objectual 
way can bring our attention to important features of this set up, or can illuminate the 
consequences of these imagined propositions. Another option is that we can be presented with 
an image and/or form a visualisation that works as, to use a term from French, a “hook”. In 
the context of theorising, French discusses the quasi-sensory elements that ‘function as the 
‘hooks’ on which we can hang the ‘belief-like’ features’ of imaginings (2020b, 27). We can 
then deliberate, using propositional imagination, the ways in which the scenario could 
unfold.80  
For example, in Stevin’s chain, the image we are presented with, and the way in which we 
use our imagination to manipulate the image, functions as the hook. Within this, we 
propositionally imagine the options; the balls either stay still or they move to the left or to the 
right, before then utilising our objectual imagination again to “play out” these options. And 
these objectual imaginings play a part in the demonstrative force of the thought experiment, 
that is, they aid our realisation that the balls must remain static. And in Maxwell’s demon, the 
thought experiment calls upon our propositional imagination in order to set up the scenario 
and to define what the demon’s capacity is. Within this set up, we then form objectual 
 
80 French discusses Einstein’s ‘On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies’ (1905) in which Einstein 
asks us to imagine certain ‘quasi-sensory’ elements, in this case, clocks and rods which are then 
stipulated as ‘perfect’ (in the case of the clocks) and ‘practically rigid’ (in the case of the rods) (French 
2020b, 27). See also Todd (2020) for a discussion of how propositional and non-propositional 




imaginings of the controlling of the door and the movement of the molecules. This helps us 
understand how such a scenario could obtain which in turn, aids our inference that the second 
law of thermodynamics could be violated.  
As mentioned, a propositional view of the imagination in science does capture some of the 
reasoning involved in thought experiments, and a proponent of that view may insist that we 
could reconstruct all of the above examples within the propositional framework. But it is 
evident that scientists utilise their visual imaginations while engaging with certain thought  
experiments and have reason to invite members of the community they are communicating 
with, whether scientific or public, to do the same. A reconstruction into propositional form 
will therefore distort cognitively important features. A complete account of the imagination 
in science needs to accommodate such instances, and a pluralistic view allows us to do so.  
 
 Conclusion  
We have seen that philosophers have typically taken the imagination in scientific thought 
experiments to consist in mental images. A recent challenge insists that it is only a 
propositional form that is required. I have argued that while I think this offers an important 
insight into how some thought experiments work, or how aspects of thought experiments 
work, I disagree with the scope of the claim. If we ask: ‘what do thought experiments ask us 
to do?’ it becomes evident that they appeal to a variety of our imaginative capacities, and 
some demand a type of imaginative activity that goes beyond the consideration of 
propositions. Consequently, we should embrace the richness of the imagination and the 
different resources it can bring into play when thinking about how scientists construct thought 
experiments for different purposes. I have argued that we should adopt a pluralist stance rather 
than limiting an account of the imagination in thought experiments to one type, whether 
imagistic or propositional. 
In the next two chapters, the ways in which thought experiments employ our imaginations, 
and how far this can be said to be similar to our engagement with literary fiction, will be 





5. The Aesthetics of Science: The Case of Thought Experiments 
 
 Introduction 
Chapters 3 and 4 looked at the nature of the imagination in scientific thought experiments. I 
defended a pluralist view of the imagination in science, arguing that different thought 
experiments call upon different types of imagination and therefore, we should not limit our 
analysis of the imagination in the scientific context to one particular type, whether 
propositional or imagistic. In this chapter and the one that follows, I develop a new approach 
to the aesthetics of science. My account demonstrates how aesthetic features contribute to a 
thought experiment being a suitable prompt for, or aid to, the imagination and are thereby 
informative for useful imaginations. Further, my view offers a way of advancing the 
comparisons drawn between thought experiments and literary fictions.  
The discussion of aesthetic value in science has primarily focused on the evaluation of 
theories or of mathematical proofs (McAllister 1996, Breitenbach 2015, Ivanova 2017a, 
2017b). Questions then arise regarding the role that aesthetic values play: How can beauty 
motivate scientific research? Do aesthetic properties have an epistemic function? Can they 
indicate the truth of a theory? And in what way do aesthetic features aid scientific 
understanding and guide theory choice in instances of under-determination (where empirical 
evidence is insufficient to choose between competing theories)? While aesthetic value 
includes, but is not limited to beauty, philosophers have taken as their starting point claims 
from mathematicians and scientists emphasising the import of beauty in their domain. To take 
just a couple of examples, Hardy states that ‘beauty is the first test: there is no permanent 
place in the world for ugly mathematics’ (1940, 14), and for Dirac, ‘one has a great confidence 
in a theory arising from its great beauty, quite independently of its detailed successes’ (1980, 
40).  
And it is not just scientists and mathematicians who have highlighted these features. The 
discussion of the beauty of theories can be seen in a seminal work in aesthetics, Hutcheson’s 
Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design. Hutcheson notes that theories ‘and 
universal Truths, in General causes’ (1726/2004, 24) including Newton’s gravitational 
principle and Euclidean geometry often strike us as beautiful. And this observation is not just 




the need for a theory of aesthetics that does not characterise beauty as a sensation that is akin 
to those correlated with the five senses.81  
While there has been attention given to the aesthetics of theories, thought experiments are 
another important part of scientific practice which have an aesthetic dimension, but they are 
currently overlooked. This is surprising given that they are designed to engage the imagination 
and have been compared to other aesthetically appreciated objects, namely works of art. In 
particular, thought experiments are said to share qualities with literary fiction as they invite 
us to imagine a fictional scenario and often take a narrative form (Elgin 2014, Davies 2007). 
Given these similarities, many have used thought experiments to defend the cognitive value 
of literature. The idea is that literary fictions are extended, more complex thought experiments 
and hence we can learn from engaging with them. 
In this chapter, I look to the aesthetic and literary qualities of thought experiments. I begin 
with a discussion of how thought experiments have been used as a way of defending the 
cognitive value of literature, including reasons why we might be sceptical of such 
comparisons. I then outline how thought experiments are also evaluated aesthetically, that is, 
how they are considered beautiful and elegant and so on. Consequently, thought experiments 
ought to be a part of the discussion surrounding the aesthetics of science. I go on to raise some 
worries for any aesthetics of science project. The problem is that it appears that either the 
application of aesthetic terms to scientific cases are really disguised epistemic features, or that 
the application of aesthetic terms is literal, but is scientifically irrelevant.  
In the next chapter, I propose my own account which looks to an overlooked source of 
aesthetic value in science; the fit between form and content. This offers a way of defending 
the role of aesthetic features in science without reducing them to epistemic features. This is 
because the interrelation between form and content is a source of aesthetic value that has 
important epistemic pay offs. I flesh out these pay offs in terms of the ways in which thought 
experiments can enhance understanding and play a persuasive role in an argumentative 
context. To end, I come back to the comparisons between thought experiments and literary 
fictions in light of the theory of aesthetics of science that I develop, and  I argue that we should 
 
81 In discussing non-perceptual art, Shelley (2013) offers an outline of Hutcheson’s aesthetics, including 
his argument that the sensation of beauty is an ‘internal’ or ‘mental’ sensation (as opposed to an 
‘external’ one, i.e. one that is perceived by the five senses). See also Kivy (1992) for an overview of 




look closely at the literary examples used when thinking about the qualities they share with 
scientific thought experiments.   
 
 The Cognitive Value of Literature 
Thought experiments can be characterised as taking the form of short, fictional narratives that 
have the purpose of instructing the reader to evaluate the described scenario in a certain way. 
In the philosophy of art, comparisons have been drawn between thought experiments and 
artworks, particularly works of literary fiction, as they share (at least some of) the key features 
of thought experiments, namely their fictionality—the events have not actually taken place, 
or at least, whether they have or not is inessential—and narrative form.82 Further, the use of 
thought experiments in learning has been offered as a way of defending the cognitive value 
of literature.  
A central issue in philosophy of art is to do with whether and how artworks can provide 
knowledge or understanding, as well as whether a work’s cognitive value contributes to its 
aesthetic value. That is, do cognitive merits or flaws of an artwork affect the value of art as 
art?83 Given the comparisons made with thought experiments, I’ll focus on literary works. We 
can, of course, learn about art from engaging with artworks; reading Kafka’s The 
Metamorphosis teaches us something about the novel and about Kafka’s literary style. 
Similarly, through literature we could learn about historical, geographical or scientific truths. 
Rooney’s Normal People might teach us facts about the city of Dublin and its various parks 
and buildings of interest, for example. While there might be interesting things to say about 
the ways in which works of literature can teach us in this sense, the focus of the debate 
concerns the ways in which literary works can be said to teach us deep truths concerning 
human nature, morality, relationships, politics and so on. For instance, many come away from 
Shakespeare’s Othello with a sense that they have learned something about human 
psychology, including the corruptive power of jealousy. Importantly, these insights are part 
of why we value Othello so highly. This contrasts with the case of Rooney’s Normal People 
 
82 A further issue is whether all scientific thought experiments count as narratives. Here, I am just going 
to focus on cases that do take a narrative form. 
83 For example, Lamarque argues: ‘To value a work of art as a work of art is not to value it for its truth 




teaching us something about the geography of Dublin; this is not part of why we value the 
novel as a work of art.  
There is a compelling set of views that take seriously the ways in which literature can inform 
us about the world, and our social, political and psychological lives by pointing out how 
thought experiments invite us to engage in an imaginative exercise and ask: ‘What would 
happen if the following was to occur?”. Typically, we take thought experiments as having 
epistemic value and so, characterising literary fictions as a kind of extended, more complex 
thought experiment allows us to maintain that engaging with narrative art can lead us to new 
insights about the world and ourselves. For example, Carroll argues that Greene’s The Third 
Man is a thought experiment that presents a powerful counterexample to the maxim “When 
loyalty to a friend conflicts with loyalty to a cause, one ought to choose in favour of the friend” 
(2002, 10). And for John, fictions such as Paley’s short story Wants function like a 
philosophical thought experiment ‘in which problematic imagined cases are used to prompt 
responses relevant to philosophical problems’. John argues that in our engagement with 
Wants, we are led to explore the concept of desire. This is therefore similar to the way in 
thought experiments can address questions about our conceptual schemes (1998, 332). 
Further, John takes it to be literarily valuable for a work to challenge us in this way, that is ‘to 
push us to examine what our concepts mean and what we use them to do: the capacity to 
inspire that kind of activity is one of the things that can make a work of fiction interesting and 
good’ (ibid., 331).  
While many discussing thought experiments in the philosophy of literature have focused on 
examples in philosophy, Elgin (2014) and Davies (2007) have used thought experiments as a 
way of bringing together issues in philosophy of art and philosophy of science. And it is, of 
course, scientific thought experiments that are my focus here. Let’s look at another example, 
this time from Newton. The thought experiment sets out to undermine Descartes’ relational 
account of motion. We are asked to imagine a bucket hanging from a long rope that is twisted 
tight. The bucket is then filled with water and the rope is released, making it unwind and the 
bucket spin. At first, the water and the bucket are in relative motion, and the water is still flat 
in the bucket. But after some time, the water will pick up the motion of the bucket, forming a 
concave shape as the water rises up the sides of the bucket. Now there is no relative motion 
between the water and the bucket—which is how it was in the initial starting point, before the 
rope was released. So how do we explain the observed difference between the first state 




when in each case, there is no relative motion? Newton explains that the motion of the water 
is absolute and not relative to the bucket, and has to be represented as such in absolute space 
(Brown 2011, 8).  
Elgin argues there is a continuity between physical experiments, thought experiments such as 
this case from Newton, and literary fictions. Experiments and thought experiments involve 
studying an object or a system that stands in for a target system, and they each require us to 
control our (real or imagined) set up, ensuring that we carefully isolate the features that we 
are interested in investigating. We can note here a key difference between, say, Galileo’s 
falling bodies and Newton’s bucket thought experiment, that demonstrates how much 
scientific thought experiments can vary with regards to their departure from how things are. 
As Elgin notes, like ordinary experiments, thought experiments involve the study of 
simplified and distorted versions of nature. In the Galileo case, there is a more straightforward 
idealisation; the abstraction of air resistance. Further, we can easily imagine ourselves going 
to the top of a tower and performing the thought experiment. Whereas Newton’s bucket places 
more demands on our imagination. We are required to imagine that there is nothing in the 
universe except the bucket filled with water hanging from a rope. Although the rope remains, 
it is not tied to anything, and even the earth (whose gravity keeps the water in the bucket) 
does not exist.  
For Elgin, this control of our scenario, and the use of idealisation carries over to literary 
fiction: ‘a work of fiction selects and isolates, contriving situations and manipulating 
circumstances so that patterns and properties stand out’ (2014, 232). On this view, fiction 
functions as a thought experiment that provides us with new insights or understanding, it ‘may 
frame or isolate mundane features of experience so that their significance is evident. It may 
defamiliarize the commonplace, making us aware of how remarkable normal behavior can 
be’ (ibid).84 As with thought experiments, works of literature differ in terms of how much, 
and in what way, they depart from reality.  
 
84 Elgin discusses these connections in the context of  her account of understanding. In particular, 
through her account of “exemplification”. An experiment, thought experiment and a work of fiction 
exemplify certain properties—they both have and refer to those properties. Scientists and artists thus 
manipulate their representations with the aim of making certain features salient which directs us towards 
a certain way of understanding the target. She offers the example of an Austen novel in which ‘relations 
among the three or four families are sufficiently complicated and the demands of village life are 
sufficiently mundane that the story can exemplify something worth noting about ordinary life and the 




However, many have highlighted the difficulties in pinning down what it is that artworks 
teach us, and have argued that reducing the cognitive value of literature to the ways in which 
they can be said to be similar to philosophy and the sciences (including thought experiments 
in these domains) fails to fully capture what is distinctive about literary works and the insights 
they can offer (John 2013, Gibson 2008). Further, there is the potential issue that on the 
thought experiment approach, we are no longer locating the cognitive value of art within the 
artwork itself, but rather in an activity that falls outside of the work; in reading a novel in a 
particular way, selecting certain features to make broader argumentative points (I return to 
this below). Take the example of Morrison’s Beloved. The novel opens as follows: 
‘124 was spiteful. Full of a baby’s venom. The women in the house knew it and so did 
the children. For years each put up with the spite in his own way, but by 1873 Sethe 
and her daughter Denver were its only victims. The grandmother, Baby Suggs, was 
dead, and the sons, Howard and Buglar, had run away by the time they were thirteen 
years old — as soon as merely looking in a mirror shattered it (that was the signal for 
Buglar); as soon as two tiny hand prints appeared in the cake (that was it for Howard). 
Neither boy waited to see more; another kettleful of chickpeas smoking in a heap on 
the floor; soda crackers crumbled and strewn in a line next to the doorsill. Nor did they 
wait for one of the relief periods: the weeks, months even, when nothing was disturbed. 
No. Each one fled at once — the moment the house committed what was for him the 
one insult not to be born or witnessed a second time’ (Morrison 1988, 3).  
The novel beings in the late 1870s, in the aftermath of the American Civil War, and tells the 
story of Sethe and her family who live in a haunted house, avoided by others in the 
neighbourhood. The novel goes back and forth from this present to the time that Sethe was 
enslaved, piecing together how she escaped and when found, killed her own daughter to spare 
her being captured. When Sethe begins a relationship with Paul D, he exorcises the ghost 
living at 124, which then results in the arrival of Beloved, a young woman in her twenties. 
Sethe comes to realise that this is the return of her daughter.  
Morrison is explicitly political in her work and in her analysis of it, and it is evident that many 
come away with a sense that the novel has enlightened them. But as the opening passage 
indicates, the novel’s exploration of the haunting impacts of slavery, and its lasting trauma 
for those who were enslaved and the generations that follow, as well as of the struggle of 




testing or exploring some particular concept or proposition. Further to this, works of literature 
do not pose what can be regarded straightforwardly as arguments (unlike say works of 
philosophy), and they often contain ambiguous and contradictory claims that are not meant to 
be taken as true (in the fiction) in any straightforward sense such as the opening sentences 
above: ‘124 was spiteful. Full of a baby’s venom’.  
It might be possible to approach Beloved as a thought experiment that explores certain 
questions regarding the psychological impacts of slavery post-abolition, for example. But 
such an approach does not appear to do justice to the work. This is not to undermine all 
comparisons drawn with thought experiments in order to defend how some literary fictions 
can offer insights. But it is worth noting that in light of these features of novels and other 
narrative fictions, others have proposed a different approach, expanding what it means to say 
that art has cognitive value. It has been argued that we should instead look to how literary 
fiction gives us the opportunity to gain access to experiences that we otherwise would not 
have had through rich descriptions of others’ thoughts and feelings, therefore broadening our 
perspective beyond our own. Others have highlighted how literature provides an emotional 
experience through the imagination which can in turn bring about an understanding of 
ourselves and others. Proponents argue that a benefit of this approach is that it offers an 
argument in defence of the cognitive value of art as art, that is, this is something that is internal 
to the practice of reading works of literature (see Gibson (2008) and Vidmar (2010) for helpful 
discussions on the debates over art and knowledge).   
And so, there are on-going debates in philosophy of art surrounding how and what exactly we 
can learn from literature, as well as how far the way in which we learn can be compared to 
the pursuits of science and philosophy which are seen as more apparent epistemic domains. 
But the key point is that there are views that maintain that (at least some) narrative art 
functions like thought experiments, and that this helps explain how we can learn from 
engaging with these works. Consequently, an analysis of thought experiments and their 
epistemological value has offered a way of drawing fruitful analogies between philosophy of 
science and philosophy of fiction. In the next chapter, I will come back to the comparisons 
between thought experiments and literary fictions and think about which examples from 
narrative art are most appropriate.  
For now, I will put to one side the question of whether literary works can be said to function 




other way as well, that is, from aesthetic and philosophy of art in order to illuminate the cases 
in science. My aim is to address how the aesthetic choices scientists make in the design of 
thought experiments contribute to the function of the thought experiment: to communicate, 
convince, or explain a theory or phenomena to a scientific or a public community. I argue that 
when thinking about the commonalities between scientific and artistic representations, 
thought experiments are a fruitful case study for philosophers of science. Part of their value 
in science are the features they share with literary works.  
The key issue is whether the aesthetic qualities provide anything beyond catching and 
maintaining our attention or at best, are a mere heuristic aid. In the next section, I am going 
to consider accounts that argue this way. I will consider some of the proposed disanalogies 
between literary fictions and thought experiments that are said to undermine purported 
connections between how we learn from scientific and artistic representations, and the role of 
aesthetic considerations in science.  
 
 Disanologies Between Literature and Thought Experiments 
Egan (2016) offers a recent and thorough discussion of the comparisons between 
philosophical and scientific thought experiments and works of literature as outlined above, 
and sets out to undermine the force of such comparisons. Egan’s primary concern is with the 
claims regarding how the cognitive value of thought experiments can explain literature’s 
cognitive value, but the disanalogies he draws are relevant for my purposes in this chapter, 
that is, for the function of the aesthetic and literary qualities of thought experiments. And so, 
it is worth spending some time on his account. 
Egan allows that the similarities between thought experiments and literary fictions entails that 
a work of literature, or a section of it, could be used as a thought experiment or part of one 
within, say, a philosophical paper. For example, a work of philosophy that argues in favour 
of the importance of freedom in our choices even when this might lead to morally 
reprehensible decisions might cite an excerpt from Burgess’s A Clockwork Orange. But in 
making this point, Egan echoes the concern raised above that the cognitive value of art needs 
to lie in our engagement with art as art. Egan states that while literature could be effectively 
put to use in this way (and some philosophers clearly refer to literary fiction in their work), 




similarities with thought experiments (or the stronger claim that literary fictions are thought 
experiments) (2016, 141). 
Egan’s account is different from Norton’s in that he is not committed to the claim that thought 
experiments are arguments that work through transforming our existing knowledge through a 
logical process. Nor is he committed to the claim that the actual conduct of a thought 
experiment consists in the execution of an argument (Norton 2004, 50). Egan does, however, 
argue that there is an essential connection between scientific and philosophical thought 
experiments and argument that leads to crucial disanalogies between thought experiments and 
literary works. Egan grants that thought experiments can have a diverse role in arguments, 
but the important point is that thought experiments are always a part of a larger, argumentative 
structure.85 Otherwise, Egan states, they would be merely ‘intriguing narratives’ (2016, 142). 
For example, Thomson’s violinist thought experiment (as outlined in chapter 4) is part of an 
argument surrounding the legitimacy of abortion that spans a whole paper, and for Egan, the 
thought experiment is ‘essentially tied’ to this wider discussion; it is ‘only within their 
contribution to this larger argumentative structure that they get their distinctive cognitive 
payoff’ (ibid.). 
Further to this, Egan claims that the purpose of a thought experiment ‘is exhausted in making 
or contributing to an argument. Whatever other aesthetic qualities that narrative might contain 
are irrelevant to the purposes of the thought experimenter’ (ibid., 142). He goes onto qualify 
the claim, stating that such features may ‘make the thought experiment more vivid or more 
compelling, but this vividness and compellingness is useful to the thought experimenter only 
insofar as it contributes fruitfully to the argument’ (ibid.). Like Norton, then, whose argument 
view of thought experiments renders their typical narrative form and any of their aesthetic 
qualities as irrelevant to the conclusion and therefore dispensable, Egan maintains that ‘we 
can, as it were, throw away our thought experimental narrative once its work is done’ (ibid., 
142). Because of this, Egan claims that thought experiments’ role in arguments is “fungible”. 
In the case of Thomson’s violinist, a different thought experiment could have been used in its 
place if it did the same argumentative work: ‘Nothing in her argument requires this particular 
story about the violinist’ (ibid., 143).  
 
85 A counterexample to this (as discussed in chapter 1) is Einstein’s recollection in his autobiography 
of imagining himself chasing a beam of light, and considering what he would observe. This thought 




Egan contrasts the essential connection between thought experiments and their situation 
within a larger argument with works of literary fiction. We do not approach works of literature 
in the same way as philosophical or scientific thought experiments, nor do we have a sole 
purpose in mind for an artwork, such as making an argument. Rather, there are a plurality of 
reasons for engaging with literary fiction, and when we come to literary works, we do not 
assign it a particular purpose nor do we take the work as addressing a certain set of questions. 
If we did, Egan argues, we would massively limit what we could gain from the work than if 
we approached it with a more open mind. And this means that literary works are not 
replaceable in the way that thought experiments are. Egan gives the example of deriving 
amusement from a literary work. We do not regard the work simply as a way of deriving 
amusement, nor do we think that any other amusing story (however funny) could be in its 
place—he states, ‘the uniqueness of just this story remains’ (2016, 143). Similarly, we would 
not want to replace A Clockwork Orange with a work that could equally be said to demonstrate 
the importance of freedom in choices, for instance.  
Egan takes it that there is value in say reading novels that could not be produced by anything 
else, and so a particular novel cannot be replaced by another work of art. Further, the work is 
not dispensable once we have read it, that is, it is not a means to an end.86 Rather, we come 
back to works of literature with the expectation that we may gain something new from them 
that on our previous readings we overlooked. This is in contrast to a thought experiment 
which, the argument goes, we would only re-read in order to remind ourselves of its role in 
an argument or to consider possible criticisms regarding how far the thought experiment can 
be said to achieve its purpose. We do not re-visit Thomson’s violinist thought experiment 
with the expectation that we may learn something beyond this.  
For Egan, a key part of this difference is that unlike literary works, thought experiments are 
not concerned with particulars. When presenting the violinist thought experiment, Thomson’s 
concern does not really lie with the idea of keeping alive a famous violinist by attaching them 
to our bodies, nor is Galileo ultimately interested in musket balls and cannon balls when he 
describes dropping them from a tower. Egan grants that the ‘concrete elements in a thought 
experiment make an arguably ineliminable contribution to exploring these relations: they 
make salient the relations under examination with a clarity that would arguably be impossible 
in a purely abstract treatment’. But these particulars are merely a means to an end: they serve 
 




as a way of exploring more abstract problems (ibid., 144). In the Galileo case, this would be 
relation between the weight of a body and the speed at which it falls. But Egan highlights that 
the same cannot be said for works of literature, where ‘the concrete particularities of narratives 
are irreducible parts of what we attend to when we read a narrative as literature’ and so, ‘they 
cannot be straightforwardly reduced to abstract ideas’ (ibid.). In addition to this, Egan argues 
that while literary works can of course bring about more abstract or general reflections, they 
do not need to. He states ‘I can derive great interest and pleasure from reading Pride and 
Prejudice as a story about Elizabeth Bennett’ and so on, without drawing more general 
conclusions about say, class or marriage (2016, 145). Whereas engaging with Galileo’s 
thought experiment without making the more general conclusions beyond the particularities 
of the case would be to fail to engage with it as a thought experiment. 
Further to this, the ways in which we can go beyond the particularities in the text and explore 
more abstract and generalisable conclusions when reading works of literature does not have a 
defined limit. This is compared to the singular purpose of a thought experiment as contributing 
to a specific argument. Because of this, we cannot abstract away from the ‘concrete 
particularities of [for example] Kafka’s narrative if we want to think about it as a work of 
literature’ (2016, 144).  This is related to a discussion presented by Frigg and Nguyen on the 
ways in which we interpret artworks on one hand, and scientific representations on the other. 
Frigg and Nguyen (2017) highlight the similarities between representation in art and science, 
and they apply their own framework, the DEKI account—in which representation consists in 
denotation, exemplification, keying-up and imputation—to both scientific and artistic cases.87 
However, they also outline an important difference which is to do with what they call ‘the 
flexibility of interpretation’ in artistic representations compared to scientific ones. In the case 
of scientific models, they claim that the interpretation ‘is usually fixed by the context and the 
interpretation highly regimented. Someone who doesn’t interpret the large sphere as the sun 
simply doesn’t understand the Newtonian model [of the solar system]’ (2017, 57). Thus the 
interpretations of models are ‘regimented and controlled’ (ibid., 58). 
 
87 Frigg and Nguyen draw on Goodman (1976) and Elgin’s (2010) notion of ‘representation-as’ to 
outline their account. They focus on the example of the Phillips-Newlyn machine, a hydraulic model 
used to represent the Guatemalan economy as a Keynesian economy. As I do not take a position on 
representation in this thesis, I discuss their view only insofar as they make the claim regarding the 





Frigg and Nguyen grant that the flexibility of interpretation varies depending upon the work 
in question, and that there can also be variation due to the genre of a work. But they highlight 
how in works of literature (and artworks more generally), the interpretation is not fixed in this 
way, and attending carefully to the work and its features in order to come up with interesting 
and even conflicting interpretations is part of engaging with and appreciating artworks. This 
point can be illustrated through returning to the case of Morrison’s Beloved. While there are 
obvious topics being explored in the novel, there is also a variety of ways we can view the 
work. We could highlight the way in which the novel explores the dangers of giving meaning 
to pain and suffering, or we could focus on how it brings to the fore the complexities in 
mother-daughter relationships. Further, scholars have studied the work via Black feminist 
theory, as well as through a Marxist lens, for example. 
A final disanology of Egan’s that I will present here is to do with the way in which thought 
experiments and literary fictions are criticised. In the former, the criticism takes the form of 
how well the case at hand contributes to the argument it is taken to support. In the latter, the 
criticism is of an aesthetic nature. For example, in response to Thomson’s violinist thought 
experiment, philosophers might point out relevant ways in which the fictional scenario departs 
from cases of unwanted pregnancies that undermines the use of the example as a way of 
defending a persons’ right to abortion. Egan argues that Thomson’s thought experiment is not 
criticised aesthetically; no one responds to the thought experiment by claiming ‘that the 
character of the hospital director lacks clear motivation or is cliched or two-dimensional. No 
one is inclined to spill much ink over praising or criticizing the elegance or compactness or 
precision of Thomson’s prose’ (2016, 147). I take Egan as stating here that at least if they 
were to criticise it in such a way, they would be displaying a misunderstanding of what 
thought experiments set out to do and thus, how we should assess their value.88   
In this section, I have outlined arguments that argue against the usefulness of drawing 
analogies between literary fiction and thought experiments and which dismiss the import of 
aesthetic qualities as well as the use of concrete particulars in the case of the latter. As Norton 
summarises, such features in the case of thought experiments are ‘merely rhetorical window 
dressing that, for psychological reasons, may well ease acceptance of the result. In many 
cases, this superfluity is easy to see, since the elements visualized can be supplied in many 
 
88 I will come back to the way in which there is an appropriate way of engaging with thought 
experiments in the next chapter, and I explore this in connection with the view that thought experiments 




ways that will not affect the outcome’ (2004, 60).89 I will now turn to the aesthetics of thought 
experiments which demonstrates how, contrary to Egan’s final claim, thought experiments 
can be, and indeed, are, evaluated on aesthetic grounds, and this motivates the account of 
aesthetics of science that I develop in the next chapter. While I think Egan taps into some key  
differences between thought experiments and literary fictions, and poses some important 
worries for those who want to defend the cognitive value of literature via thought experiments, 
the account that I develop will allow for a way of resisting the full extent of Egan’s claims as 
well as showing the importance of the literary and aesthetic qualities of thought experiments.  
 
 The Beauty of Thought Experiments 
As set out in the introduction, accounts of the aesthetics of science has focused primarily on 
theories. Thought experiments are also often referred to as beautiful or elegant. Take, for 
example, Galileo’s famous falling bodies thought experiment used to undermine Aristotle’s 
physics, which Brown refers to as ‘the most beautiful thought experiment ever devised’ 
because it is ‘brilliantly original and as simple as it is profound’ (2004, 24). Brown also cites 
the results of a poll conducted by Physics World of the ten most beautiful experiments of all 
time. Galileo’s thought experiment is second on the list (the double slit experiment is number 
one) (Crease 2002).  
Galileo’s thought experiment is considered beautiful, and there is evidence that other thought 
experiments are also considered to have aesthetic value. In 2012, edge.org conducted a survey 
which asked 192 people, including scientists and philosophers, what their “favourite deep, 
elegant or beautiful explanation” is.  As Stuart points out, 21 of the answers given were 
thought experiments, and a further 8 were ‘imagination-based inferences that any broad-
minded characterization of thought experiments should include’. This means nearly 1/6 of all 
replies provided a thought experiment as their answer (2018, 530). Physicist Sean Carroll’s 
favourite deep, elegant or beautiful explanation, for instance, is Einstein’s thought experiment 
used as part of his explanation of why gravity is universal, what Einstein called the “happiest 
thought” of his life. While Stuart is interested in how this supports the claim that thought 
 
89 Egan allows that the particulars can be ineliminable in the sense that without them, we may not have 
been able to reason about the more abstract features that we are ultimately interested in. So it appears 




experiments provide good explanations and can contribute to scientific understanding, I am 
interested in the widespread view that thought experiments have aesthetic value.  
It is clear, then, that thought experiments are often taken to have aesthetic value. But what is 
the basis for taking them to have such value, or more specifically, to be regarded as beautiful 
or elegant? To consider this question, we can turn to Sibley’s influential paper on aesthetic 
concepts. Sibley points out that when we describe something using aesthetic terms such as 
“unified”, “serene”, “dynamic”, “vivid”, “balanced”, “graceful”, or “elegant” (to take just 
some of his examples of aesthetic concepts), we often point to non-aesthetic features to 
explain our application of an aesthetic term. Sibley offers the following examples, “delicate 
because of its pastel shades and curving lines”, or “it lacks balance because one of one group 
of figures is so far off to the left and is so brightly illuminated” (1959, 424).90  
We can think about this in the science case as well, and identify the non-aesthetic features of 
theories, models, thought experiments and so on, that help explain our application of aesthetic 
terms. Firstly, what are these features in the case of theories? This is not always clearly set 
out, and often beauty is described by referring to other aesthetic terms such as simplicity, 
symmetry or harmony. But to take one example, Poincaré reduces beauty to simplicity and 
unity. A theory is simple because of the ‘number of hypotheses and axioms of the theory. 
Syntactic elegance or simplicity can be understood as the lack of complexity, adhocness, or 
free parameters in a theory’ (Ivanova 2017b, 2585). The unity of theories is a matter of finding 
“hidden relations” between phenomena that appears disconnected (2017b, 2588). And so 
when we consider this association of aesthetic qualities with other non-aesthetic epistemic 
virtues, we can see that a clear feature that is often considered part of the beauty of theories 
is economy; the theory postulates a small number of hypotheses and axioms which provides 
many successful predictions, or can explain a wide range of phenomena.  
 
90 It is important to note that Sibley argues that aesthetic terms cannot be defined in terms of non-
aesthetic concepts. And further, he claims that aesthetic concepts such as graceful are not condition-
governed. That is to say, there are no set of (non-aesthetic) features that always count towards something 
being, say, graceful. He contrasts this with, for example, the fact that being a good chess player will 
always count towards someone being intelligent (1959, 425). Todd suggests that whether or not Sibley 
is correct, it seems that the conditions under which an aesthetic term is employed are clearer in the case 
of science and mathematics than in art (2008, 71) and as we shall see, this forms part of his argument 
against accounts of aesthetics in science. Further, the aesthetic terminology utilised in science cases as 
discussed by philosophers is far more limited than in cases of art (ibid.). There is a lack of a comparison 
of aesthetic terminology in art and science by philosophers. However, O’Loughlin and McCallum 
(2019) discuss how a broader array of aesthetic terms are utilised in the scientific context that have gone 





While most accounts of the aesthetics of science have focused on theories, there has been 
some consideration of the aesthetics of experiments. This is perhaps a more useful comparison 
to thought experiments than theories are, as although the question of whether thought 
experiments classify as genuine experiments is disputed (as discussed in chapters 1 and 2), 
they share some important features with ordinary experiments. Unlike theories, both thought 
experiments and experiments involve (real or imagined) particulars, and there is an initial set 
up of the experiment, or description of the scenario, which is then manipulated to see or 
consider what would happen. The main difference, as already noted, is that unlike experiment, 
thought experiments take place in the imagination or what Brown (2011) calls “the laboratory 
of the mind” rather than intervening on the world.  
Parsons and Rueger have discussed scientists’ aesthetic responses to certain experiments. 
Experiments may be considered beautiful because they produce phenomena that is pleasing 
to experience, for example, Canton’s electric aurora borealis experiment (2000, 408). Some 
thought experiments can also be seen as beautiful in this sense, such as Einstein’s thought 
experiment that gets us to imagine what it would be like to chase a beam of light. It may be 
fairly usual for people to get some kind of aesthetic pleasure from scientific (or philosophical) 
thought experiments in that they get us to imagine a phenomena or a set of circumstances that 
is aesthetically interesting. And this may be part of their value in making say certain 
philosophical ideas engaging.91 But Parson and Rueger claim that such aesthetic evaluations 
are not relevant to the experiment’s success.  
Parsons and Rueger note that the prevailing eighteenth-century view was that an experiment 
was beautiful when it ‘made visible particular aspects of the beauty of nature itself’ (ibid., 
409) such as in the aurora borealis experiment. Since the nineteenth-century, however, 
another way of thinking about the aesthetics of experiments has emerged. Parsons and Rueger 
show this through the example of Rutherford and the artificial disintegration of atomic nuclei, 
described by Peter Kapitsa (1968) as a ‘most simple experiment’, that led to ‘striking results’. 
Here, an understanding of what is being tested becomes central to aesthetic appreciation. This 
contrasts with admirations of the workings of nature, such as in the aurora borealis case in 
which an aesthetic appreciation can be irrespective of whether or not we have a grasp of the 
theoretical framework involved. Parsons and Rueger note that since this shift, a common way 
 





of characterising aesthetically valuable experiments is to say they involve “an optimal use of 
minimal material”: 
‘An experiment now is aesthetically valuable because it shows ‘aptness’ in relation of 
result and tools, of plan and success; it is a beautiful artefact, a manifestation of human 
ingenuity, an instrument optimally suited to achieve its purpose. What is appreciated 
is, for instance, the simplicity of the arrangement, its economy, or its ability to unify 
several tasks in one display’ (ibid., 411-412) 
We have already seen this idea of beauty because of “optimal use of minimal material” in the 
discussion of theories. It is also present in the aesthetic judgement of thought experiments in 
the cases above. For Brown, as we saw, Galileo’s thought experiment is beautiful because it 
is ‘brilliantly original and as simple as it is profound’ (2004, 24). Similarly, Carroll states 
‘Einstein, in his genius, realized the profound implication’ of the situation described in the 
thought experiment. In the experiment case, the material is concrete objects.92 Thought 
experiments, of course, differ here; economy is achieved through the particulars that we are 
prescribed to imagine.93  
To further illuminate these features in the case of thought experiments, it might also help to 
contrast these with cases of thought experiments that could be regarded as cluttered or clumsy 
and so on. Norton describes Szilard’s version of Maxwell’s demon as “the worst thought 
experiment”. Why is this? Norton offers a detailed account of the thought experiment and its 
flaws, but we can focus on a couple of reasons he provides. Thought experiments are 
illuminating when they provide us with a simple scenario that allows us to focus on the most 
essential features, and when the scenario can serve as a representative case. Szilard’s thought 
experiment involves a misuse of idealisations; ‘an inconsistent muddle of improper 
idealizations’, and leads to an incorrect generalisation (2018, 466).94 Another example is 
 
92 There are discussions of profundity as an aesthetic quality such as in the context of music (Dodd 
2014). Dodd explains that a necessary condition for profundity is that ‘the work has a profound subject 
matter, and that the work handles its profound subject matter in such a way to elicit a deeper 
understanding of it (or a fuller grasp of its significance) in the suitably situated and prepared 
appreciator’. This is apt for thought experiments and as will see, my proposal in the next chapter accords 
well with this sense in which a work “handles” its profound subject matter in a particular way.  
93 In his account of the beauty of theories, McAllister (1996) argues that in theory change our aesthetic 
canons change and consequently what counts as beautiful will be revised. Bringing thought experiments 
into aesthetics of science prompts questions regarding whether their aesthetic qualities have also 
changed from era to era, throughout the history of science. 
94 As outlined, it appears that Norton would maintain that any aesthetic qualities of thought experiments 




Darwin’s whale thought experiment, which attempts to explain natural selection by 
demonstrating how whales could have evolved from bears: 
‘In North America the black bear was seen by [the explorer] Hearne swimming for 
hours with widely open mouth, thus catching, like a whale, insects in the water. Even 
in so extreme a case as this, if the supply of insects were constant, and if better adapted 
competitors did not already exist in the country, I can see no difficulty in a race of bears 
being rendered, by natural selection, more and more aquatic in their structure and 
habits, with larger and larger mouths, till a creature was produced as monstrous as a 
whale’ (1859a, 184). 
Picking up on the use of ‘monstrous’ in Darwin’s description, Louis Agassiz described the 
thought experiment itself as “truly monstrous” (Stuart 2016, 31). The example was dropped 
by Darwin in later editions of On the Origin of Species. In attempting to explain the 
morphology of whales by referring to an existing creature, the example invokes ‘needlessly 
strange evolutionary explanations’ and fails to aid our understanding of natural selection 
(ibid.).   
 
 Problems for Aesthetics of Science 
We have seen both positive and negative evaluations of thought experiments, and thus, I argue 
they ought to be included in philosophers’ discussions of aesthetic evaluations in science. 
However, this discussion brings us to a set of worries for any aesthetics of science project.  
It could be argued that when scientists or philosophers of science describe or evaluate certain 
thought experiments aesthetically, what is really being said is that the thought experiment is 
successful or unsuccessful. Take Norton’s view that Szilard’s thought experiment is the worst 
thought experiment. It is clear that given his argument account of thought experiments, Norton 
would maintain that any aesthetic evaluations of this or any other thought experiment are 
irrelevant to their epistemic value, or that the aesthetic qualities can be reduced to claims 
regarding their role in contributing to an argument and consequently, they are not genuinely 
aesthetic. In Norton’s terms, it is “merely rhetorical window dressing” (2004, 60). Szilard’s 
 
their role in contributing to an argument and consequently, they are not genuinely aesthetic. I discuss 




thought experiment, then, is just a bad argument on this reasoning.95 As I have already 
outlined, Norton has many opponents and I will not go into the worries with his view here. 
But we do not need to commit to an argument view of thought experiments to see the worry 
that when say, Galileo’s thought experiment is being described as “beautiful”, or Darwin’s as 
“monstrous”, the aesthetic language is being used in a mere metaphorical way.  
This issue has been raised by Todd (2008) in the context of theories. Todd discusses a number 
of views which claim that the beauty of a theory can be an indicator of the truth of a theory. 
To flesh out Todd’s argument, we can focus on his discussion of McAllister (1996) which he 
takes to be one the most developed accounts of the role of aesthetics in the assessment of 
theories. McAllister sets out to defend the view that we can hold that aesthetics has value in 
science, whilst maintaining a rationalist image of science, that is, one in which preference for 
scientific theories is dictated by their logical consistency and empirical adequacy. McAllister 
explains the connection between the beauty of a theory, and its truth or empirical success, 
with reference to the aesthetic canon. On this view, scientist’s aesthetic preferences have been 
shaped over time to match the features of successful theories. And so, the connection is based 
on aesthetic induction; when a theory is regarded as beautiful this is because it is similar to 
existing, successful theories (i.e. it accords with the aesthetic canon) and thus it is more likely 
to be true or empirically successful (ibid., 33-34).96  
McAllister reduces beauty to features such as simplicity, symmetry, elegance, harmony and 
visualisable structures. Because of this reductionist approach, Todd is sceptical that “beauty” 
is really being used in an aesthetic sense when applied to scientific theories. He motivates this 
by highlighting how some of these terms are used in theory assessment without a link made 
to beauty or aesthetics. And so, he calls into the question whether scientists are expressing 
something about the aesthetic value of theories rather than saying something about the kind 
of intellectual pleasures that might arise from the construction or use of simple or symmetrical 
theories, for example. Because of this, Todd argues, we should understand such terms as being 
 
95 Or on Egan’s view, the thought experiment does not fulfil its intended role in a larger, argumentative 
structure.  
96 As Ivanova (2017a) points out, McAllister utilises a phenomenon which has been labelled the ‘mere 
exposure effect’ in which people develop a preference or a liking for something based on their 
increasing familiarity with it. For example, a psychology study by Cutting (2003) demonstrated that the 
mere exposure to certain Impressionist paintings led to an increase in the participants’ positive response 
to the paintings. The limits of Cutting’s research has been discussed by Meskin et. al. (2013) who carried 
out an alternative study that demonstrated that exposure to what is taken to be bad visual art, Kinkade’s 





used in a way that actually tracks epistemic features. He claims that ‘there are strong grounds 
for suspecting that what appears to be aesthetic claims may often be, if perhaps not always 
are, really masked ‘epistemic’ functional ones’ (2008, 72).97  
Todd further claims that the part of the challenge for those who want to defend the genuine 
aesthetic nature of the use of beauty and so on in science is to provide a theory of ‘aesthetic 
value, appreciation, or properties’ that will demonstrate ‘how theories and proofs might fit the 
general contours of more paradigmatic examples of objects of aesthetic appreciation, such as 
artworks and natural objects’ (ibid., 63). For instance, Todd argues that the use of ‘simplicity’ 
in the case of describing a theory or an idea is a different use than when describing a Mondrian 
painting, thus ‘it is the context of use that determines whether they are being used to signify 
aesthetic interest or value, or not, and this McAllister and others generally fail to notice’ 
(2008, 70). Again it can be highlighted how there might be some dispute regarding the 
strength of the purported connections between thought experiments and literary fictions and 
the way in which we critically evaluate them as seen in section 3. 
On the other hand, it can be emphasised that if aesthetic judgements of “beauty”, “elegance” 
and so on are genuinely aesthetic (or are perhaps “merely” aesthetic) and cannot be reduced 
to epistemic features or do not have any kind of epistemic role, then it is difficult to see how 
they have an important part to play in the scientific context and consequently, why they are 
interesting to philosophers of science. 
To clarify, the dilemma is as follows: 
a) The application of aesthetic terms to science (such as to theories, experiments, and 
thought experiments) is merely metaphorical, and should instead be regarded as a proxy 
for epistemic features or 
b) The application of aesthetic terms to science (theories, experiments, and thought 
experiments) is literal, but their aesthetic features are scientifically irrelevant 
Therefore, any account of aesthetics in science will have to provide reasons as to why we 
should take these descriptions as genuinely aesthetic whilst maintaining that they play a 
 
97 As Todd recognises, delineating what counts as “genuinely aesthetic” and what falls outside of that 
domain is not a straightforward issue. And as already mentioned, there is great debate regarding whether 




meaningful role in science.98 I want to avoid a reductionist view, and I think we will ignore 
important aspects of scientific practice if we reconstruct aesthetic language in such a way. 
And so, we should take seriously the aesthetic claims of scientists and try to make sense of 




Discussions of aesthetic values in science have focused mainly on theories and mathematical 
proofs. My aim in this chapter was to demonstrate why thought experiments should also be 
included in the literature on aesthetics in the scientific realm. The first reason is that thought 
experiments are often compared with artworks. In particular, thought experiments are often 
compared with works of literary fiction given that each invite us to imagine some 
hypothetical state of affairs and have a narrative form. The second reason is that thought 
experiments are also described using aesthetic language as seen in Brown’s description of 
Galileo’s falling bodies as well as Agassiz’s response to Darwin’s “monstrous” whale, for 
example. I outlined existing views on the connections between thought experiments and 
literary fiction, before turning to the aesthetic evaluation of thought experiments which I 
compared to theories and experiments.  
However, this chapter also raised ways in which connections between thought experiments 
and works of literary fiction can be undermined and I ended with a dilemma for aesthetics 
of science projects. In the next chapter, I respond to these worries and develop a new 
approach to aesthetic values in science which solves the dilemma. 
  
 
98 For recent responses to Todd’s claims, see Dutilh Novaes (2019) on beauty in mathematical proofs, 




6. The Aesthetic and Literary Qualities of Thought Experiments 
 
 Introduction 
In chapter 5, we saw that present discussions of aesthetics in science have overlooked thought 
experiments. I outlined how this is surprising, given the ways in which connections between 
thought experiments and artistic fictions, namely works of literary fiction, have been drawn. 
In particular, those involved in debates regarding the cognitive value of literature have 
highlighted the similarities between the two in order to defend the view that at least some 
literary works function like (or are) thought experiments and therefore we can learn from 
them. In addition, thought experiments are also considered beautiful or elegant, and I 
discussed the aesthetic evaluation of thought experiments by calling on the attribution of 
beauty to theories and experiments.  
However, the chapter also included a discussion of the ways in which thought experiments 
are importantly different from works of literary fiction which, it has been argued, undermines 
the view that the use of concrete particulars and narrative play a similar role in each. And I 
ended with a dilemma for any aesthetics of science project: On one hand, it appears that when 
scientists are utilising aesthetic language, they are meaning it in a merely metaphorical sense. 
That is to say, what is really being picked out are epistemic features of thought experiments 
(or experiments or theories). On the other hand, if the language is genuinely aesthetic, then it 
appears difficult to defend the usefulness of aesthetic qualities in the scientific domain. A 
challenge for an aesthetics of science project, then, is to defend the view that the aesthetic 
language is being used literally, whilst demonstrating how such evaluations play an important 
role in science. As well as to show how the terminology, such as “simplicity” or “elegance” 
and so on, is being used in a way that is comparable with the use of such terms in art and other 
more obviously aesthetic domains.  
I agree that there are significant differences between our engagement with art on one hand, 
and with scientific theories/experiments/thought experiments on the other, and that these 
differences need to be taken into consideration when drawing comparisons between scientific 
and artistic representations and how we learn from them. But I want to resist the force of the 




fictions, and our aesthetic evaluation of them.99 I begin with a proposal for a way of 
characterising an aspect of the aesthetics of science that is currently neglected in the literature. 
This is by attending to the relation between form and content in scientific thought 
experiments. On this view, aesthetic value has to do with the way in which epistemic content 
is expressed.100 I then come back to the comparisons between thought experiments and works 
of literature and end with some further issues that my discussion raises.  
 
 Form and Content in Aesthetics 
A focus on the fit between form and content is common in accounts of the aesthetic 
appreciation of artworks. For example, in The Pleasures of Aesthetics (1996) Levinson states 
that when we attend to an artwork or an aspect of it, the pleasure we derive from it is aesthetic 
when ‘there is also attention to the relation between content and form—between what a work 
represents or expresses or suggests, and the means it uses to do so’ (1996, 10).101  
Take, for example, Picasso’s Guernica (1937) created in response to the bombing of 
Guernica, a village in the Basque region of Spain, during the civil war. The painting explores 
the horror of war and is composed of injured children, women and animals, and it expresses 
this in a distinctive way—the distorted lines and fragmented composition, the way in which 
the animals and humans are positioned as jumbled together, such as a bull’s head directly 
above a woman’s screaming face, and the colours of the work being restricted to black, white, 
and grey which adds to the starkness of the work, allowing us to focus on the structure of what 
is depicted. And thinking again of Morrison’s Beloved, when we consider what the work 
conveys and its cognitive and political import, we can think about how that is bound up with 
 
99 I take the account that I develop here to be adaptable to other areas of science, but given my focus in 
this thesis and the discussions of literary works presented in the previous chapter, here I am 
predominately concerned with thought experiments.  
100 At the end of his paper, Todd (2008) suggests (but does not flesh out) a view that focuses on the 
relation between form and content as a possible direction for aesthetics of science given his worries as 
presented at the end of chapter 5. 
101 Levinson grants that we could take pleasure in the formal features of a work (particular arrangement 
of lines, brushwork, colour and so on in painting, or the use of alliteration and rhythm in poetry) but 
distinguishes this from aesthetic pleasure. He states: ‘It is clear that aesthetic pleasure as I have 
characterized it in this essay comprises more than pleasure in aesthetic qualities per se—that is, those 
that Frank Sibley has famously identified—and equally more than pleasure in mere appearances’ (1996, 
9). Similarly, while we can take pleasure in the content of a work—say considering a Madonna and 





how it is expressed; the particular events described regarding the lives of Sethe and her family, 
the use of rich imagery, the style of Morrison’s writing which incorporates elements of 
African-American folklore, and in the structure of the work such as the presentation of both 
the past and present which conveys how the two are intertwined in the characters’ inner lives. 
Through the example of literature, Levinson explains that aesthetic satisfaction in artworks is 
‘precisely when such symbolic or moral content is apprehended in and through the body of 
the literary work itself—its sentences, paragraphs and fictive events—and not as something 
abstractable from them… Aesthetic appreciation of art thus always acknowledges the vehicle 
of the work as essential, never focusing only on detachable meanings or effects’ (Levinson, 
1996, 7).  
Similarly, Carroll characterises the form of an artwork as ‘whatever functions to advance or 
to realize whatever the artwork is designed to bring about. The form of an artwork is what 
enables the artwork to realize its point or its purpose’ (1999, 142).102 Further, this is part of 
our aesthetic appreciation of artworks: ‘What we appreciate in an artwork is how the forms 
function as means to bring about the ends of the artwork. Where these forms are well suited 
to the ends of the artwork, we generally take satisfaction in their design’ (ibid., 150). Carroll’s 
view thus entails that artworks have a purpose or a point to make, but he emphasises that this 
should be understood in a broad sense. A purpose of an artwork could be to arouse certain 
feelings or responses in their audience, to advance a particular point or view or communicate 
an idea, or to explore a theme and so on. Additionally, a particular work of art can have more 
than one purpose or more than one point to make. What is especially useful about Carroll’s 
conceptualisation for the consideration of scientific thought experiments is that he makes 
explicit that our analysis of artworks depends on having a conception of the point(s) or 
purpose(s) of the work. In the case of thought experiments, then, our aesthetic analysis 
conceived in this way is dependent upon what the example is used for. Carroll highlights that 
in the case of artworks, there will be variation with regards to how easy it is to determine the 
point(s) or purpose(s) of a work. He notes that this is why ‘formal analysis also usually comes 
hand-in-hand with interpretations or explications of the work’ (1999, 145).103  
 
102 See also Thomson-Jones (2005) and Eldridge (1985) for accounts of the interrelation between form 
and content in art. Carroll is also interested in artworks that do not have content such as much orchestral 
music or “pure dance”. Given that my focus is on thought experiments which are clearly about 
something (that is, they have content) I need not go into these details here (see Carroll 1999, chapter 3 
part II for discussion). 




While the link to the current aesthetics of science literature has not been made, there are some 
existing discussions of the significance of the ways in which scientific representations are 
formulated. Vorms (2011) and Frigg and Nguyen (2017) emphasise that “formulation 
matters” in scientific models; varying the formulation of the same model can provide different 
explanations and predictions (Frigg and Nguyen 2017, 58). And Frigg and Nguyen link this 
claim to comparisons between artworks and scientific models. They argue that Currie is 
mistaken when he uses the import of formulation in artistic contexts to undermine connections 
drawn between scientific models and artistic fictions. Currie claims that scientific models ‘are 
not dependent for their value in learning on any particular formulation; rather they depend on 
their capacity to get good predictive or explanatory results or to achieve some other epistemic 
aim’ (2016, 305).104  
In her discussion of accounts that defend the imaginary status of models (as presented in 
chapter 3), Vorms argues that such views are right to highlight, against the semantic view, 
that modelling involves scientists’ creative and imaginary skills.105 However, she argues that 
they have failed to attend to the ways in which models crucially involve ‘the concrete 
inferences agents perform’ when reasoning with models (2011, 288). She sets out to show 
how in order to capture the “representational power” of models, ‘one has to focus on the 
cognitive interactions between agents and the representational devices they reason with and 
manipulate’ (ibid.). Vorms demonstrates that the way in which a model is formulated is 
crucial to these interactions.  
One case that Vorms discusses to motivate the view concerns the representation of the results 
of a temperature survey. These results are represented in different ways; as a list of numerals 
and on a map. While it is the same information in each representation (thus, it is the same 
content that is being conveyed), and agents can draw conclusions from any of them, ‘the map 
 
104 Currie makes this point in the context of his scepticism regarding the epistemic value of scientific 
and artistic representations. Currie is sceptical of claims regarding literature’s value in learning. In 
contrast to the clear roles of models in the growth of scientific knowledge and understanding, there is 
‘no more than the vague suggestion that fictions sometimes shed light on aspects of human thought, 
feeling, decision, and action; a proposition that no one has found a way to test’ (2016, 307). Currie 
further states that the “feelings of truth” that we gain from artworks is dependent upon the way they are 
formulated. For example, alliteration might contribute to a feeling of truth. Which he takes to undercut 
their epistemic value; the persuasiveness of their content is dependent upon their style and so on (see 
Thomson-Jones 2005 for a criticism of this view).  
105 While I draw on Vorms, I am not committed to the fiction view of models as emphasised in chapters 
3 and 4. Because of this, the view of aesthetic values in science that I develop in this chapter (as with 
my pluralist view of imagination) could be incorporated into a variety of positions on modelling, 




makes some information much more easily available: for instance, if warm shades stand for 
high temperatures and cold shades for low temperatures, one can quickly conclude that the 
southern part of the represented area is warmer than its northern part’ (ibid., 289). Whereas 
drawing this from a list of numerals that stand for the coordinates of the place and its 
temperature value, would involve many inferential steps (ibid.).106 She highlights how 
different formats of the same information impacts agents’ reasoning processes, and can allow 
access to different information. 
Now that we have a sense of the import of form and content in the aesthetic appreciation of 
artworks, as well as of the existing discussions of formulation in the scientific realm, I will 
turn my attention to the interrelation between form and content in thought experiments.  
 
 The Formulation of Thought Experiments  
In this section, I will demonstrate that the usefulness of a thought experiment in scientific 
practice is impacted by the way in which its content is conveyed. Following Vorms, I 
emphasise how formats matter when we attend to the context in which a thought experiment 
is used, as well as the particular skills and interests of those engaging with the example.  
What do I mean by the formulation of thought experiments? In presenting Egan’s arguments 
in the previous chapter, we saw how he emphasises that thought experiments are ultimately 
concerned with abstract ideas that can be generalised beyond the particular details of the 
thought experiment narrative. For example, in Galileo’s falling bodies thought experiment, 
Galileo is ultimately interested in exploring the relation between the weight of a body and the 
speed at which it falls. This I take to be the content of Galileo’s thought experiment, or in 
Carroll’s terminology, the point or purpose of the example. More specifically, we can say that 
this is part of the “thematic content” (in the scientific context, we can label this the “scientific 
content”). As Lamarque explains in the context of literary fictions, the content at the thematic 
level is the more general, overarching reflections that go beyond the particularities of the text. 
Importantly, it is the ‘perspective or vision or general reflection that informs the subject matter 
 
106 An example of an imaginary model that Vorms discusses is the simple pendulum. This can be 
conveyed in different formats and which format is the most appropriate is dependent upon what 
information the user wants to obtain. She outlines the differences in the description of the pendulum in 
Newtonian mechanics compared with the Hamilton formulation. While these formats are 
mathematically equivalent, Vorms explains that they are inferentially different and hence do not involve 




and moves beyond the immediate events portrayed’ (2009, 150). Take Egan’s example of 
Austen’s Pride and Prejudice. At the thematic level, the work is an exploration of gendered 
expectations, reputation and class. This informs the choices regarding the particularities of 
the text; the story of Elizabeth Bennett and her romantic relationship with Mr Darcy and so 
on.107  
The form of Galileo’s thought experiment includes the way in which the relation between 
speed and weight is expressed through the particulars used in the scenario; the musket ball 
and cannon ball dropped from a tower. Another sense in which we can focus on the formal 
features of thought experiments relates to Vorms’ discussion above, in the sense that we can 
think about the style in which thought experiments are presented, including the particular 
construction of the narrative as well as the use of diagrams and images. As with artworks, I 
argue that a source of the aesthetic value of thought experiments comes from the way in which 
their formal features function as a way of bringing about its overarching content. When the 
form is well-suited to the purpose of the thought experiment, we may regard it as aesthetically 
valuable. And so, while we could take pleasure in the content of say, Galileo’s falling bodies 
or in its formal features alone, what I am interested in here is how the interrelation of these 
two aspects of the example is a source of aesthetic value that has epistemic pay offs.  
In the last chapter, I discussed one of Darwin’s thought experiments (or “imaginary 
illustrations”) used to, as Darwin states, ‘make it clear how, as I believe, natural selection 
acts’ (1859a, 90). The example I outlined was a case in which we are asked to imagine a bear 
catching insects in the water. By arguing that wider mouths would be advantageous, Darwin 
describes the bear’s mouths becoming wider and wider until ‘a creature was produced as 
monstrous as a whale’ (ibid., 184). This thought experiment was described as “truly 
monstrous” by Agassiz, and others agreed. In Darwin’s letters, we can see that the example 
caused controversy. While Darwin intended to show how selective pressure could lead to the 
 
107 Lamarque (2009) distinguishes two levels of content, or aboutness, of literary works: the thematic 
content and the narrative or immediate content. On Lamarque’s view then, the tower and the balls in 
Galileo’s thought experiment would be a part of the narrative content of the work, as would the events 
described in Pride and Prejudice. Whether or not we want to label this a relation between two levels of 
content, or a relation between form and content, is an interesting question. However, the important point 
for my account is that we have this relation between two things—between the thematic or scientific 
content and how that is expressed in the particularities of the example. I will therefore stick to Levinson 
and Carroll’s ways of drawing the distinction but note that this implies that choices regarding narrative 
content can count as part of the form of a work. If the point of a thought experiment is to, for example, 
convince us of something, then the form comprises the choices made to realise that purpose, some of 




widening of the bears’ mouths, some took the thought experiment as intending to convey that 
the mouths could widen over time due to the bear using it to catch insects (Letter to Murray, 
1860). In a review of On the Origin of Species, Owen described the example as “gross” but 
in correspondence with Darwin, noted that the passage stood out to him. As Darwin explained 
in another letter, Owen had also misunderstood the example; taking it to state that it was 
attempting to show how a bear could become a whale, or as Darwin puts it, how ‘a sort of 
Bear was the grandpapa of Whales!’ (Darwin, 1859b).  
There are multiple ways in which we can think about the aesthetics of this example. One way 
is to consider the imagery that the thought experiment produces; the image of the bear’s mouth 
becoming wider and wider is at best peculiar and perhaps even ugly. And so, the thought 
experiment could be considered “monstrous” in this sense. This would be similar to regarding 
Einstein’s light beam thought experiment aesthetically valuable because of the imagery of 
chasing a beam of light. A related way is that due to the bizarreness of the bear-whale imagery, 
the thought experiment can be considered captivating. This might accord with how the 
passage was “gross” to the reviewer, yet also stood out. An analogy of this in the case of art 
are instances of “good-bad” artworks as discussed by Dyck and Johnson (2017). In such cases, 
the artistic failure of such works makes them bizarre, which, it is argued, is aesthetically 
valuable. As Walton puts it, we enjoy ‘something like awe and amazement at how awful the 
thing turned out to be despite the efforts of its creators’ (2008, 21).108  
But another way, and the way in which I will consider the case, is to focus on the relation 
between the thought experiments’ form and content. To do this, it is helpful to compare it 
with another of Darwin’s “imaginary illustrations”. In particular, Darwin’s thought 
experiment that is used to explain how an organ as complex as the eye could have developed 
through spontaneous mutation and natural selection. In the 1872 edition, he states: ‘To 
suppose that the eye with all its inimitable contrivances for adjusting the focus to different 
distances, for admitting different amounts of light, and for the correction of spherical and 
chromatic aberration, could have been formed by natural selection, seems, I freely confess, 
absurd in the highest degree’ (1872., 143). The thought experiment is outlined as follows: 
‘[W]e ought in imagination to take a thick layer of transparent tissue, with spaces filled 
with fluid, and with a nerve sensitive to light beneath, and then suppose every part of 
 
108 Examples of “good-bad” art as discussed by Dyck and Johnson include the 2003 film The Room 
which is ‘a confusing mix of a bizarre storyline, terrible acting, very little plot cohesion, and a script 




this layer to be continually changing slowly in density, so as to separate into layers of 
different densities and thicknesses, placed at different distances from each other, and 
with the surfaces of each layer slowly changing in form. Further we must suppose that 
there is a power, represented by natural selection or the survival of the fittest, always 
intently watching each slight alteration in the transparent layers; and carefully 
preserving each which, under varied circumstances, in any way or in any degree, tends 
to produce a distincter image. We must suppose each new state of the instrument to be 
multiplied by the million; each to be preserved until a better one is produced, and then 
the old ones to be all destroyed. In living bodies, variation will cause the slight 
alterations, generation will multiply them almost infinitely, and natural selection will 
pick out with unerring skill each improvement’ (ibid., 146).  
As Stuart highlights, the two thought experiments are functionally similar. In each, Darwin is 
attempting to explain how a complex part of nature—the intricacies of the eye or the 
morphology of whales—could have come about through a series of steps (2016a, 31). This I 
take to be the “thematic” or “scientific” content of Darwin’s two examples, that is, its point 
or purpose. While they involve different applications, each is used to demonstrate the 
explanatory power of the theory of evolution by natural selection. Throughout the book, 
Darwin invokes such illustrations to show how the theory can account for a variety of natural 
phenomena.  
In chapters 3 and 4, I discussed how thought experiments work by calling upon our 
imaginative faculties, and I offered a pluralist account of the nature of the imagination in their 
conduct. Part of this account included the role of thought experiments in scientific 
understanding. I called upon the work of De Regt (2017) to discuss how thought experiments 
can contribute to making certain theoretical content intelligible, as outlined via the use of 
Maxwell’s demon to enhance our understanding of the second law of thermodynamics. Given 
that thought experiments are performed in the imagination, we can use them most effectively 
when they are formulated in an appropriate way; the particular details of the thought 
experiment narrative give our imaginations something to latch onto. Thought experiments 
thus work by presenting more generalisable and abstractable problems (that is, their scientific 
content) in more vivid terms. When they are formulated well, thought experiments can help 




Another key aspect of De Regt’s account of understanding was that he focuses on features of 
theories that enhance its usability. This is also relevant to the examples considered here: While 
Darwin is interested in explaining the complexity of the eye, and the morphology of whales, 
his imaginary illustrations are also intended to be generalizable beyond the particular details 
of the case. That is to say, they are used in order to illuminate the theory in such a way that it 
allows those who engage with the thought experiment to see how natural selection can also 
explain other complex organs and species. With this in mind, we can explore how the 
formulation of Darwin’s examples impacts their effectiveness at increasing understanding of 
natural selection. 
Darwin’s whale thought experiment can be easily misinterpreted. In explaining how whales 
could have evolved, Darwin chooses to invoke an existing animal. This makes the example 
more convoluted than is necessary, and makes it difficult to focus in on the key features of 
the example—the step-by-step changes of a species that results in it becoming something 
else—and instead can easily lead the reader astray, such as understanding the bear as integral 
to the example and thus, taking it to suggest that whales have evolved from bears. This is a 
stark contrast to the eye illustration. In this example, we are given a solution to the problem 
of the “absurdity” of the prospect of natural selection accounting for complex and intricate 
phenomena through the description of the eye. The example is easy to imagine; we can see 
how by various steps and modifications, we end up with an increasingly complex organ which 
at each stage, becomes more useful. Further to this, the description offered gives the reader a 
way of going beyond the particulars of the case of the eye; engaging with the thought 
experiment enhances our ability to apply the process of step-by-step changes to the evolution 
of other complex phenomena. Finally, along with the described scenario above, Darwin 
utilises a helpful comparison with a telescope ‘which could be built up in stages from a single 
lens, where each stage involves a small improvement on the last’ (Stuart 2016a, 29).109  
De Regt of course offers just one account of understanding, but we can see an emphasis on 
usability in other accounts. Take for example Levy’s discussion of the role of metaphors in 
scientific understanding. A good metaphor, Levy argues, should represent the relevant facts 
in a usable way. He discusses how metaphors “frame” their targets, that is, they direct 
attention in a way that is ‘striking and illuminating’ to particular properties of their target 
 
109 These comparisons may be particularly helpful in cases such as Darwin’s, since his thought 





subject via a more familiar subject matter (2020, 293; see also Camp 2009). Similarly, in 
thought experiments, the particular fictive events described—often familiar objects such as 
balls and towers in Galileo’s example, or buckets in Newton’s example—are utilised in order 
to realise the more general, abstract content.  
Stuart takes the whale thought experiment as a failed thought experiment, arguing that it does 
not increase understanding. I agree that the thought experiment has problems and can easily 
lead to confusion (as it clearly did at the time) regarding what Darwin was trying to explain. 
While Darwin removed the thought experiment from later editions due to the ridicule he 
received, he stood by its potential explanatory power. I think it is possible that the thought 
experiment could aid our understanding of natural selection, but it is far less apt to do so than 
the eye example. Hence, this affects its usefulness as a thought experiment for Darwin’s 
purposes.   
Furthermore, an appropriate fit between form and content may be more or less significant 
depending on who the example is designed for. In discussing the imagination in chapter 4, I 
highlighted that certain contextual features of a thought experiment will impact the nature of 
the imagination that it invites. Similarly, as noted before, Vorms’s account of formulations in 
science emphasises that we ought to attend to the relations between the representation and the 
cognitive interactions of those utilising the example. We have already seen that both Galileo 
and Maxwell were communicating with not only a scientific community, but also a public 
one. Similarly, in the Origin of Species, Darwin was appealing to a broad audience. The 
particular elements of how the scientific content is expressed are thus chosen to be suited to 
the audience of the text in order to contribute to its cognitive force. For example, while 
someone who may be familiar with the theory of natural selection could navigate Darwin’s 
whale example, someone less familiar with the theory is more likely to get confused by the 
case. Again, returning to chapter 4, we can think about how the use of diagrams and so on can 
form part of the presentation of a thought experiment which acts as aids to our imaginations. 
The value of such images may vary depending on the level of expertise of the user. 
A final consideration is that many of the examples that I have discussed are not only used to 
communicate certain scientific content, but to persuade. In this sense, I take it that Norton 
focuses on the wrong way in which thought experiments are closely related with arguments; 
thought experiments are utilised in an argumentative context in scientific practice. As seen in 




arguments without losing anything of epistemic worth by showing how the argument form of 
Galileo’s falling bodies lacks the demonstrative force of its original, narrative form. And we 
can also think again about Einstein’s clock-in-the-box thought experiment as presented in 
chapter 1. In this case, we see that the formulation of the example (including the addition and 
modification of diagrams presented alongside the description of the scenario) was revised at 
the hands of Einstein and Bohr, in order to become a better, more refined thought experiment 
and thus more appropriately formulated for their purposes.  
And so, Egan downplays the role of the particular ways in which scientific content is 
expressed when comparing scientific thought experiments with literary fictions. Similarly, 
Norton is too quick to regard the way in which the overarching point of a thought experiment 
is expressed is merely a use of “irrelevant particulars”. Egan could still maintain that although 
the role of concrete elements in thought experiments are indispensable in some sense, this 
does not fully address his concern. As outlined, Egan claims that in the case of literature, ‘the 
concrete elements of the narrative remain irreducibly a part of our imaginative engagement’ 
(2016, 144). The worry was that treating literature as thought experiment suggests that, for 
example, Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan Ilyich ‘exhausts its purpose once it has made a particular 
distinction salient, and we could just as well used some other thought experiment provided it 
made the same distinction equally salient’. As a work of literature, the argument goes, it is 
not exhausted or replaceable in this way (2016, 143). It seems true that there is a particular 
experience of reading say a work of Tolstoy that cannot be had another way, and that the 
details of (scientific) thought experiments could be changed to some degree without impacting 
its force, but there are a couple of worries here. Firstly, it is difficult to identify exactly what 
changes in the formal features of a thought experiment are permissible without altering the 
thought experiment’s effectiveness and hence, its usefulness in scientific practice. Further, it 
appears that at least some of the details of a work of literature could be changed without 
altering the novel or affecting the interpretations we draw from the novel. This might depend 
on what works of literature we are focusing on. I come back to the issue of what examples 
from art are relevant in comparisons with thought experiments in section 5.  
 
 Interpretation of Scientific and Artistic Representations 
The final issue that was raised by Egan in the previous chapter that was connected to the 




of interpretation in artistic and scientific representations. Frigg and Nguyen argue that 
interpretation of artworks is far less constrained than in the case of science. To demonstrate 
how interpretation in the case of scientific representations is highly regimented, we saw that 
Frigg and Nguyen provide the example of the Newtonian model of the solar system. They 
argue that if we did not interpret the largest sphere as the sun, then we would have 
misunderstood the model. I agree with Frigg and Nguyen about this case in that such an 
understanding of the model would constitute a misunderstanding. However, this does not 
allow for a sharp contrast with artistic representations. This is because there are clear parallels 
in the case of artworks. For example, if I do not take say the Mona Lisa to be a representation 
of a woman, then I clearly have misunderstood the painting. Or if I do not take Beloved to be 
about a formerly enslaved woman and her family, then I have misunderstood the novel.110  
In light of this, it is helpful to consider a distinction that is widely appealed to in the 
philosophy of art between a description of a work and an interpretation of a work. Matthews 
(1977) motivates the distinction through the example of three critics discussing James’s The 
Turn of the Screw. One critic was asked to describe the work, and offered the following: the 
story ‘is told by a governess, who lets us know how she saw two children under her charge, a 
little boy and a little girl...corrupted by the ghosts of two evil servants’ (Matthews 1977, 6). 
The other two critics agree with the description in so far as the novella is about two children 
who are under the care of a governess, but they object to the inclusion of the ghost. They 
argue that the ghost is not part of the description of the work, but rather, is part of an 
interpretation of the work. This is because, Matthews explains, such an understanding of the 
novella goes beyond the features of the text itself. And this means that there can be (and 
indeed is) wide disagreement regarding the ghost in the story. For example, about whether it 
is actually seen, or if it is a figment of the governess’s imagination (ibid.).  
For Matthews, the distinction is rooted in the fact that descriptions can be known to be correct, 
whereas interpretations cannot. He states how a critic would not be able to know whether the 
children were corrupted by ghosts because there are no facts about the novella that would 
decide this. He explains that whatever ‘the facts about James's story happen to be, they do not 
include either the children's being corrupted by ghosts or their not being corrupted by them. 
There is no fact of the matter here; hence, nothing that one could be in a position to know’ 
 
110 Frigg and Nguyen make this point within the context of their view on representations in art and 
science. Here, as mentioned in the last chapter, I am just concerned with the way in which interpretation 




(ibid., 8). Matthew’s claim that an interpretation of a work cannot be known to be correct is 
contentious and so, we might be wary of drawing the interpretation/description distinction in 
this way. In light of this, we can weaken the claim. For instance, we might take interpretations 
of work to be about the “non-obvious” (rather than essentially unknown) aspects of a work. 
As Lamarque puts it: ‘Interpretation is called for whenever there is need to “make sense” of 
something that is initially puzzling or not open to any obvious construal’ (2009, 148).  
There is more than one way in which the difference can be pinned down, but in general, there 
is agreement that there is a distinction to be made between descriptions and interpretations.111 
Drawing on this, we can say that “the portrait is of a woman” is part of the description of the 
Mona Lisa or “the novel is about a formerly enslaved woman and her family” is part of the 
description of Beloved, and so on. And this can be extended to representations more generally, 
including scientific models and thought experiments, in order to see that “the largest sphere 
is the sun” is part of the description of the model of the solar system, rather than an 
interpretation of it.  
It is also important to emphasise that while artworks such as Morrison’s Beloved initiate 
conversations about the meaning of the work and has led to many different critical approaches 
to its content, there are various accounts proposed in the philosophy of art regarding the proper 
interpretation of artworks, and what features of a work and its history are relevant to its 
interpretation. This debate includes whether there can be several correct or acceptable 
interpretations of a work (pluralism), or if there is a single correct or acceptable interpretation 
(monism). And so, even if it is allowed that there can be multiple, inconsistent interpretations 
of a work, it is not the case that “anything goes” when interpreting works of art (Stecker 2010, 
chapter 7). For example, even though on Matthews’s view, interpretations can never be 
known, this does not mean that anything can be offered as an interpretation of a work. 
Matthews states that interpreters must be able to justify their interpretations by offering 
evidence from the work that demonstrates why it is a plausible understanding of the text 
(1977, 8). 
 
111 For an alternative picture that engages with Matthews’ view, see Goldman (1990). On his view, there 
can be (uniquely) correct interpretations and hence, the distinction cannot be drawn in epistemic terms 
as on Matthews’s account. Instead, Goldman argues that the distinction is one between direct perception 
and inference. He explains that to ‘directly perceive that elements of artworks have certain properties 
is not to interpret them…we can perceive without needing to interpret the expressive properties of 
works, say the sadness in a musical phrase, while at the same time we interpret the phrase as being there 




We can also see problems with drawing a sharp distinction between how artistic and scientific 
representations are interpreted by turning to the discussions in chapter 1. In that chapter, I 
outlined how thought experiments can be situated within different theoretical contexts or 
arguments and thereby support different interpretations. I discussed the rocket and thread 
thought experiment as outlined by Bokulich (2001), but we can also see this by considering 
Newton’s bucket as presented in chapter 5. Newton used the thought experiment to argue that 
the motion of the water is relative to absolute space. Mach presents an alternative analysis of 
the same thought experiment scenario, denying that it establishes the existence of absolute 
space or motion, and rather demonstrates ‘only that motion relative to the Earth or fixed stars 
produces such effects (whereas the water’s motion relative to the bucket does not)’ (Bokulich 
and Frappier 2018, 546). While the interpretation of scientific representations such as thought 
experiments clearly has its limits, there can be disagreements on what would happen in the 
scenario presented or what conclusions ought to be drawn. In some cases, for example in 
Einstein’s clock-in-the-box and Maxwell’s demon, the debate regarding what the thought 
experiment demonstrates are ongoing.  
Furthermore, considering alternative interpretations of what phenomena would occur in a 
thought experiment setup, or what the thought experiment actually demonstrates can even be 
a part of the style of presenting thought experiments. We see this in Galileo’s dialogues where 
differences amongst the interlocutors’ interpretations of the thought experiment scenario are 
presented. In some cases, they agree on what would happen but offer different explanations 
in light of their different theoretical commitments. In other cases, the issue does not revolve 
around how best to explain an agreed outcome. Rather, the different theoretical standpoints 
of the interlocutors influence judgments regarding what would happen in the thought 
experiment. As Palmerino puts it, Galileo’s thought experiments function as ‘magnifying 
glasses that render the different theoretical assumptions of the three interlocutors accessible’ 
(2018, 907).  
And so, thought experiments can be reanalysed and retooled from different theoretical 
standpoints. This means that the ways in which scientific and artistic representations can be 
interpreted is more complex than has been allowed (see also Elgin 2017, chapter 11). Despite 
this complexity, I do think that there is a key difference that should be highlighted. Part of the 
aesthetic appreciation of artworks can consist in how they can be “open-ended” in certain 
ways. Artworks are often valued (as artworks) for the conversations that they prompt 




virtue. This I take it is part of Egan’s point when he emphasises the richness of literary works 
in that we can come back to them and find new ways of understanding them. Thought 
experiments can similarly prompt such discussions, and as outlined in chapter 1, this can form 
part of their value. However, I take it that the best version of an argument that wants to 
emphasise the difference between artistic and scientific representations in light of their 
interpretation is one that highlights how this is not part of scientific representations’ aesthetic 
value. 
In the previous chapter, we saw how thought experiments such as Galileo’s bodies, or 
Einstein’s “happiest thought” have been described using aesthetic language. Their beauty or 
elegance and so on lies in their ability to evaluate, explain or help us understand something 
profound based on a description of a simple scenario that allows for reasoning about complex, 
abstract relations through the introduction of concrete particulars. This chapter so far has 
offered a view of an aspect of aesthetics of science through a focus on how thought 
experiments and other representations in science are formulated in a way that fits their content. 
This resists a reductive approach to aesthetics in the scientific domain, as this interrelation 
between form and content is a source of aesthetic value. But it also shows why aesthetics 
should be of interest to philosophers of science. This is because well-formulated thought 
experiments aid our imaginations and contribute to their ability to effectively communicate, 
explain and convince. In this section, I returned to a purported difference between the 
interpretation of artworks on one hand, and scientific works on the other. By utilising an 
important distinction in philosophy of art, between descriptions and interpretations, I argued 
that interpretation cannot be used as a clear way of demarcating scientific and artistic 
representations. While I take the “open-endedness” of some thought experiments to be a part 
of their value, I do grant that unlike in the case of artworks, it is less clear that this is part of 
their aesthetic value. In the final section, I will further explore the comparison between 
thought experiments and literary fiction and offer a discussion that highlights which examples 
from art will be more appropriate in an attempt to avoid over-stating the shared qualities 
between the two. 
 
 Selecting the Right Examples 
The discussion so far indicates that we ought to look closely at the literary examples that are 




If we focus on the likes of Morrison or Tolstoy, then the comparisons are going to be thin. 
Further, as I highlighted in the previous chapter, pinning down what it is that we learn from, 
say, Morrison’s Beloved is difficult, and there is reason to think that reducing the novel to 
functioning like a thought experiment does not do justice to the work. However, such works 
are not representative of all narrative art and in this section, I will outline some case studies 
that are more relevant to thought experiments, whether scientific or philosophical. This 
includes speculative fiction and fables and parables. To do this, I begin with an outline of 
genre conventions which enables a consideration of the similarities between thought 
experiments and other genres of literary fiction. 
 
6.5.1 The Thought Experiment Genre 
Genres (including hybrid or sub-genres) are categories of artworks. Liao offers a broad 
characterisation of genre as ‘simply groupings of narratives that are recognized by the relevant 
community as special’ (2016, 469). Philosophers of art including Liao have offered rich 
discussions on how an artwork’s inclusion within a certain genre influences our engagement 
with it (see also Currie 2004, Friend 2012), but the key point for my purposes is that 
recognising that a work fits within a particular genre generates certain expectations about the 
work, and affects the way in which the reader or audience understands and evaluates it. For 
example, the title alone indicates that Buffy the Vampire Slayer fits within a horror and/or 
fantasy genre which will lead us to expect that the series involves supernatural elements. And 
if we know that the series centers around a group of high school students, then we will also 
have the expectation that it will involve elements of teen dramas and coming-of-age stories, 
as well as the highs and lows of romantic relationships and friendships. Further to this, if 
someone was to watch the series and offer a criticism along the lines of “how stupid, demons 
could never exist!” then we would take it that, to use Weinberg’s (2008) terminology, they 
have not mastered the genre that Buffy is a part of.  
Weinberg has presented the idea of thought experiments as a genre (see also Peterson 2018):  
‘There are rules to engaging properly with a hypothetical scenario, after all. To make 
just some of the more obvious generalizations about our imaginative practices with 
thought experiments: one should embellish as little as possible; generally it is a practice 
conducted in an affectively ‘cool’ manner; and our inferential systems must often be 




While Weinberg’s focus is on philosophical thought experiments, this can be carried over to 
scientific ones. We have seen through Norton’s discussion of Szilard’s thought experiment, 
as well as through the comparison between Darwin’s whale and eye, that there are certain 
conventions involved in the creation and engagement of thought experiments with regards to 
their use of idealisations and how their results are taken to be generalisable. Further, in 
Galileo’s Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems (1632/1967), we see how 
Galileo puts boundaries on what properly constitutes a thought experiment. In the Dialogues, 
Galileo, through the interlocutors, offers examples of different hypothetical scenarios from 
different theoretical standpoints. This includes passages in which one of the interlocutor 
proposes a thought experiment, and it is rejected as meaningless. I will focus on an example 
that Palmerino (2018, 2011) discusses. Simplicio proposes a thought experiment through 
calling upon the work of Locher who denied the Copernican theory that the rotation of the 
earth is related to the circular motion of objects on earth as they fall. To support this, Locher 
provided some counterfactual scenarios in which we imagine, for example, that the earth was 
‘reduced to nothing’, and argues that an absurd thing (that ‘experience and reason refute’) 
would happen if Copernicus was correct: ‘no hail or rain would fall from the clouds, but would 
only be carried naturally around; nor would any fire or flaming thing ascend, since in their 
view, probably, there is no fire above’ (Galileo 1632/1967, 243). 
Saliviati does not offer an analysis of the scenario. Instead, he argues that it is nonsensical to 
consider such situations. This is because we cannot know what would happen if the earth was 
annihilated in the same sense that we cannot know ‘what was going to take place on it and 
around it before it was created’ (ibid., 245). Saliviati highlights how this thought experiment 
goes beyond what can be evaluated through calling on our experiences of the world. Further, 
the scenario itself is not adequately described in order for us to work through its consequences. 
For instance, Saliviati highlights how it is unclear as to whether the thought experiment 
assumes that when the earth vanished, it took gravity with it (which would effect what would 
happen).112 A helpful way of understanding cases such as these is that they involve a violation 
of the thought experiment genre.  
 
112 In Galileo’s Dialogue, we can thus see the type of scepticism that has been directed towards some 
thought experiments in philosophy (Palmerino 2018, 916). For instance, Rescher discusses Putnam’s 
thought experiment in which we are asked to imagine that all domestic cats are actually robots. In 
‘tearing apart what experience…binds together’ (in this case, the biology and the behaviour of a cat), 




Moreover, as Weinberg discusses, our ability to master a genre may not come naturally and 
may take some time and experience with a number of examples within that genre. In teaching 
students how to engage with and criticise thought experiments, there is often some work to 
be done in order to get them familiar with the genre, such as explaining how thought 
experiments work, why they are used, and what are the right and wrong questions to ask about 
the imagined scenario. To discuss a philosophical case, if in response to Thomson’s violinist 
thought experiment someone responded with “you could never attach two people in that way, 
that’s ridiculous!” then it would be clear that they have not mastered thought experiments yet. 
Similarly, to get caught up in the colour of the balls that Galileo drops from the tower would 
be to misunderstand what is key to the thought experiment, and consequently what is an 
appropriate way to evaluate it. In the previous chapter, we saw that Egan argues that unlike 
artworks, thought experiments are evaluated aesthetically. Against Egan, I set out how 
thought experiments are often evaluated aesthetically, but what I do think that Egan gets right 
is that we critically engage with thought experiments based on how well they function in a 
larger argumentative structure. I add that this is part of the convention of their genre. 
We can further understand a literary genre by comparing it other genres. The first genre I will 
consider is speculative fiction, and then I’ll turn to fables and parables.  
 
6.5.2 Speculative Fiction 
Cameron (2015) offers an account of speculative fiction as moral and metaphysical thought 
experiment. Unlike works of say, realist fiction, speculative fiction as a genre describes 
worlds that depart radically from our own and are not constrained by the history of our world. 
In creating such “extreme worlds”, relevant features can be isolated and exaggerated. 
Cameron gives the example of Orwell’s 1984, and compares it with works of realist fiction 
that also depict totalitarianism. Works of speculative fiction can ‘aim at, and to varying 
degrees be successful at, distilling the essence of what it is to be focused on in a way’ (ibid., 
33). And in some cases, a work of speculative fiction ‘is truly fantastical but at the same time 
very simple, so that pretty much every feature of the imagined society is there as the result of 
its being a comment on totalitarianism’ (ibid.). This therefore echoes Egan’s characterisation 
of thought experiments in which each of the concrete particularities presented ultimately 
“stand in” for an element of a more abstract problem or phenomenon. Whereas, Cameron 




totalitarianism in the same way; such works necessarily situate their depiction of 
totalitarianism within a social-historical context. In this case, within Stalinist Russia (ibid., 
32).  
Another work of speculative fiction that can be considered is Le Guin’s The Left Hand of 
Darkness first published in 1969 which Le Guin herself described, in the 1976 introduction 
to the book, as a thought experiment comparable to those in the scientific realm such as 
Schrödinger’s cat. The novel explores the question: What would society look like in the 
absence of a presumed male-female gender binary? Le Guin states that the thought 
experiment’s purpose is not predictive, in that it is not a commentary on what gender could 
be like in another world, but rather, its role is to ‘describe reality, the present world’. She goes 
on to say that in the ‘thought-experimental manner proper to science fiction’ the work 
describes ‘certain aspects of psychological reality in the novelist’s way, which is by inventing 
elaborately circumstantial lies’ (1976, 3). Despite being set on an alien planet, and therefore 
asking us to imagine a world far-removed from our own in many respects, we are presented 
with certain features and personalities that we are familiar with and can thus latch onto. 
The novel describes Genly Ai’s time spent on the planet Gethen where the inhabitants are 
genderless. The novel is more than an exploration of gender. It is also lauded for its 
descriptions of the harsh conditions of an extreme winter, its exploration of loyalty and 
betrayal and experiences of isolation and alienation, as well as its non-linear structure, 
amongst other things. But it is at least in part a study of this question, and this is clearly an 
intended aspect of the work.  
Furthermore, works of speculative fiction are critically evaluated (again, at least partly) in 
light of how well they explore certain questions. This mirrors Egan’s discussion of how 
thought experiments in science and philosophy are evaluated based on how well they serve 
the broader argumentative structure that they are a part of. For example, there has been 
criticism centered around the use of “he/him” pronouns in The Left Hand of Darkness which, 
it is argued, effects the success of the novel as an exploration of a society in which gender is 
eliminated and hence, its success as a thought experiment. Le Guin agreed, and later published 
another story also set on Gethen in which she changed the pronouns to “she/her”, although 
never adopting “they/their” which arguably would have been a better choice. Similarly, there 
is criticism due to the fact that the gender of the inhabitants of Gethen is determined by their 




the ‘book drives you to question all of our assumptions about male and female bodies, it never 
raises any questions about how gender shapes us independently of our biological sex’ (Anders 
2019).  
This indicates that we should be careful when selecting our points of comparisons when 
discussing the aesthetic and literary qualities of thought experiments; some literary fictions 
will be more relevant than others. Furthermore, this has implications for Egan’s view 
regarding the types of more abstract reasoning literary fictions will prompt. As already 
mentioned, the relation between aesthetic and cognitive value in art is very much an alive 
debate in philosophy of art. Consequently, there will be opposition to Egan’s claim that when 
engaging with literary fictions in general, we do not need to have more general reflections 
beyond the particularities presented in the work. Egan’s own example, of gaining pleasure 
from an Austen novel without reflecting on say, class and marriage and so on, will be 
contentious. Someone could of course greatly enjoy the story of the novel without grasping 
its thematic content, but it is plausible that such an engagement would count as a failure to 
fully appreciate the work. Similarly, someone could gain pleasure from reading 1984 or Left 
Hand of Darkness by appreciating the events told in the story and the formal features of the 
work and so on, without reflecting on totalitarianism or gender. And we could even gain 
pleasure from, say, a weird and wonderful thought experiment without grasping its thematic 
or scientific content.  
So I have doubts about Egan’s examples and his view regarding the proper appreciation of 
literary works in general. But I do agree with him insofar as the value (cognitive and/or 
aesthetic) of, say a work of Austen, or Morrison’s Beloved to use my example, does not lie in 
the way in which they are similar to a thought experiment. However, I do not think this 
extends to all artworks. In particular, 1984 and The Left Hand of Darkness, insofar as they are 
an exploration of totalitarianism and gender, have cognitive value in virtue of the way they 
function as thought experiments.  
 
6.5.3 Fables and Parables  
Another form of literary work that provides a useful comparison to thought experiments are 




‘Between the North Wind and the Sun, they say, a contest of this sort arose, to wit, 
which of the two would strip the goatskin from a farmer plodding on his way. The North 
Wind first began to blow as he does when he blows from Thrace, thinking by sheer 
force to rob the wearer of his cloak. And yet no more on that account did he, the man, 
relax his hold; instead he shivered, drew the borders of his garment tight about him 
every way, and rested with his back against a spur of rock. Then the Sun peeped forth, 
welcome at first, bringing the man relief from the cold, raw wind. Next, changing, he 
turned the heat on more, and suddenly the farmer felt too hot and of his own accord 
threw off the cloak, and so was stripped.  
Thus was the North Wind beaten in the contest. And the story means: “Cultivate 
gentleness, my son; you will get results oftener by persuasion than by the use of force”’ 
(from Hunt 2009, 370).  
As with literary works and thought experiments, fables and parables such as this focus on 
examples of concrete objects and events. Like thought experiments, they are not merely a 
short fictional story, nor are they simply an articulation of a viewpoint, but are written with a 
purpose to convince or explain something to the reader. In this case, the fable’s moral is that 
persuasion is superior to force. Further, the characters and objects in a fable are idealised and 
depart from their real world counterparts and yet importantly make the scenario relatable. The 
situations are simple, they are not situated in a certain historical context or geographical 
location, and the conclusion is intended to be generalised in order to apply to a broader range 
of cases than depicted in the example. At the same time, although their relation to literature 
is contentious, their style is clearly literary rather than that of abstract argumentation. 
In the scientific context, Cartwright (1991, 2010) has drawn parallels between models 
(including thought experiments) on one hand, and fables and parables on the other. She argues 
that fables ‘transform the abstract into the concrete’ in a way that is comparable to models in 
physics. She states that ‘the relationship between the moral and the fable is like that between 
a scientific law and a model’ (1991, 57). As Cartwright explains, in order to find a conclusion 
that is true in both the model or fable and in other cases beyond the particulars in the described 
scenario, we may have to “climb up the ladder of abstraction”, that is, express the conclusion 
or the moral in more abstract terms. We generalise the result of Galileo’s falling bodies 
thought experiment beyond the particularities of the case, that is, we take the result as applying 




Cartwright further argues that the relation between the moral and the fable (or a model/thought 
experiment and its result) is ‘that of the general to the more specific’ and that the moral is 
“fitted out” by the fable. That is to say that, ‘the moral describes just what happens in the 
fable; but the fable fits it out in a special way—a way true to the moral but not necessarily 
shared by all cases of which the moral is true’ (2010, 26-27). The “fitting out” of the moral 
of the superiority of persuasion over force is done in a particular way in the example above, 
that is, through the comparison of the wind’s forceful blow versus the sun’s patient approach. 
In another case, the fitting out of the abstract moral will be “fitted out” in a different way, and 
the sun and the wind will be irrelevant. So too for the use of the tower and the falling balls in 
Galileo’s thought experiment. In this sense, then, Cartwright is appealing to the distinction I 
introduced above; that is, the difference between the thematic (or scientific) content of a 
thought experiment and the particular way in which that content is expressed through the 
narrative. 
A key difference between parables, such as the good Samaritan, and fables such as Aesop’s, 
that Cartwright highlights in her later work, is that the former do not typically have the moral 
or lesson “built in”. Instead, defending a view of what the parable shows involves 
interpretative work, including attending to other parts of the text in which it is presented, as 
well as how the world operates. Cartwright argues that many of the highly idealised models 
utilised in physics and economics are more like parables than fables in this sense:  
‘A variety of morals can be attributed to the models, expressed in a variety of different 
vocabularies involving abstractions of different kinds and at different levels. 
Importantly, these morals can point in different directions, implying opposite 
predictions for the real-life situations to which we want to apply them’ (2010, 21).  
In the previous section, we saw how the interpretation of thought experiments can vary; 
different theoretical commitments alter the conclusions drawn from the example, and that 
there can be debate around what exactly a certain thought experiment shows. In Cartwright’s 
terms, the moral of a thought experiment or parable is not part of the parable or thought 
experiment itself. Rather, further work needs to be done to show which “ladder of abstraction” 
must be climbed to reach the result that can be generalised.  
We can see, then, that there are connections between the ways in which thought experiments 
and fables/parables and works of speculative fiction explore certain questions as well as 




the author, and do not object to them on the grounds that they are “unrealistic” because they 
involve say, imagining the wind and the sun as having agency, or animals that can speak, or 
a lack of air resistance and so on. There is a shared convention to how we engage with these 
stories. We recognise that they have an intended aim or moral. Additionally, the role of their 
formulation and particular elements is similar. In each case, they are carefully chosen to 
effectively convey their more abstract message that can be generalised beyond the scenario 
given. This in turn guides our engagement with and critical evaluation of them.113  
In one sense, thought experiments can be more straightforwardly compared with fables and 
parables than with speculative fiction in that they are more simply intended explorations of 
certain ideas and questions, whereas works of speculative fiction have other features that go 
into their evaluation as highlighted above. Another way in which thought experiments and 
fables and parables differ from speculative fiction can be seen by attending to our affective 
responses. Weinberg (2008) highlights how we conduct philosophical thought experiments in 
a “cool” manner which means that we do not have the kind of affective responses typically 
associated with our engagement of literary fictions. It would be odd (or at least not part of an 
appropriate engagement) to feel a sense of sadness for the violinist’s illness in Thomson’s 
thought experiment. Similarly, it would be odd to feel a sense of injustice for the shivering 
man in Aesop’s fable because he is subject to a competition between the sun and the wind, 
for example.114 More generally, it is evident that membership in a certain genre impacts our 
affective responses to a work. Take for example the ways in which we might respond to death 
and misfortune with amusement when watching black comedies, compared to our response to 
similar events in dramas. As Peterson (2018) discusses, feeling sad at the end of Dr. 
Strangelove would be to overlook the point of the film, which is dictated, at least in part, by 
its inclusion within a particular genre. 
And so, considering the way in which we conduct thought experiments in a “cool” manner 
indicates that they are more like fables and parables than speculative fictions in one respect. 
However, in another sense, thought experiments are more similar to literary works (including 
speculative fiction) than fables and parables. Like great works of literature, thought 
 
113 Weatherson (2010) has also discussed this connection between fables, thought experiments and genre 
on his blog, under ‘surveys and thought experiments’. 
114 Although we can highlight that at least for some, part of the persuasiveness of Thomson’s violinist 
might lie in our feelings of distress and so on that occur when we imagine waking up and finding 
ourselves in that position. I won’t say anything about affective responses with regards to scientific 
thought experiments, although see Todd (2017, 2020) for a discussion of aesthetics, imagination and 




experiments are described as “profound” or “deep” (as we saw in chapter 5). Thought 
experiments are invoked to realise or communicate something that might have otherwise been 
difficult to comprehend or access, and they can offer surprising and novel insights. Whereas 
the case of fables and parables often seem to provide a message that is already known (albeit 
repackaged in a succinct and often elegant way) rather than contributing anything new of 
cognitive value. Consequently, there are various dimensions along which we can explore the 
connections between thought experiments and other literary genres. 
In this section, I have argued that a discussion of the comparisons between thought 
experiments and literary works would benefit from a more careful selection of literary cases. 
Further to this, there are other elements from the artistic realm that can be brought to bear on 
(scientific) thought experiments, namely genre conventions and how membership in a genre 
affects our engagement with fictional scenarios.  
 
 Conclusion 
The previous chapter ended with a dilemma for aesthetics of science. This was the problem 
that either aesthetic language in science is being used in a merely metaphorical way (and what 
is really being tracked are epistemic features) or the aesthetic language is literal, but such 
values are not useful in science. In this chapter, I have set out to solve this dilemma. I have 
characterised an aspect of the aesthetics of science which is currently overlooked in the 
literature; the interrelation between form and content. This offers a novel and promising way 
of defending the role of aesthetic features in science without reducing them to epistemic 
features. This is because an appropriate fit between form and content is a source of aesthetic 
value that can contribute to understanding through aiding our formation of useful imaginings, 
and can increase the demonstrative force of scientific thought experiments. The account I 
have developed also has the benefit of showing how aesthetic values in science can be 
compared with the aesthetic evaluation of artworks as the way in which artworks express their 
content via their formal features is a basis of their aesthetic appreciation. In light of this, I 
returned to some of the comparisons made between thought experiments and works of 
literature. While I agree that there are significant differences that ought to be attended to, and 
that not all works of literature are like thought experiments, I hope to have shown that part of 
the value of scientific thought experiments in scientific practice includes the qualities that 






In this chapter, I will sum up the focal points of my thesis and indicate some future avenues 
of research that this project opens up.  
 
Summary 
This project began with an outline of the debate that shapes the literature on thought 
experiments. This contrasts Norton’s argument view with Brown’s platonist account. Both 
of these views are concerned with what is called the “puzzle” of thought experiments, that 
is, the question of how thought experiments can increase our knowledge of the world. In this 
thesis, I set out to show how a closer look at the imagination in thought experiments allows 
us to explore their value beyond the narrow confines of a Norton/Brown dichotomy in order 
to consider the use of thought experiments in scientific practice. In doing so, we realise that 
we do not need to commit to a platonist view of thought experiments if we want to maintain 
that there are severe limitations to a position that reduces thought experiments to arguments. 
At the same time, I aimed to show how focusing on thought experiments can illuminate the 
role of scientific imagination more generally in science. Thought experiments are a good 
starting point for an analysis of the scientific imagination as they rely on our imaginative 
faculties and are an accepted part of scientific practice.  
My aim in the first part of the thesis was to get clearer on the sense in which thought 
experiments can be considered experiments in the imagination. Currently, the issue 
regarding thought experiments and ordinary, physical experiments has been primarily 
concerned with whether or not the two can be placed on a continuum. I argued that this is 
largely down to a matter of emphasis—we either focus on the features that they share (such 
as the method of variation) or we focus on ways in which they differ and hence, argue that 
thought experiments are something else (for example, arguments). In light of this, I drew on 
a parallel debate on computer simulations in science which can further the discussion 
surrounding the epistemic status of thought experiments compared with that of physical 
experiments. In the first chapter, I outlined how, against Hacking, thought experiments also 
have a “life of their own”. Thought experiments can evolve in order to become more suited 
to their purposes, thought experimental results can be “robust” in the sense that they 
withstand changes in the theoretical realm and further, thought experiments can precede 




over computer simulations and I argued that these can also be carried over to thought 
experiments. This is because, like computer simulations, they do not intervene on the world 
and instead can be said to explore hypothetical scenarios. The first of these arguments is the 
materiality thesis which states that there is a crucial difference between the object-target 
relation in an experiment compared with that in a computer simulation; experiments are 
materially continuous with their target, whereas computer simulations lack this “shared 
ontology”. While this view may be compelling, it ultimately fails. This is because there are 
difficulties in pinning down how far one system can be said to be materially similar to 
another and further, there are instances in which the relevant similarity between object and 
target is not of a material kind. The outcome of this was that materiality does not always 
matter. Hence, experiments cannot be automatically privileged for this reason.  
I then turned to the argument from surprise which states that computer simulations do not 
have the capacity to surprise in the way that physical experiments can. We saw that Morgan 
(2003, 2005) distinguishes between mere surprise and confoundment, and argues that 
experiments only can achieve the latter. Confoundment can be characterised as “productive 
surprise” (Currie 2018) because it can force scientists to revise their theories in a 
fundamental way. The reason why only experiments can confound, according to Morgan, is 
related to the materiality claim; as physical experiments capture the part of the world that 
the scientist is ultimately interested in, the scientist is not in complete control over the 
experiment’s results. Whereas in a computer simulation, scientists are working with 
something that they themselves programmed and ultimately retain control over.  
While surprise has not been discussed in the context of thought experiments, I set out how 
different views on thought experiments will have different consequences regarding how 
thought experiments generate surprise. Via a comparison with abstract objects in other 
domains, such as mathematical platonism and Popper’s view regarding theories as “World 
3” entities, I demonstrated that on Brown’s view, thought experiments can confound in the 
same way as experiments. On Norton’s view, we saw that thought experiments can still 
productively surprise, but this is in a different way than experiments. This is because thought 
experiments (and computer simulations) involve inference rather than genuine discovery. 
Finally, I demonstrated that attending to the role of the imagination in thought experiments 
shows how thought experiments can productively surprise in a distinctive way. Thought 
experiments, like computer simulations and arguments, “probe” our existing knowledge, but 




steps from the initial set up of the scenario. Through the example of Galileo’s falling bodies, 
I argued that there is a certain “freedom” to our imagination which allows for a source of 
surprise that is disruptive but cannot be captured as argumentative reasoning.  
The upshot of chapter 1 and 2 was that we need to get a clearer idea of the function of the 
imagination in thought experiments. This was my core aim in the second part of the thesis.  
In chapter 3, I gave an overview of attitudes surrounding imagination in science. While there 
has been scepticism regarding the imagination as a tool for learning (both in science and 
more generally), which can be at least in part explained by the imagination’s link with 
creativity, more recently, philosophers of science have recognised that it is an important tool 
in science that cannot be dismissed as merely part of the context of discovery. In particular, 
there is a set of views that argue that models have important similarities with artistic fictions 
and our engagement with each relies on our imaginative capacities. Some of the most 
prominent versions of these accounts have drawn on Walton’s (1990) account of 
representation as “make-believe”. While models’ imaginary status has received a great 
amount of attention, there is a crucial question that has been for the most part overlooked: 
What is the nature of the imagination in science? 
We saw that many have equated the imagination with mental imagery, that is, an objectual 
form of imagination. I then set out ways in which we should broaden the notion of 
imagination to also include the propositional imagination. A recent proposal that has 
furthered the discussion of the type of imagination in science argues that other views have 
been wrong to assume the imagination consists in mental imagery. Furthermore, they argue 
that mental imagery is neither a sufficient nor a necessary form of imagination in the 
scientific domain. Rather, it is the propositional imagination only that has import in science. 
This view is presented by Salis and Frigg (2020) and they argue that it avoids some of the 
scepticism directed towards imagination in science. I argued that Salis and Frigg are correct 
to bring the propositional imagination into the picture. However, they are too quick to 
dismiss the objectual imagination, and further, we should be cautious when extending our 
analysis of the imagination in modelling directly to thought experiments. 
In chapter 4 I developed a new pluralist view of the nature of imagination in thought 
experiments. In light of the uncertainty surrounding which forms of imagination will be 
“necessary” for the conduct of a thought experiment, I argued that we should instead consider 




imagination do they invite? On my view, we cannot take one example and generalise to all 
other cases of thought experiments. Instead, we need to consider a variety of thought 
experiments and the role they play in science. I set out two examples of thought experiments 
that I think a Salis-Frigg analysis gets right; they merely invite the propositional imagination 
and any mental imagery experienced would be superfluous to the conduct of the example. 
However, I then consider examples in which we are asked to do more than consider a set of 
propositions. By drawing on De Regt (2015, 2017), I discussed how imagining via mental 
imagery can contribute to scientific understanding, and I argued that this might vary 
depending on who is conducting the thought experiment or who the example was designed 
for. Further, there are cases of thought experiments that involve spatial reasoning and many 
thought experiments are presented alongside images which work as aids to our imagination 
as in the case of Stevin’s chain. To end, I emphasised that we should not see our imagination 
as being restricted to either a propositional or an objectual type. Rather, these different forms 
of imagination can work together in order to allow us to conduct a thought experiment 
successfully.  
The final part of the thesis turned to aesthetics, and I developed a new approach to the 
aesthetics of science that incorporates the significance of the imagination in thought 
experiments. In chapter 5, I outlined the connections that have been drawn between thought 
experiments and works of literary fiction. The cognitive value of literature has been defended 
through comparing literary works with thought experiments; each ask us to engage in 
fictional scenarios and if the latter can lead us to new insights about the world, then so can 
the former. The proposed similarities between thought experiments and artworks in part 
motivated my view that we ought to include thought experiments in our accounts of 
aesthetics of science. This literature currently focus on theories and mathematical proofs. 
But thought experiments are also often evaluated by scientists and philosophers using 
aesthetic terminology. While the comparisons between artworks and thought experiments 
are persuasive, I set out some important differences that have been used to undermine the 
connections drawn between the two. For example, thought experiments are always part of a 
larger, argumentative structure whereas literary fictions are not; thought experiments are 
ultimately about something more generalisable than the particulars of the case, whereas we 
are not required to engage in the more abstract themes of a work of fiction; finally, the 
interpretation of thought experiments is fixed more firmly than in the case of literary works. 




The thought is that either aesthetic terminology is being used in a metaphorical sense (and 
really tracks epistemic features). Or scientists’ aesthetic evaluations are genuinely aesthetic, 
but such values do not form an important part of science. 
In chapter 6, I set out a new way of considering aesthetic values in the scientific domain. I 
outlined views in aesthetics that argue that a source of aesthetic pleasure in artworks has to 
do with the relation between the overarching content of a work (the purpose of a work or the 
point that the work expresses) and the way in which it is formulated. In drawing on some 
existing work concerning the way in which formulations matter in science (Vorms 2011), 
especially when we attend to the interactions between the representation and its user, I 
outlined how the fit between form and content in thought experiments plays a significant 
role in its usability in science. To do this, I discussed two examples from Darwin. Each of 
these aim to demonstrate the explanatory power of the theory of natural selection (hence, 
there are similarities in their content) but the way in which they are formulated helps explains 
the success of one (the eye thought experiment), and the failure of the other (Darwin’s 
“monstrous” whale). I argued that appropriate fit between form and content enhances the 
accessibility of a thought experiment scenario, and hence its usefulness as a prompt for our 
imagination as well as playing a role in effectively communicating some idea or theory. 
Finally, I came back to some of the comparisons between thought experiments and works of 
literary fiction. I utilised a distinction drawn in the philosophy of art—between an 
interpretation and a description of a work—to complicate the view that interpretations of 
scientific works are “fixed” in a way that artistic fictions are not. Further, going back to 
chapter 1, I demonstrated how thought experiments can indeed be interpreted in different 
ways, and that this can even form part of their presentation in science. Finally, through 
accounts of genre in philosophy of art, including how membership in a genre can affect our 
engagement with a work, I argued that some of the disanologies between thought 
experiments and literature can be responded to by being more selective in the artistic works 
that we use as a comparison. In particular, thought experiments, and our evaluation of them, 
is similar to that of speculative fiction as well as fables and parables. I hope to have shown 
that there are fruitful analogies to be drawn between scientific and artistic representations 







To end, I will indicate some other areas of enquiry that can be pursued with the aid of the 
arguments developed in this thesis.   
Firstly, as previously mentioned, surprise has not received much attention in the philosophy 
of science. My discussion of thought experiments and the imagination has already indicated 
that Morgan’s (2003, 2005) distinction between mere surprise and confoundment does not 
capture all there is to say about surprise and its value in the scientific realm. This opens up 
other ways to consider surprise in science. One possible avenue is to consider Dutilh 
Novaes’s work on mathematical proofs. What is especially fruitful about this account for the 
topics explored in this thesis is that she links surprise with aesthetic values. In her dialogic 
account of mathematical proofs, she states that a deductive proof ‘corresponds to a dialogue 
between the person wishing to establish the conclusion (given the presumed truth of the 
premises), and an interlocutor who will not be easily convinced and who will bring up 
objections, counterexamples, and requests for further clarification and precision’ (2019, 74). 
Most proofs are not actual dialogues and so Dutilh Novaes describes them as “fictive 
interactions” in the sense that they reproduce ‘multi-agent communicative scenarios’ (ibid., 
76). Further, she argues that ‘one of the main functions of deductive proofs (then as well as 
now) is to produce persuasion, in particular what one could call explanatory persuasion: to 
show not only that something is the case, but also why it is the case’ (ibid, 74).  
Dutilh Novaes claims that surprise in mathematical proofs also results in pleasurable 
aesthetic feelings. Crucially, she argues, such pleasure increases the mathematician’s 
conviction regarding the proof in question, increasing its persuasiveness by eliciting positive 
affective responses towards it (ibid.). Whether or not a dialogic approach works well for 
proofs, it does appear to carry over well to thought experiments, granted of course that unlike 
Dutilh Novaes’s interest, these go beyond deductive reasoning. Thought experiments are 
often used to convince as well as to increase knowledge and understanding. In some cases, 
they are presented as dialogues (as in Galileo’s writings) whereas in others, we can appeal 
to the notion of “fictive interactions” and think about how thought experiments are typically 
engaged with and analysed. A further research topic is thus one which combines the value 
of the psychological sense of surprise that Dutilh Novaes highlights for mathematics with an 
exploration of the ways in which scientific thought experiments are formulated so as to bring 
about such feelings. In particular, this would require a closer look at the social aspects of 




presented in the thesis that we need to attend more carefully to the context in which a thought 
experiment is used.  
A crucial aim of my project was to get clearer on both the nature of the imagination in 
science, and on the comparisons between thought experiments and other more obviously 
aesthetic artefacts, namely, works of literary fiction. In developing my pluralist account of 
the imagination in science, I raised ways in which the limitations of mental imagery (used to 
undermine the fiction views of models) do not appear to apply to the case of thought 
experiments. While I did not say much more on the imagination in modelling, I suspect that 
my pluralist account can also apply in their case. Models form a hugely diverse group and 
my view can act as a framework within which we can consider the ways in which the 
imagination will also vary in their case, in accordance with different types of models. For 
example, one helpful point of comparison might be some cases of “toy models”. These are 
very simplified and highly idealised representations of their targets and they investigate a 
small range of causal or explanatory factors (Reutlinger et. al. 2018, Nguyen 2019).  
While theoretical models may not be so straightforwardly visualisable as in the case of (at 
least most) thought experiments, and some models may only invite a propositional form of 
imagination, I also discussed how the objectual and propositional imagination can interact 
in the conduct of a thought experiment. This can also be applied to models. For example, we 
can consider the ways in which we imagine a model system via a mental image, then within 
this, we draw certain conclusions regarding the behaviour of the system via the propositional 
imagination. As a consequence, a fruitful question to consider is which instances of models 
will rely more on the objectual imagination and why. As with thought experiments, I expect 
this to vary with the function of the model and may be particularly apparent in cases in which 
a model is used to increase understanding.  
A further dimension that could be added to my pluralist account comes from considering the 
use of not only theoretical, but physical models. In chapter 4, I demonstrated how external 
pictures can be used with a thought experiment. Not only can they aid us in imagining the 
scenario correctly, but we can mentally manipulate the static image in our imaginations in 
order to consider how it can change as we reason through the thought experiment scenario. 
A feature of physical models such as those used in chemistry that Toon (2012) discusses is 




investigate the properties of molecules in a kind of ‘imagined analogue’ of the way in which 
we discover the properties of normal, everyday objects’ (ibid., 129).  
Finally, while I anticipate that the account of aesthetics in science that I have outlined will 
be a promising defence of aesthetic value across the board in science, an obvious starting 
point for the extension of the view (given the typical presentation of thought experiments) 
would be to consider other areas in which narratives are used in science. In particular, it 
would be fruitful to compare my view with those that discuss narratives and narrative 
explanations in science such as in modelling (Morgan 2012), computer simulations (Wise 
2011) and the historical sciences (Currie and Sterelny 2017) As Morgan and Wise explain, 
‘for some scientists, or at some sites of science, narrative works to create coherence between 
a variety of different elements that otherwise do not appear to hang together, but do need to 
be made to fit sensibly together whenever an investigator recognises that they are all 
elements that belong to the phenomenon to be described or explained’ (2017, 1-2). They go 
onto state that presenting the same information in an argument form or as ‘theory-led 
description’ would be less advantageous; ‘all too often theories are too thin to cover the 
problem or the ground and the answering account requires the construction of something like 
a mosaic’ (ibid.). This thus chimes with my account in chapter 6 on how we can represent 
content in different ways, but some will be more fitting than others. Furthermore, there may 
be a further connection to be made to philosophy of art, with regards to accounts of narrative 
understanding in literary works in which the function of narratives in coherence making is 
also emphasised (Barwell 2009).  
In a couple of places throughout the thesis, I called on some examples of thought experiments 
in philosophy. But I am yet to consider the beauty of philosophical thought experiments 
compared with scientific ones, nor have I said anything about how the appropriate fit 
between form and content may be a source of their aesthetic value that can contribute to their 
epistemic value. The use of thought experiments in philosophy is more of a contentious issue 
than in science (for a classic criticism, see Wilkes 1988). Something to consider would be 
the ways in which their aesthetic features and narrative form can be part of how they can 
lead us astray; such features can be seductive and hence, contribute to the force of misleading 
examples. One potentially helpful comparison comes from William’s “The Self and the 
Future”. Williams outlines two different presentations of the same thought experiment, the 
different presentations yield different judgments of the scenario. In light of this, it would be 




role in persuading us even when a closer analysis reveals that they are based on faulty 
reasoning. Further, it would be interesting to consider whether the nature of the imagination 
that the example invites plays a role in such instances. And so, the fruitfulness of the 
imagination and the value of aesthetics in scientific thought experiments and other areas of 
practice may simultaneously be possible source of errors. This relates to Levy’s comments 
regarding metaphors in science for which, compared with more “direct” forms of 
representation, there is also a potential danger ‘for the model or metaphor to be overapplied, 
reified, or otherwise taken “too seriously”’ (2020, 295). This is an interesting question and 
my pluralist account, as well as my proposal for an source of aesthetic value in science, 
including my outline of the thought experiment genre and its conventions, provides the tools 
to begin diagnosing where such features can go wrong and hence, lead us astray.  
Therefore, the core components of my thesis surrounding thought experiments and the 
scientific imagination—the way in which thought experiments can surprise, the pluralist 
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